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Abstract
The theory of schematism was initiated by I. Kant, who, however, was never precise
with respect to what he understood under this theory. I give—based on the theoreti-
cal works of Kant—an interpretation of the most important aspects of Kant’s theory
of schematism. In doing this I show how schematism can form a point of departure
for a reinterpretation of Kant’s theory of knowledge. This can be done by letting the
concept of schema be the central concept. I show how strange passages in, say, the
first Critique are in fact understandable, when one takes schematism serious. Like-
wise, I show how we—on the background of schematism—get a characterization of
Kant’s concept of ‘object’. This takes me to an analysis of the ontology and episte-
mology of mathematics. Kant understood himself as a philosopher in contact with
science. It was science which he wanted to provide a foundation for. I show that, con-
trary to Kant’s own intentions, he was not up-to-date on mathematics. And in fact, it
was because of this that it was possible for him to formulate his rather rigid theory
concerning the unique characterizations of intuition and understanding. I show how
phenomena in the mathematics of the time of Kant should have had an effect on him.
He should have remained more critical towards his formulation and demarcation of
intuition, understanding and reason.
Finally I show how D. Hilbert in fact gives the necessary generalization of Kant’s
philosophy. This generalization provides us with a general frame work, which func-




Denne afhandling handler om skematisme, som er en teori, der påbegyndes af I.
Kant. Kant var aldrig helt præcis med hensyn til, hvad han forstod under denne
teori. Baseret på Kants teoretiske værker giver jeg en fortolkning af de vigtigste
dele af Kants skematisme, og jeg viser, hvorledes skematisme giver anledning til en
nyfortolkning af Kants erkendelsesteori ved at lade begrebet være det centrale begreb.
Således viser jeg, hvorledes mærkværdige passager i f.eks. den første Kritik kan gøres
forståelige, når Kants teori om skemaerne tages alvorligt. Jeg viser ligeledes, hvordan
vi på baggrund af skemaerne får karakteriseret Kants begreb om ‘objekt’, hvilket
leder frem til en analyse af matematikkens ontologi og erkendelsesteori. Kant så sig
selv som en filosof i kontakt med videnskaberne. Det var videnskaberne han søgte
at fundere med sin erkendelsesteori. Jeg viser, hvorledes han desværre var tidsligt et
stykke bagefter med hensyn til matematikken. Dette førte ham til at formulere sin
noget rigide teori angående den entydige og endelige karakterisering af anskuelsen
og forstanden. Jeg viser, at fænomener i matematikken, som den så ud på Kants tid,
burde have fået Kant til at forholde sig mere kritisk i forhold til netop sin formulering
af anskuelse, forstand og fornuft.
Endelig viser jeg, hvorledes D. Hilbert faktisk giver en generalisation af Kants
filosofi. Denne generalisation giver anledning til formuleringen af en generel ramme,




In contemporary philosophy of science there is a renewed interest in Kant’s theory of
knowledge and his philosophy of science. One of the reasons for this is the compre-
hensive work done by Michael Friedman which has prompted a variety of responses.
The present thesis can also been seen as a reaction on Friedman’s work on Kant. I
was introduced, through Friedman (1992), to Kant’s notion of schematism in geome-
try. Now, by reading the Critique of Pure Reason I became acquainted with that fact
that Kant claims to have a theory of schemata, not only for geometry, but for all the
concepts of the understanding—pure as well as empirical. As it was clear to me, that
the theory of schemata could provide an alternative understanding of Kant, it became
a goal to get a deeper understanding of it. But also other interests motivated me.
Today, within the philosophy of mathematics, there is also a growing interest in
the use of diagrammatic reasoning. Euclid is paradigmatic in this respect—some find
the reasoning style used by Euclid highly problematic, others do not. Kant belongs
to the latter category. Euclid uses diagrams throughout Elements and Kant wants to
give an account of and a foundation for this kind of reasoning. With Kant’s theory
of schematism follows a notion of schematic construction in pure intuition—and this
is precisely Kant’s device when providing an epistemological frame work for Eu-
clid’s reasoning. Schematic reasoning is not exclusively about justification, nor ex-
clusively about discovery in mathematics—it is generally about the whole reasoning
process which the mathematician makes from discovery to justification. Mathemati-
cal schematic reasoning is not in particular about mathematical proofs, it is generally
about mathematical thinking.
I have not written this thesis for the sake of writing history, rather it is for the sake
of understanding what mathematics really is about. Understanding Kant’s schema-
tism is on my path. Nevertheless, for an understanding of schematism I need to use
and produce elements from history of science and history of philosophy. On the other
hand I will also use theories and concepts from contemporary philosophy and math-
ematics in order to get something meaningful out of Kant’s schematism. We need to
interpret Kant’s theory of schemata, as Kant does not present a clear, nor a detailed
theory; rather he outlines some remarkable and very fruitful ideas. But these ideas
are much in need of elaboration. I am interested in understanding Kant’s theory of
knowledge, not for the sake of history, but for the sake of truth. Thus this thesis
should be read as a thesis on philosophy of mathematics, not as a thesis on history of
philosophy. In consequence of this I allow myself to use notions and concepts which
were not know at the time of Kant.
Chapter 1 and 2 treat my interpretation of Kant’s schematism. The former of the
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two chapters shows how the geometrical schemata and Euclid’s postulates go hand
in hand. The geometrical schemata are the part of Kant’s schematism which is best
explored in the literature. In this thesis, this chapter on the geometrical schemata
functions mostly as an introduction to schematism and the central notions of schema-
tism such as types, tokens and rules. Chapter 3 is on the schematism of the pure
concepts of quantity. I show how Kant operates with both a concept of a particular
number and a concept of a schema determining the properties of numbers. A particu-
lar number, to Kant, signifies unity in a collection of objects falling under a concept.
The unity that the collection can posses is, that by counting the elements of the col-
lection we reach a finite number just in case we can judge the collection to be a unit.
I furthermore show that numbers are not determined extensionally. Rather they are
determined by a schema—an intensional element.
Chapter 3 and 4 deal with the relations between space, schemata, geometry and
the notion of object. It has always been difficult for me to understand the following
words: “Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude” (B40). I also show
in chapter 6 that also Hilbert and Bernays had difficulties here. As it turns out, my
interpretation of the arithmetical and geometrical schemata as presented in chapter 1
and 2 actually provide a framework for an understanding of Kant’s concept of infinity.
Geometrical schemata need a space to exercise in; a space which is unbounded. How
unbounded is the space? Well, it is in-finite in the sense that no magnitude can be
ascribed to space. In chapter 4 I elaborate on an observation due to Carl Posy. It
is well-known that according to Kant all objects are completely determined, in the
sense, that given any object x and any predicate P, then either P(x) is true or false.
Posy (1995) observes that this is expressible by the following first order formula:
∃y(y = x) → P(x)∨¬P(x).
I note that it is not quite clear to which language this formula belongs. In elaborating
on the formula I provide a class of modal models which (semi-)validates a modalized
version of Posy’s formula.
I chapter 5 I critically discuss Kant’s philosophy of mathematics, and I generalize
some of his notions in order to incorporate some of the new elements which have been
discussed and introduced in mathematics since the time of Kant. This leads me to:
Chapter 6. In this chapter I outline a relation between Kant’s general theory of
knowledge and Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics. Through Kantian schematism
we will reach a notion of constructibility in pure intuition. In fact this notion charac-
terizes Kant’s notion of ‘mathematical object’. But as it turns out, such a notion is to
narrow. This insight was realized by Hilbert who generalized the concept of ‘math-
ematical object’ by introducing ideal elements. I show how the the pair, schema
xi
and so-called quasi-schema, can fully describe Hilbert’s finitary and ideal parts of
mathematics, respectively. I furthermore hope the reader can see that my analysis of
schematism founds an outline of a general philosophy of mathematics which I present
by the end of chapter 6.
I will assume that the reader is familiar with the central notions of Kant’s phi-
losophy such as intuition, understanding, pure concepts, reason, ideas and regulative
principles.
When making references to Kant I refer to the standard German edition of Kant’s
works, Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German)
Academy of Sciences, Georg Reimer, later Walter de Ruyter & Co., 1900– , Berlin.
For the first Critique I use the standard pagination referring to the first and the second
edition; the translation of this work is due to P. Guyer and A. W. Wood (Kant; 1998).
Unless stated otherwise, remaining translations are my own. When I refer to chapters
or sections in Kant’s work, like the chapter presenting schematism in the first Critique
I use: Schematism; but when I refer to the element schematism in Kant’s theory I use:
schematism.
I wish to acknowledge my great debt to my supervisor Professor Stig Andur Ped-
ersen. He introduced me several years ago to logic and philosophy and to a very
fruitful, I think, view on mathematics. I have had enormous benefit in discussing
these things with him.
I also want to thank Frederik Voetmann Christiansen and Claus Festersen, who
read drafts of some of the chapters. Thanks also to Torben Bräuner who provided a
reference, which turned out somewhat important. Thanks also to Thomas Bolander
and Vincent F. Hendricks for discussing some of the logical things with me.
It is, however, my family that I am most grateful towards. Especially Anne Dorte
supported me constantly, and gave me the space and time that I (apparently) needed—
though it was tough by the end. By that end it probably sounded pretty odd when I
kept saying “I am 95 percent done”.
Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüth mit immer neuer und und zunehmender
Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nach-
denken damit beschäftigt: der bestirnte Himmel über mir und das
moralische Gesetz in mir. (Ak. 5, 161)
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CHAPTER 1
Kant and Geometrical Schematism
1.1 Introduction to Schematism
The first chapter of the second book in the Transcendental analytic is entitled “On
the schematism of pure concepts of the understanding”. This important chapter is not
a long chapter—it makes up 11 pages of the whole Critique which constitutes 883
pages in the second edition. Although the chapter is short the content is very central
in Kant’s theory of knowledge: Schematism explains how concepts and sensibility are
connected and the chapter is therefore at the heart of Kant’s synthesis of rationalism
(Leibniz–Wolff) and empiricism (Locke). Given these facts, it is not surprising how
difficult and condensed the text is. When reading the chapter for the first time, one
gets the impression that it is a careless writer, not knowing precisely what he wants
to say.1 The wonder does not diminish when realizing that nothing is changed in the
second edition.2 Kant made substantial notes in his own copy of the first edition, but
none of them found their way to the second edition. In my view this is a peculiarity,
but I am not the first to be puzzled:3
His [Kant’s] doctrine of the schemata can only have been an af-
terthought, an addition to his system after it was substantially complete.
For if the schemata had been considered early enough, they would have
overgrown his whole work. (Peirce; 1.35)
Whether an afterthought or not, the doctrine does not appear early in Kant’s writ-
ings. According to P. Guyer and A. W. Wood the first mention of schematism is
around 1779/80 (Ak. 18, 220).4 The next is from the period immediately following
1Kant writes, for instance: “The schema of actuality is existence at a determinate time.”
(A144/B184). This is stated without any further indication of how this should be seen as a transcenden-
tal schema which generally is understood as a universal rule for transcendental time-determination.
2Except for two things: In the running header “the Categories” changes to “pure concepts of under-
standing”, and then an “is” is missing in the first edition (A145).
3E. Shaper (1964-65, 270) puts it like this:
The opaqueness and obscurity of the Schematism chapter—the chapter which Kant him-
self thought to be one of the most important pieces of the Critique, and to which Hegel
paid tribute as being among the finest pages of the entire Kantian oeuvre—has often
been—stressed with undertones ranging from wonder to irritation. From among the ear-
liest statements we recall F. H. Jacobi’s assessment of schematism as “the most wonder-
ful and most mysterious of all unfathomable mysteries and wonders” [. . . ], and Schopen-
hauer’s characterization of schematism as a curiosity “which is famous for its profound
darkness, because nobody has yet been able to make sense of”.
4See their commentary to the Critique (Kant; 1998, 728).
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the composition of the first edition of the Critique (Ak. 18, 267-68). And interest-
ingly, there is a late note (Ak. 18, 685-87) from the end of 1797 where Kant summa-
rizes: “The Schematism is one of the most difficult parts. – Even Mr. Beck could not
understand it. I think this chapter is one of the most important chapters”.5
I think Kant was aware of the incompleteness of the chapter when he wrote that
the schematism is “a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations
we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty.”
(A141/B180–1) And further down the page: “Rather than pausing now for a dry and
boring analysis of what is required for transcendental schemata of pure concepts of
the understanding in general, we would rather present them”.
The Schematism is deeply connected with the so-called figurative synthesis (syn-
thesis speciosa) as introduced in § 24 of the Deduction in the second edition of the
Critique. Now, what seems to be missing in the Critique is a general discussion of
that ability of the mind which the figurative synthesis designates. This discussion is
apparently left out due to its general dryness and boredom. The philosophical litera-
ture of today is still in need of a detailed, thorough and careful interpretation of the
source of schemata in Kant’s theory of knowledge, which is deeply connected with
an analysis of the figurative synthesis and more generally the transcendental imagi-
nation. Such an interpretation requires that, especially a) the B-deduction is analyzed
with respect to the synthesis, and that b) the general role of imagination in Kant’s
thinking is taken into account. Such a project is not within the scope of this text.6
I will rather analyze and interpret what, especially, the geometrical and arithmeti-
cal schematism consist of. This will be of the highest importance for the complete
interpretation of the Kantian notion of schematism and his concept of figurative syn-
thesis. Fortunately, these two types of schemata form the most accessible parts of
Kant’s theory of schemata.
1.2 What Schematism is generally about
The Analytic has three very important parts: The Deduction, the Schematism and
the Principles. All three of them concern the relation between (pure) concepts and
sensibility. Roughly it can be said, that the Deduction shows (or is intended to show)
that there is harmony between the pure concepts of the understanding and the way
appearances are given. This harmony ensures that appearances can be cognized under
categories. The Schematism shows (or is intended to show) how the appearances are
subsumed under categories. The Principles show (or are intended to show) what the
general conclusions to be drawn are.
5Jakob S. Beck was a disciple of Kant.
6But see (Longuenesse; 1998) concerning a) and (Gibbons; 1994) concerning b).
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But in fact the Schematism concerns the connection between concepts and sensi-
bility more generally; it is not only about the schematism of the categories but about
schematism of:
1. Empirical concepts,
2. Pure sensible (i.e., geometrical) concepts,
3. Pure concepts of understanding.
I treat the schematism of empirical concepts in section 1.4, the geometrical concepts
in section 1.6 and the schematism of the categories of quantity are analyzed in chapter
2.
As a first definition of schema Kant writes: “Now this representation of a general
procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image is what I call the
schema of this concept” (A140/B180–1). Any concept has a schema associated and
such a schema constructs and/or reflects on mental images in accordance with rules.
The images are necessary for subsuming appearances under concepts as the schema
is a “general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object”
(A140/B179). This is exemplified in the case of the geometrical schemata, which are
put on a par with mathematical axioms:
Now in mathematics a postulate is the practical proposition that contains
nothing except the synthesis through which we first give ourselves an
object and generate its concept, e.g., to describe a circle with a given
line from a given point on a plane; and a proposition of this sort cannot
be proved, since the procedure that it demands is precisely that through
which we first generate the concept of such a figure. (A234/B287)
The schema which is associated with a geometrical concept makes the very concept
possible in the first place: “We cannot think of a line without drawing it in thought,
we cannot think of a circle without describing it” (B154). In this way, our capacity for
producing images by means of schemata can be seen as a transcendental condition
for knowledge and objective representation. As schemata and axioms are two sides of
the same coin it does not make sense for Kant to talk about uninterpreted formulas of
mathematics which can either be true or false depending on a particular interpretation.
Kant writes: “On axioms. These are synthetic a priori principles, insofar as they are
immediately certain” (A732/B760). In saying this, “certain” is certainly not to be
understood as being true in some model-theoretic sense—rather it is to be understood
as “correctness”; correct axioms describe human procedures which make concepts
possible in the first place.
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Schemata are a mediating “third thing” (A138/B177) preventing that situations
where “[t]houghts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”
(A51/B75). This mediating element is providing concepts with images which in turn
provide concepts with meaning. Although a theory of language with a modern dis-
tinction between intensional and extensional semantics is not to be found in the Cri-
tique, Kant’s theory of schemata is an anticipation of work found in for example
Frege. “Thus the schemata of the concepts of pure understanding are the true and sole
conditions for providing them with a relation to objects, thus with significance [Be-








1.3 What Schematism is to account for
As we know, Kant wants to formulate a theory of knowledge in which we find an
account for the possibility of the synthetic a priori. In particular, Kant is of the
opinion that “mathematical judgments are all synthetic” and “a priori” (B14-15). But
more ambitiously, Kant also intends to give an account of human thinking in general.
In answering both of these question Kant understands how important and central
mental images are for cognition. The empiricists, such as Berkeley and Locke, were
definitely aware of the epistemological significance of mental images.7 But Kant is
the first to view images relatively to schemata.
An image, according to Kant, is not to be confused with the schema. Rather
than being singular, the schema is a general procedure. Schemata are rule-governed
operations and they provide and/or reflect on images. In doing this the schemata
make it possible for objects to be subsumed under concepts. We will see below, that
this general idea—schemata being responsible for the construction and reflection on
images—is seen as a foundation for geometrical concepts. Thus, the geometrical
concepts are ultimately founded on two things: Firstly, they are grounded in space as
a form of intuition, and secondly, they are made possible by the transcendental imagi-
nation through schemata. See chapter 3 for a detailed analysis on the epistemological
interplay between geometrical schemata and space.
7The neo-Kantian Harald Høffding (1905, 200) formulates this position in a rather precise way:
“We cannot think without images [. . . ] Every thought, be it as abstract and sublime as it may supposes
images”.
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The role of the transcendental imagination in connection with geometrical con-
cepts is, however, more complicated than just described. As we saw above, we “can-
not think of a line without drawing it in thought”. Here Kant not only means that
images, or the production of images, are necessary, he also means that by thinking a
concept (line) of outer sense, we must also produce an inner representation (which
happen to be an image) of the concept. It is the relation between inner and outer
which is interesting here. Representations are part of our inner life, and as such
they are given—and can only be given—in time; the inner sense. Thus it seems that
geometrical concepts are made possible through the transcendental imagination by
way of time. But the relation between inner and outer is in this respect symmetrical:
When Kant in fact introduces the figurative synthesis in §24 in the B-deduction—in
the section where talks about drawing lines—it is also postulated that “we cannot
even represent time without [. . . ] drawing a straight line (which is to be the external
figurative representation of time)” (B154). Thus it seems that pure temporal concepts
are made possible by spatial concepts. The figurative synthesis is the central ingre-
dient for this and the schemata are—as we shall see—the explanation of how it can
be possible. But note, how the transcendental imagination (here represented by the
figurative synthesis) is the connection between inner and outer. This is one of the
very important consequences of this synthesis that I will explore in this chapter.
1.3.1 Schemata in mathematics
In mathematics and in geometry, in particular, schemata play an indispensable role
according to Kant.
Philosophical cognition is rational cognition from concepts, mathe-
matical cognition that from the construction of concepts. But to con-
struct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding
to it. For the construction of a concept, therefore, a non-empirical in-
tuition is required, which consequently, as intuition, is an individual
object, but that must nevertheless, as the construction of a concept (of a
general representation), express in the representation universal validity
for all possible intuitions that belong under the same concept. Thus I
construct a triangle by exhibiting an object corresponding to this con-
cept, either through mere imagination, in pure intuition, or on paper, in
empirical intuition, but in both cases completely a priori, without hav-
ing had to borrow the pattern for it from any experience. The individual
drawn figure is empirical, and nevertheless serves to express the con-
cept without damage to its universality, for in the case of this empirical
intuition we have taken account only of the action of constructing the
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concept, to which many determinations, e.g., those of the magnitude of
the sides and the angles, are entirely indifferent, and thus we have ab-
stracted from these differences, which do not alter the concept of the
triangle. (A713–4/B741–2)
It is precisely the schematism which puts Kant in a position where he can account for
the mentioned characteristic properties connected with the the mathematical method:
Constructibility of mathematical concepts—of which constructibility of mathemati-
cal objects is seen as a special case; inference to the general from the singular; and
necessity of mathematical propositions. Kant is serious when he says that we can con-
clude universal statements, even though we have only examined a particular instance;
and even more problematic: This instance can be given to us as an empirical figure.
By the end of the 19th century a mathematician such as M. Pasch rejected the use of
diagrams in geometry. Diagrams, it was claimed, could be very useful in the context
of discovery, but one should never rely on them when proving theorems. In fact he—
and also Hilbert—turned towards a linguistic conception of proofs as sequences of
sentences, in which diagrams seemed to play no role. Moreover, they were both of
the opinion that when investigating the mathematical science called geometry only
the highest rigor was sufficient—and, perhaps therefore, the mathematician should
avoid thinking of the meaning when proving theorems: “[I]f geometry really has to
be deductive, then the deduction has to be completely free of any form of [reference
to] meaning [Bedeutung] of the geometrical concepts, and likewise independent of
figures. Thus, we will acknowledge only those proofs in which one can appeal step
by step to preceding propositions and definitions” (Pasch; 1882/1926, 90). Hilbert
(1902b, 602) was also skeptical to the use of diagrams: “One could also avoid using
figures, but we will not do this. Rather, we will use figures often. However, we will
never rely on them.”8 But Hilbert’s standpoint on this is not as simple as one would
think on the face of it. I will return to this in section 1.6.6.
One of the reasons why a certain skepticism towards the use of diagrams was
expressed was probably due to a discovery by K. Weierstraß announced in 1872.9







is continuous on the whole of R but nowhere differentiable. This is a counterexample
to the idea which arises when one draws continuous functions by hand. When do-
8The translation of Hilbert is due to Paolo Mancosu (2005, 15).
9The result was published by du Bois Reymond (1875, 29).
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ing this it seems evident that any continuous functions is smooth, i.e., differentiable
except at isolated points.
Despite the problems (which I will come back to in section 1.6.5) Pasch and
Hilbert seem to find in the use of diagrams we, nevertheless, find Kant in a position,
where he claims that in fact we can use diagrams (intuitions) as an essential and
reliable part of mathematical arguments. We see that the problems Kant wants to
solve with his theory of schemata are not minor problems.
I hope to show in this chapter that Kant is actually approaching an analysis of
what can be seen as the type–token distinction. And in doing this I hope to be able to
give an explanation of why I take, for instance, the following argument to be a proof
of:




We argue for the case where n = 5:
The diagram shows 1 + · · ·+ 5 placed in a square with area 5 · 5. To get 1 + · · ·+ 5
we divide the area of the square by 2 and add half of the elements on the diagonal.
Therefore:










From the diagram it is seen that nothing special about the number 5 is used, thus the
proof will apply to any number.10
1.3.2 Schemata for pure concepts of the understanding
It might be the case that Kantian claims about geometrical schemata, such as drawing
lines in thought, seem awkward. But the claims about transcendental schemata are
worse. Here a “transcendental time-determination” figures prominently:
10The example is found, for instance, in (Brown; 2005, 64). Interestingly, Brown writes “The simple
moral I want to draw from this example is just this: We can in special cases correctly infer theories
from pictures, that is, from visualizable situations. An intuition is at work and from this intuition we
can grasp the truth of the theorem.” This sounds very much like Kant at A713/B742. Note, however,
that Brown sees his own position as ‘full-blooded Platonism’; a term which can hardly be said to
characterize Kant’s position.
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Now a transcendental time-determination is homogeneous with the cat-
egory (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is universal and rests on
a rule a priori. (A138–9/B178–9)
The central aspects are (again) universality, rules and a prioriness, but now supple-
mented by time-determination. Transcendental schemata are of special interest to the
philosophy of mathematics, as “number” is the schema for the category of quantity.
Precisely this very fact, that “number” is a transcendental schema has as a conse-
quence that for a mathematical theory of numbers “there are nevertheless no axioms”
(A164/B204). Today this sounds odd, and is in any circumstance in contrast with the
situation within geometry where there certainly are axioms according to Kant.
In the following I give an interpretation of Kant’s theory of schemata. As already
mentioned, Kant operates basically with three different kinds of schemata: These
are labeled 1) empirical schemata, 2) geometrical schemata, and 3) transcendental
schemata. What they have in common is the following: The schemata are a product
of the transcendental imagination, and they are responsible for production of and
reflection on images. The images are necessary when objects in our experience are
subsumed under concepts. In all three kinds, the schemata can be seen as essential for
the type-token relation. I will, however, emphasize the geometrical and arithmetical
schemata.
1.4 Empirical schematism
Although Kant’s chapter on schematism is entitled as a chapter on the schematism of
pure concepts, there are several examples of the schematism of empirical concepts.
Now, empirical concepts are a posteriori concepts and they are as such derived from
the contingent experience we may have of, say, dogs. The concept of a dog is a col-
lection of so-called marks (Merkmale),11 and as the concept is not pure this collection
may vary among humans. Typically we would, however, tend to think of a dog as an
animal which has four feet (and is inclined towards barking). But we are not able to
refer to anything, unless the concept is used together with its schema. When this is
the case, then:
The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my imag-
ination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general, without
being restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers me
of any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto. (A141/B180)
11See page 60 for an my analysis of the intension and extensions of Kantian concepts.
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Here we are introduced to (what seems to be) the more simple aspects of the the-
ory. The schema of dog is a procedure by which the imagination can produce a
paradigmatic mental image, which functions as a prototype or a representative ex-
ample giving me a figurative representation of a typical dog.12 By using this I can
think of a dog (as such) even though no dogs are present, and when there is a dog
present I can subsume this animal under my concept dog, since I find the character-
istics (the marks) to be present in the dog, because of essential similarities between
the dog and my mental image of a dog in general. I can compare dogs, and I can
count collection of dogs. Kant uses this example, I think, as an introduction to the
more complicated parts of schematism. On the face of it, the empirical schemata
may all seem unproblematic and straight-forward. But I think there is more to it. The
problem is that, according to Kant, empirical concepts are dynamical, since “empir-
ical concepts cannot be defined at all but only explicated”, where “to define properly
means just to exhibit originally [ursprünglich] the exhaustive concept of a thing with
its boundaries” (A727/B755). Therefore, to give a definition of the concept “dog”,
would be to give a priori (originally) the necessary and sufficient characteristics for
objects to be subsumed under dog. But empirical concepts are derived from experi-
ence and thus different persons may understand different things under the concept.
Thus it seems problematic to require universality of empirical schemata. Another,
though related, problem in this connection seems to be, in the words of Mary Tiles
(2004, 127) that “any empirical object will have more specificity than is contained in
the schematic image”. As a consequence of this it follows that empirical objects are
not—and cannot be—determined by the schematic rule. Thus the empirical schema
does not characterize uniquely the reference.13 As images referring to empirical ob-
jects are essential for transcendental schemata I will come back to this problem in
section 2.1.
1.5 Euclidean reasoning: The challenge for geometrical schemata
There is no doubt that Kant has a special interest in geometry. And in connection
with the theory of schemata this is particularly clear. I think there are three reasons
for this.
The first reason: The challenge from mathematics. Kant understands mathe-
matics and mathematical knowledge as based on constructions taking place in time.
12Thus Kant’s theory of schemata are a clear predecessor of a contemporary theory of prototypes
found in cognitive psychology as given by Rosch.
13Therefore there is a conflict between empirical schemata and Frege’s “sense”. In Frege’s theory
“sense” should determine uniquely the reference.
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Therefore mathematics is synthetic. Moreover, the propositions of mathematics are
necessary, therefore a priori. Simultaneously, Kant aims at giving a general account
of human knowledge and here the sciences play a central role. So Kant’s theory
intends at being a framework for understanding the human activity of science. Math-
ematics is a special kind of science: The objects are in a certain sense non-empirical;
nevertheless mathematical knowledge is synthetic. Thus, Kant wants to develop a
theory in which we are ‘guaranteed’ that there really are meaningful mathematical
objects, fulfilling the criteria concerning constructibility and necessity. The theory of
schemata is a basic pillar in explaining this.
The second reason: The possibility of abstract concepts. Kant’s more general
problem is to explore the possibility of subsuming objects under concepts. If Kant
can explain how geometrical concepts, such as triangle, ‘function’ then, perhaps, he
can lift this to a general theory of the relation between concepts and objects? In fact,
I think this is Kant’s strategy
The third reason: The source of schematism. As a Kantian unification of the
two foregoing I find it most likely that Kant got the idea about schematism from
his studies of Euclid. Lisa Shabel sharpens this claims by saying that Euclidean
reasoning through diagrams “provides an interpretive model for the function of a
transcendental schema” (2003a, 109).
As evidence for the third reason let me mention that Kant frequently lectured on
Euclidean geometry, and that he was well-trained in Euclidean reasoning. Having this
in mind it seems reasonable that his insights from Euclidean geometry inspired him,
at least, for chosen the term “schema”. When looking up the Greek word “Schema”
in Liddell & Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon, one the the possible meanings are “geo-
metrical figure” with reference to—not surprisingly—Aristotle.
1.5.1 Reasoning style in Euclid’s Elements
Euclid’s Elements comprises 13 books with content ranging from basic plane geom-
etry, over arithmetic and incommensurables to solid geometry. A list of definitions,
postulates and common notions open Book I. Whereas the postulates and common
notions remain the same throughout the 13 books, each of the subsequent books add
new definitions to this list. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a full survey
of the type of reasoning used in Elements. For the purpose at hand it suffices to give
representative examples. I will give an analysis of the proof of proposition 32 from
Book I.14 I.32 claims that the three interior angles of any triangle equal two right
14Below I will refer to propositions and definitions by X .Y , where X is the number of the book and
Y the number of the proposition/definition in that book. Proposition 13 from Book I, for instance, is
referred to as “proposition I.13”. When it is clear from the context whether it is a proposition or a
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angles. In modern terms, that the sum of the angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees.
Let me begin by stating the postulates (Euclid; 1956, 154–155):15
POSTULATES.
Let the following be postulated:
1. To draw a straight line from any point to any point.
2. To produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line
3. To describe a circle with any centre and distance.
4. That all right angles are equal to one another.
5. That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior
angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight
lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the
angles less than the two right angles.
The first three postulates concern constructions of objects and it is commonly taken
that those are the objects that can be constructed with a straightedge and compass.
Thus these postulates can be seen as construction-axioms. An important feature of
the objects which are constructible is that only finite objects are constructed: Given
two points a line of finite length can be constructed, and given any centre and any
(finite) distance a circle with a finite area can be constructed.
The fourth and the fifth postulate can be seen as structural axioms, making Eu-
clidean geometry special. The fourth, for instance, guarantees invariance of right
angles. And given we have notions of “smaller than” and “greater than” the fourth
postulate puts us in a position where we can recognize the situation given in postulate
5, (where the two interior angles are less than two right angles), and thus postulates
that if we extend the two lines far enough they will meet. Note again the finitary
attitude expressed: If a certain state of affairs occurs, then if we extend the two lines
continuously then the extensions will meet after construction in a finite amount of
time. A figure illustrating the postulate is:
definition I will refrain from specifying this.
15The objects that the five postulates are about are defined in the 23 definitions presented just before
the postulates. Definition I.1 says for instance: “A point is that which has no part” and I.2: “A line is a
breadthless length”. Furthermore, we learn in I.3 that: “The extremities of a line are points”.
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Let us now take a look at proposition I.32 and its proof as given in (Euclid; 1956):
PROPOSITION 32.
In any triangle, if one of the sides be produced, the exterior angle is equal
to the two interior and opposite angles, and the three interior angles of
the triangle are equal to two right angles.
Let ABC be a triangle, and let one side of it BC be produced to D;
I say that the exterior angle ACD is equal to the two interior and op-
posite angles CAB, ABC, and the three interior angles of the triangle
ABC, BCA, CAB are equal to two right angles.






Then, since AB is parallel to CE , and AC has fallen upon them, the alter-
nate angles BAC, ACE are equal to one another. [I. 29]
Again, since AB is parallel to CE , and the straight line BD has fallen
upon them, the exterior angle ECD is equal to the interior and opposite
angle ABC. But the angle ACE was also proved equal to the angle BAC;
therefore the whole angle angle ACD is equal to the two interior and
opposite angles BAC, ABC.
Let the angle ACB be added to each;
therefore the angles ACD, ACB are equal to the three angles ABC, BCA,
CAB.
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But the angles ACD, ACB are equal to two right angles; [I. 13]
therefore the angles ABC, BCA, CAB are also equal to two right angles.
Therefore etc.
The use of diagram is already seen in the formulation of the proposition. Here the
angles are classified as either interior or exterior. These terms cannot be understood
unless one uses the diagram—“exterior” and “interior” are only defined implicitly
through diagrams. Now, the diagram of I.32 depicts what we are given: a triangle
ABC. But more is shown in the diagram. Out of the given triangle we construct line
BD by postulate 2. The extremity of any line is a point, thus D is constructed and
exists. Furthermore, due to I.31 a line CE can be drawn parallel to AB. I.31 is, in
turn, proved by appealing to postulate 1 and 2 and propositions I.23 and I.27, and
the construction taking place in this proof is also visualized by a diagram (as all the
proofs in Elements generally are).
The diagram used in the proof of I.32 shows properties about line CE which can
only be inferred by use of the diagram: From the text we do not know the direction
in which the construction of CE goes. But from the diagram we see that it is drawn
upwards and thus splits ACD in two angles ACE and ECD. Euclid’s fifth common
notion states that “[t]he whole is greater than the part”—but it is through the diagram
we learn what the whole is (ACD) and what the parts are (ACE and ECD).16
Now that we have determined relations between the lines and we know what is
interior and exterior we see—due to proposition I.29—that BAC and ACE are equal
(in size). In fact this is the only non-obvious part of the proof. And I.29 is proved—
through a diagram—by appealing essentially to postulate 5 and I.15 (which relies
I.13 and postulate 4).17
The rest of the proof of I.32 is more elementary in character: We apply common
notions and I.13 which says that “If a straight line set up on a straight line make
angles, it will make either two right angles or angles equal to two right angles”
(Euclid; 1956, 275).
The reasoning style used by Euclid is very rigorous and in consequence of this
it is natural to view Euclid as the founder of the axiomatic-deductive method. As a
16The other four common notions in (Euclid; 1956) are:
1. Things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another.
2. If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal.
3. If equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal.
4. Things which coincide with one another are equal to one another.
17Of course common notions (1 and 2) are also used in the proof of I.29.
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result of this it is perhaps also natural to require that he should conform to only the
strictest contemporary standards. But the picture is, however, not that simple. On a
first reading it looks as if (almost) every step is justified by appeal to postulates, or
common notions or previously proved propositions. But as seen above from the proof
of I.32 diagrams are used in an essential way. In my understanding of the reasoning
style used by Euclid I tend to agree with Shabel when she writes:
[Euclid] offers a list of definitions and common notions that, properly
understood, help us to read information off of diagrams constructed in
accordance with the postulates [. . . T]he diagrams enable the reasoning
of the demonstration by warranting deductive inference. Crucial steps in
common Euclidean derivations are taken by virtue of observations made
on the bases of a diagram. (Shabel; 2003a, 38)
This is of course not the same as to say that diagrams are necessary when prov-
ing geometrical theorems. In fact the schematic reasoning more generally concerns
mathematical reasoning as such, not only in connection with justification, but also in
the general mathematical reasoning-process. Mathematics and its working-process
concerns both proofs and discoveries and diagrammatic reasoning is a cornerstone in
the mathematical process.
Euclid’s reasoning through diagrams has been—within the context of
justification— criticized for its “many deficiencies” (Kline; 1972, 1007). One of
the claimed problems is that Euclid is relying on unjustified continuity assumptions.
According to the contemporary understanding of geometry which originates in Pasch
(1882/1926) (see page 6) one should only use diagrams on the heuristic level. This
was a part of the whole foundational ‘project’ by the end of the 19th century to elim-
inate essential use of diagrams in proofs.
An instance where continuity seems to be needed is in the very first proposition
I.1: “On a given finite straight line to construct an equilateral triangle” (Euclid;
1956, 241). Euclid’s proof goes like this: Given any line AB construct a circle with
center A and radius AB (postulate 3). Likewise construct another circle with center B
and radius AB. The circles cut in C, and CA and CB can be constructed (postulate 1).
By construction18 it follows that ABC is the required triangle.
18And by definition 15 and common notion 1.




It could happen that A and B have rational coordinates (0,0) and (0,1), re-
spectively and C would therefore have (1/2,
√
3/2) as coordinates. Now, we could
view the Euclidean postulates as axioms not associated necessarily with any specific
model—thus with no fixed reference. Then, it could (perhaps) be argued that a model
having only Q2 as domain would make the Euclidean postulates true. As
√
3 /∈ Q it
follows that the non-existence of C is consistent with the postulates. The existence of
C does therefore not follow from the postulates, and Euclid is accordingly not war-
ranted in claiming its existence. A criticism along these lines was stated by Pasch
(1882/1926, 44–5). The first obvious objection to this argument is that it is rather
doubtful that Q2 should exhaust the points constructible by the postulates. But I will
raise two other and more principle objections to the Paschian criticism.
The first bear on the general project concerning the development of the axiomatic
method and the rigorization of mathematics in the 19th century. This development
led to new views on the methodology of mathematics, one of them being—in a rough
and ideal form—the formal method of mathematics: Mathematics is written in an
uninterpreted language which can have several different models. This methodology
has two important consequences. The formal method allows—for instance in the case
of Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie—for a study of new structures, which can
only be studied through the axiomatic method. I will elaborate on this in section 1.6.6.
The other consequence is of course the rigor accompanying more formal methods.
Thus Pasch writes, that “we will acknowledge only those proofs in which one, step
by step, only refers to preceding theorems and definitions” (Pasch; 1882/1926, 45).
This idea—which ultimately is the idea of mathematics done in an uninterpreted
language, where theories allow for a variety interpretations in different models—is a
thought very remote for Euclid and Kant. They do not want to separate mathematics
from the models—as they have only one model in mind. Thus the method used by
Euclid is not the same as the method used by Pasch and Hilbert—and is not intended
to be either.19 See section 1.6.6 for more details in this respect.
19This observation is in turn also an objection to the so-called “model-interpretation”. According to
this interpretation one understands non-Euclidean geometry as a confirmation of Kant’s epistemology. It
follows from Kant’s considerations in regard to the modalities that consistency does not imply existence.
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Shabel (2003a) has raised another objection. She claims that Euclid understands
a circle as a disc. This follows from three of Euclid’s definitions: Definition I.13 says
that a “boundary is that which is an extremity of anything”, and definition I.14 that
a “figure is that which is contained by any boundary or boundaries”—note the use of
“contained”. And finally, definition I.15: “A circle is a plane figure contained by one
line such that all straight lines falling upon it from one point among those lying within
the figure are equal to one another” (1956, 153). In consequence of his understanding
of a circle, Euclid constructs in the proof of I.1 a disc with center A from the given
AB. Likewise he uses B and AB to construct the second disc. As seen in the diagram,
this construction implies that the two discs have a non-empty intersection, which
itself is a figure because it is contained in both circles. The boundary of the new
figure is given by the boundary of the first circle which is contained in the second
circle and the boundary of the second circle contained in the first. The boundary of
the intersection is therefore constructed out of two partial circumferences created in
accordance with postulate 3. These two curved lines have extremities. One of them
is C. Thus, when Heath writes in his commentary that “Euclid has no right to assume
[. . .] that the two circles will meet in a point C” (Euclid; 1956, 242), I think he puts it
wrongly: Euclid does not assume that the point exists, rather he constructs the point.
There are other criticisms of Euclid such as the use of the so-called “principle of
superposition” (that objects can be moved through space for purposes of comparison,
e.g., proposition I.4), but it is beyond the scope of this text to analyze this.20 Another
criticism is that Euclid has no proper theory of order,21 but as indicated above, the
diagrams—at least partially—take care of this.
It is, however, interesting that in her interpretation Shabel (2003a, 21–28) goes
through (equivalents of) the different groups of axioms for Euclidean geometry as
provided by Hilbert (1902a)—axioms of connection, order, parallels, congruence,
and continuity—and shows how the interplay in Euclid’s geometry between defini-
tions, common notions and construction through diagrams in accordance with the
postulates can be seen as warranting all the axioms of Hilbert. Thus Euclid was
not necessarily sloppy or inattentive to the finer details of geometry, but—to quote
“That in such a [sensible] concept no contradiction must be contained is, to be sure, a necessary logical
condition; but it is far from sufficient for the objective reality of the concept” (A220/B267–8). Thus
the existence of consistent non-Euclidean geometries does not present a problem, it just shows that
Euclidean geometry is not logically necessary—although it is the only really possible geometry, being
the only correct model of our spatial intuition. Also Friedman (1992, 100–104) argues against this
interpretation—but for other reasons.
20See (Shabel; 2003a, 29–34) for a discussion.
21C.F. Gauss complained for instance about this (Kline; 1972, 1006); but also—according to Fried-
man (1992, 56)—“Russell, who habitually blamed all the traditional obscurities surrounding space and
geometry—including Kant’s views, of course—on ignorance of the modern theory of relations”.
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Shabel:
That they were not expressed as axioms at the outset of Book I of the Ele-
ments should not lead us to conclude that Euclid failed to recognize nec-
essary axioms, nor that he left them wholly implicit; instead we should
come to realize that he did not see his project as foundational in the
modern sense. The foundation of Euclid’s project lies in the systematic
use of the diagrams constructed and understood in accordance with his
definitions, postulates and common notions. (Shabel; 2003a, 28)
1.6 Geometrical schematism
References to Euclidean geometry are found throughout the Critique. Let me give
some examples.
In a letter to Schütz of 25 June 1787 Kant writes (Ak. 10, 489) that he was think-
ing of proposition I.5 when he—in the introduction to the second edition (Bxi-xii)—
wrote about the mathematical method Thales used when he “demonstrated the isosce-
les triangle”. And the triangle was one of Kant’s favorite examples. In the Aesthetic
(A24/B39) proposition I.20 is written out almost verbatim, and in the section Ax-
ioms of intuition (A164/B205) it is clear that Kant is thinking of proposition I.22. A
final example; on A716/B744 Kant mentions proposition I.32—which also happens
to be Aristotle’s favorite illustration of geometry.22 I will come back to the two lat-
ter examples. Moreover, Kant continuously mentions the first three postulates23 or
paraphrasings hereof.24 Common notions are mentioned; as analytical propositions
(B16–17; A64/B204–05). What I want to stress by mentioning this, is that it is pre-
cisely the Euclidean way of reasoning that Kant wants to give an account of and a
foundation for. He does this by his schematic construction in pure intuition. There-
fore, there is more than a grain of truth in Leibniz’s comment on I.1 which according
to Kline is: “Leibniz commented that Euclid relied upon intuition when [proving
I.1]” (Kline; 1972, 1006).
Kant wants to give this account because, this is how he understands what he took
to be the most important mathematical discipline. Moreover, the Euclidean model of
construction provides a general model for Kant’s notion of constructibility.25
22See Heath commentary on page 320 in (Euclid; 1956).
23But only the first three(!)
24See (A24/B39; B154; A163/B204; A234/B287; A239/B299; A261/B317; A300/B356;
A511/B539; A716/B744).
25As was perhaps first observed by Hintikka (1967).
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1.6.1 Constructibility and schemata
It is “schemata that ground our pure sensible concepts” (A140/B180). This grounding
is deeply connected with the so-called “construction of concepts”. What it means
to “construct a concept” is expressed by Kant on pages A713–4/B741–2 (see page
5 for the full citation). Here we learn that to construct a concept means to construct
in accordance with rules a non-empirical intuition, which should represent the con-
cept universally. The production of the intuition can be done either purely by the
imagination (the figurative synthesis) or it can be a figure drawn on paper. In the lat-
ter case the empirical intuition functions as a symbol which refers by analogy to the
pure intuition.26 The universality of the image results when the particular image is
taken together with the procedure generating the image. Such a procedure is deeply
connected with the Euclidean style of reasoning:
Give a philosopher the concept of a triangle, and let him try to find out
in his way how the sum of its angles might be related to a right angle.
He has nothing but the concept of a figure enclosed by three straight
lines, and in it the concept of equally many angles. Now he may reflect
on this concept as long as he wants, yet he will never produce anything
new. He can analyze and make distinct the concept of a straight line,
or of an angle, or of the number three, but he will not come upon any
other properties that do not already lie in these concepts. But now let the
geometer take up this question. He begins at once to construct a triangle.
Since he knows that two right angles together are exactly equal to all
of the adjacent angles that can be drawn at one point on a straight line,
he extends one side of his triangle, and obtains two adjacent angles that
together are equal to two right ones. Now he divides the external one of
these angles by drawing a line parallel to the opposite side of the triangle,
and sees that here there arises an external adjacent angle which is equal
to an internal one, etc. In such a way, through a chain of inferences that
is always guided by intuition, he arrives at a fully illuminating and a the
same time general solution of the question. (A716–7/B744–5)
Geometrical knowledge evolves in precisely the manner that we have seen the
production of mathematical knowledge in Elements. Here Kant explicitly refers to
the proof of Euclid’s proposition I.32. The geometer constructs a triangle. But he
already knows something in advance, namely (a generalization of) proposition I.13.
Therefore he constructs in accordance with postulate 2 an extension of one of the
26In consequence of this I adopt the use of “symbolic reference” as used by Mary Tiles (1991).
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lines. Then he divides—a construction validated by proposition I.31—the external
angle, and so on. But it “is always guided by intuition” by the construction of an
image (purely mental or empirical with symbolic reference to the pure image) in
accordance with some basic postulates, definitions and common notions; after wards
discoveries are realized through the constructed image.27 Then a ‘general solution’
can be found. I will treat the problem concerning universality in section 1.6.3. Here
I concentrate on what precisely the schemata are.
Kant seems to claim that any meaningful concept has a schema. For instance,
“[t]he schema of the triangle [. . . ] signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination
with regard to pure shapes in space” (A141/B180). So the natural question is: What
does this rule consist of? The schema for the concept “triangle” must be a rule by
which we can construct any (image of a) triangle. Kant writes: “Thus we think of a
triangle as an object by being conscious of the composition of three straight lines in
accordance with a rule according to which such an intuition can always be exhibited”
(A105). And later in the Critique;
“three lines, two of which taken together are greater than the third, a
triangle can be drawn,” then I have here the mere function of the produc-
tive imagination, which draws the lines greater or smaller, thus allowing
them to abut at any arbitrary angle. (A164/B205)
These two quotations show that the “function of the productive imagination” which
Kant is referring to is the function defined in the proof of I.22:
PROPOSITION 22.
Out of three straight lines, which are equal to three given straight lines,
to construct a triangle: thus it is necessary that two of the straight lines
taken together in any manner should be greater than the remaining one.
[I.20]
The proof is of course given by constructing a triangle out of the three given lines
A, B and C, which fulfill the requirement that any two are greater than the remaining
one. The requirement was proved in I.20 to be a property of the collection of the
three sides of any triangle. On a line DE constructed to be long enough (postulate 2)
we construct DF to be equal (in length) to A; we construct FG to be equal (in length)
to B and construct GH equal (in length) to C. This can be done by the procedure
27Thus my interpretation differs from Friedman’s (1992, 90), where it is rejected that intuition “en-
able us to “read off” the side-sum property [in the case of proposition I.32]”. Of course the ‘reading
of’-procedure is not just a simple visual inspection, as Kant also rejects in the case of I.5 referred to on
page Bxi-xii. See section 1.6.3 for an analysis of how the ’reading of’ can yield universality.
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given in the proof of proposition I.3. Now describe two circles with center F and
diameter FD and center G and diameter GH , respectively (postulate 3). The circles
intersect (as seen from the diagram) and thus they meet in K. Connect K with F and









The proof of the proposition depends on proposition I.3 which depends on pos-
tulate 3 and proposition I.2, which in turn depends on proposition I.1. The latter
propositions depend on the first three postulates. Of course common notions and
definitions are also used in the proofs, and additionally properties about order and
continuity must be inferred from the diagrams.
Now, the schema for the concept “triangle” is, according to Kant, a rule-governed
operation which “draws the lines greater or smaller, thus allowing them to abut at any
arbitrary angle” (A164/B205) (postulate 2). Out of these three lines a triangle is
constructed. This construction is with respect to postulates ultimately founded on the
first three postulates. But the schema operation is of course also based on the common
notions, definitions and the more implicit diagrammatic rules as indicated above. The
rule-governed operation producing all triangles must, however, also conform to the
insight expressed in the assumption given in the formulation of I.22: That any two of
the lines are greater than the third. This assumption is necessary according to I.20.28
Let us understand the concept “triangle” as similar to a definition: x is a triangle,
if and only if, x has three lines and the three lines are. . . etc. The concept is like a
(Peircean) type, whereas the individually constructed images are the tokens falling
under the type. The schema corresponding to the concept is, following this line of
thought, a complete method which exhaust the relation between a type and the tokens
28Note, that I.20 is proved by referring, among other things, to the parallel postulates. So, the schema
for the concept “triangle” also contains a notion about parallelism, although I.20 could perhaps be
proved without reference to these postulates.
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falling under that type. By the schema we can construct all triangles, but we can also
decide whether a given figure is a triangle or not, by examining whether it can it be
constructed by the schema. Thus the concept itself is something passive, whereas the
schema amounts to certain active construction procedures.
In accordance with the analysis of the proof of I.22 I think it is reasonable to
interpret Kant in the following way. There are certain geometrical schemata which
are more basic than others. The schema for triangle can, on the one hand, be seen
as founded in basically the first three postulates together with the relevant common
notions and definitions. This must, however, be supplemented with the more implicit
rules used when reasoning through Euclidean diagrams.
Some handwritten notes of Kant from 1790 support my interpretation. They be-
long to the Kant-Eberhard dispute and are notes which were used by Kant’s disciple
Johann Schulze in Schulze’s review of Eberhard’s Philosophisches Magazin. In the
notes Kant writes:29
[I]t is very correctly said [by Kästner] that “Euclid assumes the possi-
bility of drawing a straight line and describing a circle without proving
it”—which means without proving this possibility through inferences.
For description, which takes place a priori through the imagination in
accordance with a rule and is called construction, is itself the proof of
the possibility of the object. [. . . T]hat the possibility of a straight line
and a circle can be proved, not mediately through inferences, but only
immediately through the construction of these concepts (which is in no
way empirical), is due to the circumstance that among all constructions
(presentations determined in accordance with a rule in a priori intuition)
some must still be the first—namely the drawing [Ziehen] or describing
(in thought) of a straight line and the rotating of such a line around a
fixed point [. . . ] (Ak. 20, 410–11)
Thus some schemata are more basic than others: The drawing of a line and the de-
scribing of a circle. These very concepts are made possible only through the fig-
urative synthesis by construction in pure intuition. And so, constructions by rule
and compass are the primary and paradigmatic schematic geometrical constructions.
Here Kant confirms what he writes in §24 of the B-deduction where he introduces
the figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa),30 and later in the Critique:
29The following translation is Friedman’s (2000, 189).
30“We cannot think of a line without drawing it in thought, we cannot think of a circle without
describing it” (B154).
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Now in mathematics a postulate is the practical proposition that contains
nothing except the synthesis through which we first give ourselves an
object and generate its concept, e.g., to describe a circle with a given
line from a given point on a plane; and a proposition of this sort cannot
be proved since the procedure that it demands is precisely that through
which we first generate the concept of such a figure. (A234/B287)
Central to the notion of schematic construction is that the construction is pure.
The construction of, say the geometrical configuration, used for the proof of I.32, is
an ideal construction. The diagram enables and supports the reasoning, but we are
not measuring on the concrete diagram drawn on our paper. Thus the construction
is (our) pure construction and we are not proving an “empirical proposition (through
measurement of its angles), which would contain no universality, let alone necessity,
and propositions of this sort are not under discussion here” (A718/B746), but if we
use an empirical diagram then
in the case of this empirical intuition we have taken account only of the
action of constructing the concept, to which many determinations, e.g.,
those of the magnitude of the sides and the angles, are entirely indiffer-
ent, and thus we have abstracted from these differences (A714/B742).
Therefore, when we construct a geometrical concept a priori we generate an empir-
ical or pure image representing the concept. This image makes it possible for us to
think the concept. But in order to get a concept construction a priori, the image must
be understood together with the rules generating any image of that concept.
1.6.2 Geometry and syntheticity
Geometrical objects are constructible, therefore mathematics is synthetic. The type
of constructibility and constructivism we find in propositions like I.22 and I.32—and
ultimately the constructivism given by the first three postulates when seen together
with diagrams—is paradigmatic to Kant. The geometrical objects are not as such
temporal objects. They belong to outer sense and are therefore spatial and not tem-
poral. A triangle is a pure form, which can be found in experience. Therefore, al-
though the geometrical concepts are constructible, they are not subjective and contin-
gent ideas. To grasp geometrical concepts, however, we need intuitions constructed
by the figurative synthesis—the transcendental imagination. That the methodology
based on concept construction is reliable is due to the fact that the type “triangle” is
connected in a complete and reliable way to its tokens by the schema. Viewed in this
way, mathematics, or at least geometry is a spatio-temporal process made possible
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by the transcendental imagination which mediates between inner and outer. Thus the
inner and outer senses are connected in an essential way, namely by the imagina-
tion.31 Thus our geometrical knowledge is synthetic in the sense that time functions
as a pre-condition—without time we would not have any access to the mathematical
properties.
If the knowledge expressed by, say, proposition I.32 had been analytic then the
philosopher could have analyzed the three concepts (or rather the “angle”, “line” and
the number “three” and he could have inferred that the sum of the three angles equal
two right angles. But this is not possible, rather we have to “go beyond” the con-
cepts, go to intuition and use our general geometrical capacities—the schemata—by
which we in time construct new lines, new angles etc. all which together constitute
an intuition. This is a singular object which taken together with the generating rules
represent the concept of triangle. Then by analyzing this intuition and the rules gen-
erating it we discover I.32. One of the points is that “[t]houghts without content are
empty”—we need intuitions in order to reason about mathematical concepts; we have
access to the abstract concepts only through particular and concretely given instances
falling under the concepts.
I put together in a pure intuition, just as in an empirical one, the manifold
that belongs to the schema of a triangle in general and thus to its con-
cept, through which general synthetic propositions must be constructed
(A719/B746)
But if we think through concretely drawn diagrams how can we obtain necessary and
universal results? How do we gain universal knowledge from particulars?
1.6.3 Schemata and universality
Central to the schematism is that the schematic rules are universal: “[T]his repre-
sentation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its
image is what I call the schema for this concept” (A140/B180–1). In the case of
geometrical schemata the problem is specifically the problem of drawing a universal
conclusion based on a singular instance. Let me quote again:
31Especially important evidence for this is found in §24 of the B-deduction, but is also at A162–
3/B203–4: “I cannot represent to myself any line, no matter how small it may be, without drawing
it in thought, i.e., successively generating all its parts from one point, and thereby first sketching this
intuition. It is exactly the same with even the smallest time. I think therein only the successive progress
from one moment to another, where through all parts of time and their addition a determinate magnitude
of time is finally generated.” See also Ak. 20, 410-11 and A234/B287; both cited above.
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The individual drawn figure is empirical, and nevertheless serves to ex-
press the concept without damage to its universality, for in the case of
this empirical intuition we have taken account only of the action of con-
structing the concept (A714/B742).
My interpretation is that when we argue for a universal statement from a singular
instance we use schemata in the following way. We want to prove that some property
belongs generally to a mathematical concept:
1. We recognize a particular constructed figure—presented as a mental image or
a figure drawn on paper—as a token of a type. We use schema or schemata for
recognizing this.
2. Then we prove that the property we are after holds for this particular token.
3. We recognize that in this proof we have not used anything about that particular
token which would not hold for any other token of that type. We use the schema
in recognizing this.
4. Therefore, the type has the property, i.e., any token of that type has the property.
This is precisely what happens in the proof of I.32; “we have taken account only
of the action of constructing the concept”, and therefore we have not used properties
such as “the magnitude of the sides and the angles” and since “we have abstracted
from these differences” the figure represents the concept universally. Now this is of
course nothing but a very typical way of proving universal statements in mathemat-
ics. We prove that some property A holds for a, then we recognize that none of our
assumptions concerns a, except that a is of a certain type, say, the natural numbers;
therefore we can conclude that every x of that type must have property A. Precisely




32Note, that all this is in fact not far away from what Aristotle says in the Metaphysics:
[I]f we regard objects independently of their <accidents> and investigate any aspect of
them as so regarded, we shall not be guilty of any error on this account, any more than
when we draw a diagram on the ground and say that a line is a foot long when it is not;
because the error is not in the premises. (Aristotle; 1933, 192)
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1.6.4 Schemata and abstract concepts
One of the reasons why geometrical schemata can be successful in the way just de-
scribed is that geometrical concepts are well-defined. As discussed on page 9 this
is in contrast with empirical concepts. According to Kant (A727/B755) we can give
necessary and sufficient criteria for, say, triangles.33 Below I will argue that the ob-
jects of pure intuition are precisely those objects which can be constructed using the
schematic rules. Therefore, we can decide, in a finite amount of time, whether an
intuition is an instance or not of some concepts.
The distinction between image and schema is a way of making abstract concepts
possible, and thus the distinction can be seen as a refutation of a crude empiricist
claim that mathematical concepts, as simple generalizations, are illusionary. It is
in this way that schemata ground or found mathematical concepts, as claimed for
instance on A141/B180, and described on A234/B287. See page 21 for an analysis
of the latter.34
Generally Kant views schemata as the mediating element “which must stand in
homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other”
(A138/B177). This applies as well to empirical concepts. The schema of dog is
mediating between the empirical dog and the concept of dog in that it produces a
mental image which as an representation mediates between the empirical and the
intellectual.
The situation is different in the case of geometrical and mathematical concepts:
The objects are not empirical objects, but pure intuitions. This leads Shabel (n.d., 24)
to conclude that “[i]n the case of mathematical concepts then, schemata are strictly
redundant: no “third thing” is needed to mediate between a mathematical concept
and the objects that instantiate it since mathematical concepts come equipped with
determinate conditions on and procedures for their construction”.35 I think this is a
somewhat peculiar view. Though certainly, as Shabel notes, mathematical concepts
are well-defined. Thus we can define precisely what it means to be an triangle. But
a definition does not necessarily include a description of the schema. As Kant writes
on A716/B744 “[g]ive a philosopher the concept of a triangle”—from the concept
33When using one of Locke’s favorite examples Kant says on A728/B756 that this is not the case
of empirical concepts: “[I]n the concept of gold one person might think, besides its weight, color, and
ductility, its property of not rusting, while another might know nothing about this”.
34That Leibniz had a huge in influence on Kant is beyond no doubt as Carl Posy (1995, 1998, 2000)
has documented. But it is interesting that even this distinction between image and schema and the
importance was already seen by Leibniz. In his discussion on Locke’s New Essays on Human Under-
standing Leibniz notes “how essential it is to distinguish images from exact ideas which are composed
of definitions” (Leibniz; 1996, 137).
35In this respect she follows Guyer (1987, 159).
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alone, the philosopher can learn nothing about the sum of the interior angles. And,
although the certain relation between a right angle and the sum of the interior angles
is discoverable only by the schema, the relation itself belongs to concept, not to the
schema. The schema of triangle is essentially a part of a larger enterprise being
reducible, perhaps, to some fundamental capacities such as equivalents of Euclidean
postulates, basic axioms resulting in general capacities for reasoning using intuitions.
Of course I do not understand the concept triangle unless I posses its schema—but
this is not the same as saying that the concept and its schema are identical. It is more
reasonable to view a geometrical concept as a (passive) type, images as tokens, and
the schema of the type as the constructive (i.e., active) relation between the type and
its tokens. Such a constructive relation is to be understood, on the one hand, as our
capacity for recognizing in finite time something as a token of a type; on the other
hand it gives rise to a rule for constructing a paradigmatic and pure instantiation of
that concept. The schema is therefore a decidable and constructive procedure in the
sense that we can decide in finite time the type to which a token belongs, but also that
we can ‘go from type to token’ through construction.
1.6.5 A contemporary critique of Euclid
As already mentioned it is not uncommon to find sharp criticism of Euclid’s method.
Kline (1972, 1005) mentions the “[d]efects in Euclid” and presents—what is taken to
be—a counterexample to the Euclidean use of diagrams. The example is the follow-
ing “proof” that every triangle is isosceles. Let a triangle ABC be given. Construct
an angle bisector at A and construct a line bisecting BC. If these two lines are parallel









Construct OF perpendicular to AB; and likewise OE perpendicular to AC. It is easy to
see that the triangles marked I in the diagram are congruent; therefore AF and AE are
equal. Construct also OB and OC. By construction triangles III are congruent. From
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this it follows that triangles II are congruent, so FB and EC are equal. Consequently,
AB and AC are equal.
Now, one could question the position of O and in fact it necessarily falls outside






But we can again “prove” ABC to be isosceles. Now, every triangle is of course not
isosceles, so what is wrong? The positions of E and F are wrong. In fact, it can be
proved that either E is between A and C and F is outside the triangle, or F is between
A and B and E is outside. Given the correct determination of the positions of E and
F the “proof” does not go through.
But this means that we must be able to determine the correct position of
F with respect to A and B and E with respect to A and C before starting
the proof. Of course one should not rely upon drawing a correct figure to
determine the locations of E and F , but this was precisely what Euclid
and the mathematicians up to 1800 did. Euclidean geometry was sup-
posed to have offered accurate proofs of theorems suggested intuitively
by figures, but actually it offered intuitive proofs of accurately drawn
figures” (Kline; 1972, 1007).
I do not find this criticism reasonable. Firstly, the above “proof” is (of course) not to
be found in Elements. Secondly, I find it highly implausible, that Euclid would ever
produce a proof of this character. Euclid, as we have seen, is always very careful and
refers to propositions proved earlier. Thus, to produce a correct proof (which does
not exists) one would have to know the positions of E and F . Euclid would have
established these in a proposition used as a lemma.
But more importantly: It is reasonable to characterize the “proof” as empirical.
Attention is only paid towards the constructed empirical figure (drawn incorrectly),
which should symbolically refer to the pure intuition. If this reference is taken into
account then the particular properties of the empirical figure are of no importance.
But in this case, the reference is not taken into account. About such a methodology
Kant writes: “[This] would yield only an empirical proposition (through measure-
ment of its angles), which would contain no universality” (A718/B746). On the
28 Kant and Geometrical Schematism
other hand, Euclid’s methodology consists of taking the diagram together with the
rules producing the diagram. Thus I find it difficult to understand how it should be
a counterexample to Euclid. In principle there is nothing wrong with Euclid’s use
of diagrams. Of course Euclid is sometimes mistaken, sometimes his diagrammatic
reasoning is flawed. As is well-known, diagrams can be misleading.36
1.6.6 Hilbert and the axiomatic method
Also Hilbert has reservations in regard to the use of diagrams, as seen on page 6, but
he represents a rather subtle position.
In his famous lecture delivered before the International Congress of Mathemati-
cians at Paris in 1900 Hilbert he argues (1902c, 442–3) that there are many important
styles of reasoning within mathematics, and argues strongly against a kind of re-
ductionism which advocates—in the strive for rigorous proofs—an elimination of all
concepts which do not belong to analysis and, ultimately, to number theory. Geomet-
rical rigor certainly exists:
The use of geometrical signs [Zeichen] as a means of strict proof pre-
supposes the exact knowledge and complete mastery of axioms which
underlie those figures; and in order that these geometrical figures may
be incorporated in the general treasure of mathematical signs, there is
necessary a rigorous axiomatic investigation of their conceptual content
[. . . T]he use of geometrical signs is determined by the axioms of geo-
metrical concepts and their combination. (Hilbert; 1902c, 443)
Note how close Hilbert seems to Kant here. Hilbert argues, that we can use
diagrams when we have exact knowledge about the procedures which ground the
figures—i.e., when we posses and understand the schemata, we can use figures in a
fully rigorous way; the use of symbols, such as diagrams, is determined by axioms.
But how does this relate with the views expressed by Pasch and Hilbert earlier.
It seems that Pasch is interested in the formalistic conception of proof for the sake
of rigor. This, however, is not the main motivation for Hilbert when applying formal
methods in geometry. For Hilbert the motivation is new discoveries, made possible
by the axiomatic method.
Hilbert’s presentation in the seminal Grundlagen (1902a) deals with different
kinds of geometries. The axioms are not treated as self-evident axioms which are true
in some absolute sense. Hilbert is interested in the groups of axioms, their relations
and consequences. There are five groups:
36As mentioned on page 6, diagrams could lead one to think that any continuous function is differ-
ential except in isolated points—which is false.
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I. Axioms of connection.
II. Axioms of order.
III. Axioms of parallels.
IV. Axioms of congruence.
V. Axioms of continuity.
Hilbert shows that the groups are pairwise independent. This is done by provid-
ing different models, validating different groups of axioms. Thus the groups give
rise to different geometries such as Euclidean, non-Euclidean, Archimedian and non-
Archimedian geometries. Therefore, when Hilbert talks about lines they can be lines
as Euclid understands them, or they can be great circles on a surface of a sphere, or
they can be something quite different. Hilbert’s treatment is much more abstract and
the objects that the theory refers are not fixed.
The core of Hilbert’s method is that he detaches the geometrical concepts from
their semantics. Hilbert is not studying one, and only one, particular model. He is
open minded towards a whole variety of models. This is not for the sake of rigor—it
is for the sake of discovery. By his axiomatic method Hilbert opened a gate-way for
new discoveries such as the connections between projective geometry and algebra as
was found in the beginning of the 20th century.37
Thus, by the axiomatic formal method discoveries are made possible; discoveries
which are not possible in the Euclidean-Kantian way of doing geometry. The sepa-
ration of language and interpretation; the whole idea of an uninterpreted language is
as remote as it can be for Kant. When Hilbert is making the detachment he is not
anymore studying what Kant takes to be the object of study for mathematics: The
concrete schematic images. Rather, Hilbert studies the axioms—the schemata. But
the schemata are taken as formal rules with no fixed semantics. Thus postulate 1,
does not necessarily produce a Euclidean line given two Euclidean points. For Kant,
on the other hand, schemata are semantics and therefore it is a very drastic step to
treat a schema not as a rule determining some specific semantics.
For Kant schemata produces the mathematical objects such as lines, circles, tri-
angles and the like; and these are the only mathematical objects. When doing math-
ematics schemata are applied whereby new properties are discovered in synthetic
37Take for example, relations between geometrical theorems such as the theorems of Desargues and
Pappus on the one hand, and properties of rings on the other. Desargues’ theorem, taken as an ax-
iom, corresponds to additional algebraic conditions on the addition and multiplication to form a skew
field. (i.e. a field minus commutativity of multiplication). Also, that the multiplication operation be
commutative corresponds to a further geometric axiom, namely the Pappus theorem.
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ways. But, where schemata produce objects for mathematics they are not themselves
objects. As we shall see below, on Kant’s view there is only one source for mathe-
matical objects: Spatial objects. Thus to Kant, geometry concerns the properties of
objects constructed in pure intuition; the sum of the angles in a triangle, for exam-
ple. Hilbert’s geometry is on a level higher—his main concern is not to prove new
theorems about spatial objects. His investigation concerns the axioms. Thus Hilbert
also rejects Kant’s thesis that the axioms are transcendental procedures which cannot
themselves be objects. To Hilbert axioms are true objects of another type and they
are studied by the axiomatic method
Nevertheless, geometry as such is not seen as some formal and meaningless the-
ory with no content; Hilbert’s geometry is an investigation of how we conceptualize
space, thus “[t]his problem is tantamount to the logical analysis of our intuition of
space” (Hilbert; 1902a, 1)
Hilbert rejects Kant’s thesis, that schemata are not the objects of mathematics.
As he also raises questions about the existence of one and only one geometry, he
is positive towards the possibility that our conception of space is not necessarily
Euclidean. But as seen above, Hilbert does not, in general reject, the Euclidean use of
diagrams in reasoning—but we must be completely explicit about the “exact know-
ledge and complete mastery of axioms which lie at the foundation of those figures”
that we may want to use in our proofs. Thus he includes, for instance, Pasch’s axiom
(Hilbert; 1902a, 7). It is certainly not trivial that it is necessary to include this axiom:
Pasch’s axiom. Let A, B, C be three points not lying in the same straight
line and let a line a be a straight line lying in the plane ABC and not
passing through any of the points A, B, C. Then, if the straight line a
passes through a point in the segment AB, it will also pass through either




1.6.7 Conclusion and perspectives on geometrical schemata
Kant wants to show that and how Euclidean geometry is possible. By the theory of
schemata we now know how. Kant argues that geometry is our conceptualization of
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space. We have a concept of a triangle, for example. We can think and reason about
our concepts of space through, and only through, singular pure intuitions. These
intuitions are produced by geometrical schemata, and are therefore not simple gen-
eralizations on perceptions, rather they are constructed a priori to any (empirical)
experience. The intuitions gain, nevertheless, their objectivity from the fact that they
can in principle be met in experience.38
A concept and its schema are two different things, but we only understand a con-
cept when we are able to use its schema. The schema is, moreover, a condition for the
concept in the sense that it makes it possible, and that we through schemata can learn
properties of these abstract concepts. As such the interplay, primarily, between basic
schemata (equivalents to Euclid’s postulates), their concepts and intuitions explains
how we can reason about our conceptualization of space and obtain knowledge about
it. In principle I find Kant’s analysis completely sound and satisfactory as a theory
about Euclidean reasoning: Proving theorems about mathematical concepts through
the use of basic postulates and other axioms by using particular diagrams (intuitions).
In fact one can understand Kant’s theory of schemata as the beginning of a theory
of diagrammatic reasoning. Take for instance, the diagram-proof of
1+2+ · · ·+n = n(n+1)
2
given on page 7. We want to prove this property with respect to all numbers. Using
the schema for numbers we realize that any sequence 1,2, . . . ,n can be represented
in a square with sides of length n. In realizing this we are also using our geometrical
schema of square. Take the number 5, and represent it by a square. By some geomet-
rical reasoning we prove the wanted property for this particular token of the number
5. Using the schema for the concept of square we see that the argument applies to any
square. And we know that the sequence 1,2, . . . ,n can be represented with respect to
all its properties by a square. Therefore the theorem is proved for all numbers.
38This is a crucial point in Kant’s philosophy of mathematics. I will take this up later in this text,
see for instance the long quotation on page 44. The relation between pure and empirical intuition is
discussed in subsection 3.6 found in chapter 3. Moreover, in chapter 5 I discuss in subsection 5.2 this
thesis of objectivity that Kant endorses. I criticize it to the effect that numbers, for instance, can be
objects.
CHAPTER 2
Kant and Arithmetical Schematism
In the forgoing chapter the Kant’s concept of geometrical schema was analyzed. We
saw that Euclidean geometry and the general reasoning style in Elements are essen-
tially what Kant wants to give an epistemological account of. This leads Kant to
his schemata of pure sensible concepts. In the coming chapter we will see how this
theory functions as the paradigmatic example, which Kant in certain ways builds his
more general theory of transcendental schemata upon. We will, however, only work
with one type of categories: The categories of quantity.
The pure schema of magnitude [Größe] (quantitatis), however, as a
concept of the understanding, is number, which is a representation that
summarizes [zusammenfaßt] the successive addition of one (homoge-
neous) unit to another. (A142/B182)
Now, it must be admitted that even with regard to some of the most fundamental
aspects of his epistemology Kant is not completely clear. Here, however, it seems
clear that “magnitude [Größe]” is a category—but not which one. In the “Table of
Categories” (A80/B106) there are four main divisions of the categories; the first one
being “Of Quantity [Der Quantität]”. This consists of the three categories unity,
plurality and totality. Now, “magnitude” could either refer to the collection of the
three categories, or it could be one of them. Let us elaborate a little on this.
2.1 Number as schema
Quite generally Kant claims that it is equivalent to cognize and to perform judg-
ments.1 Therefore “the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Under-
standing” (A70/B95) goes via the different ways we form judgments. In respect to
quantity, Kant is completely Aristotelian: There are singular, particular and uni-
versal judgments (for instance, ‘this body has mass’, ‘some bodies have mass’ and
‘all bodies have mass’). These different types of judgments lead Kant to the three
categories unity, plurality and totality. The singular judgment corresponds to the
1See for instance the important A69/B94:
We can, however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the
understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging. For according
to what has been said above it is a faculty for thinking. Thinking is cognition through
concepts. Concepts, however, as predicates of possible judgments, are related to some
representation of a still undetermined object.
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category of unity; the particular judgment to plurality and the universal to totality.2
Totally there are 12 categories, and just after stating what “the schema of magnitude”
is Kant continues the Schematism by listing the nine remaining schemata—one after
the other (A143–7/B182–7). This can be taken as evidence indicating that Kant took
“the schema of magnitude” to be a schema common to the three categories unity,
plurality and totality. And as Longuenesse notes (1998, 254) the three different cate-
gories seem to be involved in the definition of the schema: unity (“units”); plurality
(“successive addition of one (homogeneous) unit to another”); and totality (“a rep-
resentation that summarizes the successive addition of one (homogeneous) unit to
another”). I think, however, that it is more plausible, to understand “the schema of
magnitude” to be the schema of totality.3 The third category in all the four divisions
is always understood as a “combination of the first and second in order to bring forth
the third” (B111). “Thus allness (totality) is nothing other than plurality considered
as a unity” (B111). In Prolegomena, when listing the categories, Kant terms the first
category of Quantity as “Unity (Measure [das Maß])” (Ak. 4, 303). Therefore, Unity
is the concept we use when we judge something to be a unit; ‘this body—taken as a
unit—has mass’; but also ‘this unit can be taken as a unit, when we want to count—it
can be seen as (giving rise to) a measure’. A determination of a unit ‘body’ together
with a judgment ‘here is a plurality of divisible bodies’ can form a new judgment,
when we think another unit: ‘All bodies in this collection are divisible’. In this way
it is seen that totality is something more and something different than the two first
categories, because:
to bring forth the third [pure] concept requires a special act of the under-
standing, which is not identical with that act performed in the first and
second. Thus the concept of a number (which belongs to the category
of allness) is not always possible wherever the concepts of multitude and
of unity are (e.g., in the representation of the infinite) (B111).
Thus, the category of totality is not reducible to unity and plurality and, moreover,
it is “number” which belongs to totality. If we re-read the definition of “the schema
of magnitude” in this light we see that it corresponds very well to the act performed,
2It is remarkable that it is not even completely clear from Kant’s texts precisely what the correspon-
dence between the Quantity of Judgments and the Table of Categories is in this case. Just like Paton
(1936, II, 44) and Longuenesse (1998, 249), I understand Kant in such a way that the (Aristotelian)
judgments are given in the traditional order: Universal–particular–singular, whereas the order of the
categories are given as unity–plurality–universal. Therefore, the order of one of the tables is the reverse
of the other. This interpretation is in contrast with Hartnack (1968, 39) and (Tiles; 2004).
3Here I am close to Longuenesse (1998, 253–255), although she seems to identify plurality and
totality.
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when totality—as a combination of unity and plurality—is performed: A certain unit
(measure) has been determined; and we have encountered a plurality of these units.
When reflecting on this plurality, we form a set out of the homogeneous elements
and enumerate (summarize) the elements. This enumeration ends with a number,
which is the number of elements in the set.4 Therefore, when we apply “the schema
for magnitude” we think unity in plurality. Generally “the schema of magnitude” is
the ability humans have for determining finite extensions of empirical concepts. For
instance ‘there are five fingers on my left hand’: The unit is ‘finger’; the context is
‘my left hand’; and there are totally five of them. The rule determining this act of
enumerating and counting is the schema called “number”.
But how precisely do we operate with this schema? It is a transcendental schema
and there are certain important differences between the transcendental schemata and
the geometrical schemata. “The schema of a pure concept of the understanding, on
the contrary [to empirical and geometrical schemata], is something that can never be
brought to an image at all” (A142/B181).5 Rather than producing images, transcen-
dental schemata provide a “transcendental time-determination” (A138–9/B178–9) of
the objects given in experience. As empirical objects are given to us in outer sense
(space) and time-determination is a determination of moments according to inner
4But as Kant notes, we cannot reduce the third category to the two forgoing, because sometimes
we encounter an infinite plurality of units which do not form a set. Thus, the set-class distinction
from set theory is reflected in Kant’s epistemology. We can for instance, form a sequence of growing
finite (in the sense that the volume is finite) empirical spaces. The space containing my office; the
space containing my city; the space containing my country, the earth and so on. All these spaces are
possible objects of intuition. But the collection of all finite space—the absolute empirical space—
which is needed for Newtonian mechanics in the definition of absolute motion is not a possible object
of intuition and “absolute space is in itself therefore nothing and indeed no object at all” as Kant writes
in Metaphysical Foundation (Ak. 4, 481). I can measure all the finite spaces, but their collection is not
measurable. Nevertheless, the concept of “motion in absolute (immovable) space” “in general natural
science is unavoidable” (Ak. 4, 558), so “[a]bsolute space is therefore necessary, not as a concept of
an actual object, but rather as an idea”, i.e., as a concept of reason (Ak. 4, 560). In set theory any set
of ordinals is itself measurable by an ordinal, but the class of all ordinals, is not a set, because it is not
measurable by any ordinal.
5In fact, this fundamental difference between the arithmetical schema number and the geometrical
schemata leads Kant to reject the possibility axioms for arithmetic. This well-known claim of Kant is
expressed on pages A163–4/B205. This view seems rather awkward in a contemporary understanding
and I will elaborate on it below.
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sense,6 this determination proceeds mediately by way of inner images.7 Thus the
schematism of pure concepts—in contrast to geometrical and empirical concepts—is
more about reflection on images, rather than construction. This observation somehow
runs counter to Shabel’s (2003a, 109) claim (which I also mentioned on page 10 as
the “sharpened claim”) that the diagrammatic reasoning in Euclid—which Kant sup-
plies an epistemological analysis of in terms of geometrical schemata—“provides an
interpretive model for the function of a transcendental schema”. Nevertheless, it will
become clear that Kant’s theory of geometrical schemata and his theory of transcen-
dental schemata have many properties in common. The most important one being
that schemata provide a foundation and explanation of the use of types and tokens.
In the following I will give my interpretation of the transcendental “schema of
magnitude”. As will be clear this really is an interpretation. Kant does not write
much about the transcendental schemata and many of the details are ‘left to the reader
as an easy exercise’. But this exercise is not an easy one, as Kant certainly is not very
clear on the whole issue. This is in contrast with the geometrical schemata. Kant’s
theory of these is much more clear than when he is discussing the transcendental
schemata. In consequence of this I will in the first place not stay close to the text.
This is for the sake of giving a coherent (as coherent as it can be at least) interpretation
of the schema of magnitude. After having provided my interpretation I will go back
to Kant’s text and see whether or not I am able to supply difficult passages with
meaning. If I succeed in doing this my interpretation will be justified.
Let me return for a moment to the empirical schemata which I will give the fol-
lowing interpretation. Let us view the collection of all the different images represent-
ing empirical objects as a constructive and non-monotone open-ended universe. It is
not monotonic as our empirical concepts may vary over time and it is constructive in
the sense that we produce images in time in accordance with rules. Furthermore, it
is open-ended as our collection of empirical concepts is certainly not fixed once and
for all. However, given a point i in time we can take the universe of images which are
in principle constructible according to the collection of empirical concepts we may
possess at i. Let us call this snapshot Ui. Any empirical concept partitions Ui in two
sets. One of the sets consisting of the images representing the concept, the other set
6“Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner
state. For time cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape or a posi-
tion, etc., but on the contrary determines the relation of representations in our inner state.” (A33/B49-
50)
7“[T]ime is an a priori condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition
of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances.”
(A34/B51)
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consisting of those which do not represent the concept.8
“[M]agnitude (quantitatis)” concerns the question: “How big is something?”
(A163/B204). An example could be: ‘How many fingers are there on my left hand?’.
Let ≺ denote the order of time.9 I have experienced a plurality of fingers and let
i ≺ j ≺ k ≺ l ≺ m be the different moments in time corresponding to these experi-
ences. Although the sequence of image-universes is generally not monotone, let me
assume that locally there is monotonicity such that the partitions of Ui, . . . ,Um con-
sisting of finger-images is the same from i to m. Alternatively we could assume that
the schema belonging to concept ‘finger-on-my-left-hand’ is constant. Such a prag-
matic assumption seems reasonable.10 Therefore any image from the partition can be
used to represent any finger from time i to time m. Let x be such an image. x repre-
sents any of the fingers that I experience on my left hand. The minimal requirement
making the images different is their location in time.11 Time “determines the relation
of representations in our inner state” (A33/B49-50). Therefore we have temporized
images: xi,x j,xk,xl and xm. This is my interpretation of Kant’s “transcendental time-
determination”, and note that the temporal indexes are necessary for my judgment
‘there is a plurality of fingers’. Now, by judging unity in plurality I form the set M
consisting of the temporized images which I simultaneously count (“summarize”).
This is done by enumerating M. Mathematically speaking this is a determination of a
set of natural numbers which is equinumerous with M. In other words, we determine
a set of natural numbers N and establish an injection f from N to M. The canonical
domain for f is, of course, {1,2,3,4,5}. Figure 2.1 represents this mental process.
On pages A142–3/B182 Kant defines the “schema of magnitude” in one para-
graph. I gave most of the first half of that paragraph on page 32. The second part
goes:
Thus number is nothing other than the unity of the synthesis of the mani-
8Of course this is an idealization which is perhaps not fully justified. Empirical concepts are vague
concepts, and therefore it is perhaps not possible, given a concept P, to form two disjoint sets U Pi
and U¬Pi such that Ui = U
P
i ∪U¬Pi . This problem is, however, not a problem which threatens the
interpretation of “the schema of magnitude”, and therefore I will make this idealization.
9Kant’s precise understanding of the order of time is not important for this example. For our example
it only matters that the collection of past moments is linearly ordered.
10The assumption of monotonicity locally around a concept seems reasonable, given that I in the time
from i to m do not discover new essential properties of the concept, and given that I do not forget any
of the essential properties either.
11We could also imagine another way to make the images different, namely that they are cognized
as fingers with coordinates in space. This would also separate the images. But this would only be an
additional property making the images different, because we cannot help that the images are constructed
in time. Thus the images with spatial coordinates would be different both with respect to time and
coordinates.
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fold of a homogeneous intuition in general, because I generate time itself
in the apprehension of the intuition. (A142–3/B182)
In terms of the finger-example my interpretation is the following.
Firstly, I can produce the injection f “because I generate time itself in the appre-
hension of the intuition”—it is I who locate the images according to inner sense. This
temporization is necessary. Secondly, that “number is nothing other than the unity of
the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general” means that the
number 5 describes the unity of my set of fingers in the sense that a bijection ( f is
of course also surjective) can be established between the set of natural numbers less
than or equal to 5 and M. But what precisely does the correspondence between 5 and
M consist of?
The order of time ≺ induces a natural order on the temporized images; let ≺
denote also the induced order. The function f specified in Figure 2.1 is actually
showing that ({1,2,3,4,5},<) and (M,≺) are isomorphic. Could it be a notion
along these lines that Kant has in mind when saying that number 5 is “the unity of
the synthesis”? The bijection established would then show that the two sets are equal
up to isomorphism. I think this is not Kant’s idea. We are only interested in the
size (größe) of M, not its order. Thus it is 5 as a cardinal number and not as an
ordinal number Kant is interested in. The unity Kant is after is the unity which is
expressed through cardinality. A contemporary mathematical understanding of size
is the following. A and B are equinumerous or equal in cardinality, if a bijection
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between the two exists:
A =c B, if and only if, there exists a bijection f such that f : A → B.
Of course, given a set N of temporized images with n elements any bijection g be-
tween N and {1, . . . ,n} gives rise to an isomorphism between ({1, . . . ,n},<) and
(N,<g), where <g is the order induced by g—but this additional information is not
what Kant has in mind. It is information which lies in the process determining the
cardinality of any finite set, but one has to pay attention to this. I understand Kant
as saying that this type of information is not what we are after when applying the
category of totality, although it can be unwinded from the process. Thus, in the
finger-example 5 reflects the unity of the synthesis with respect to cardinality. The
equality-relation is not isomorphism, rather it is =c. Thus, the function f depicted in
Figure 2.1 could be any bijection between M and {1,2,3,4,5}.12
I can now give my general interpretation of the “schema of magnitude”. The
task of the schema is to give unity to a succession of objects thought under the same
concept; objects that we represent as temporized images. In our interaction with the
world we temporize images. Before temporization the images belong to the universe
of images constructible in principle. For the sake of presentational simplicity let
us assume that this universe is constant, i.e., that my empirical schemata generating
images are the same over time. Later I will dismiss this restriction. From this universe
we form, by “transcendental time-determination” a temporized derivative, namely,
the universe U of temporized images.
The general problem concerns the possible unity of a plurality of experiences
of objects falling under a concept. Let us in accordance with this purpose form a
second order universe U consisting of sets of temporized images representing the
same concept. Thus the definition of U :
M ∈ U iff M is a subset of U and the members of M represent the same concept.
Clearly the notion of equal in cardinality, =c is an equivalence relation on mathscrU .
The “schema of magnitude” which Kant calls “number” is the general rule which
generates this equivalence relation. When we judge unity in a plurality of homoge-
neous units we determine the equivalence class to which the unit belongs. And if no
such class can be found we cannot judge unity: A plurality of experienced units can
be judged to be a unit itself only if, we can determine a cardinality of this plurality.
Therefore, the generation of the members of U proceeds by production of the equiv-
alence classes. An M becomes a member of U , when it becomes a member of an
equivalence class of U . Thus it is a genuine constructive notion of existence.
12Of which there are many: 5!.
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Let us now see, what the content of the rule “number” is. First of all, it consists of
a “transcendental time-determination”, as otherwise we cannot distinguish between
images representing the same concept. But what is the content of the act which
partitions U in accordance with =c? It is our ability to enumerate finite sets, and the
mathematical description of this, is the ability to produce bijections between finite
sets.
In this way, we see that the “schema of magnitude” is reflective because of re-
flection on already constructed first-order level images. But it is constructive on a
second-order level; the sets of U are determined (second-order constructed) by the
schema, and they live in U only when this determination has taken place. Moreover,
the schema is an act of the understanding which itself takes place in time, temporal
succession is a transcendental condition:
No one can define the concept of magnitude in general except by some-
thing like this: That it is the determination of a thing through which it can
be thought how many units are posited in it. Only this how–many–times
is grounded on successive repetition, thus on time and the synthesis (of
the homogeneous) in it. (A242/B300)
Let us now dismiss the restriction posed on the universe of images. Thus a certain
invariance of meaning of images can happen, as an image can represent a concept at
a certain time and not represent that concept at another time. Thus the universe U
is a dynamical floating universe where the equivalence classes defined by =c are not
the same over time. Does this pose a problem for the status of the pure concept of
totality? Certainly not, given any variant of U the rules determining equivalence
classes according to =c are precisely the same. The underlying universe may vary,
as our empirical concepts vary, but the structure imposed on it, is the same. Of
course there are extensions of empirical concepts which we are unable to determine,
of which Sorites paradox provides excellent examples. But this is not a problem
for our theory of magnitude, it is (perhaps) a problem for our theory of empirical
concepts.
2.2 Number as concept
It must be admitted that my interpretation is somewhat involved. I am, for instance,
using notions like equivalence-class and second order object—notions which were
not present in the mathematics of Kant’s time. On the other hand, it is also true that
the bijections involved for example are constructively fully meaningful: We are only
working with functions from finite sets to finite sets—the essence of that is simply to
pair objects from two different finite sets. Moreover, the universes mentioned should
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certainly not be understood in some kind of Platonic sense—rather they are universes
constructed by a cognizing human.
Some interpretation is needed as Kant’s own text is not crystal clear neither suf-
ficiently detailed. Kant designates the constructive procedure used when counting
as “number”.13 But from his text (or texts) alone it is not clear precisely what he
means. For a full justification of my interpretation I should be able, however, to ex-
plain central themes in the Kantian theory of transcendental schemata. One of the
most distinctive ones is, that arithmetic has no axioms. I will take that up in chapter
??. Another important distinction in Kant’s theory is the distinction between ‘number
as concept’ as opposed to ‘number as schema’.
Kant notes on A142/B181 that a transcendental schema “is something that can
never be brought to an image at all”. His point is that there are no generic images of
the pure concepts. In contrast to empirical schemata, pure schemata do not provide
images representing the pure concept. How would a paradigmatic image of causality
look like, for instance? Somehow in contrast to this Kant writes when discussing the
difference between image and schema, that
“if I place five points in a row, ....., this is an image of the number five.
On the contrary, if I only think a number in general, which could be five
or a hundred, this thinking is more the representation of a method for
representing a multitude (e.g., a thousand) in accordance with a certain
concept than the image itself (A149/B179)
Thus there is a concept for the number five, but there is also a schema called
“number” which is an act of the understanding or a “representation of a method
for representing a multitude”. Therefore we have to distinguish between the con-
cept number, and the schema number. The number five is not the rule synthesiz-
ing my finger-images xi,x j,xk,xl ,xm, but rather a concept of the specific size—the
cardinality—of the corresponding set. This cardinality is realized through the enu-
meration which simultaneously determines set-hood (unity) and cardinality. Thus
number is a concept under which a multiplicity is thought. This concept is thought
through the schema “number”. The schema is the procedure, i.e., a rule-governed ac-
tivity, that we use to determine whether a given collection of sensible things exhibits
unity in plurality.14
13Note also that in German to count is z ählen—a derivative of Zahl.
14In the A-deduction Kant writes: “ If, in counting, I forget that the units that how hover before my
senses were successively added to each other by me, then I would not cognize the generation of the
multitude through this successive addition of one to the other, and consequently I would not cognize
the number; for this concept consist solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis” (A103).
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Let n denote the class of elements in U which are equivalent {1, . . . ,n} with
respect to cardinality, in other words:
n = {{x1, . . . ,xn} ∈ U | {x1, . . . ,xn} =c {1, . . . ,n}}.
Now, I propose to understand the concept of a particular number n as a type, in fact
more specifically as the corresponding equivalence class n. We know, however, that
the elements of this equivalence class is not constant: An element of U is constructed
as a second order object at a certain moment in time and trough this construction the
element becomes a member of an equivalence class. Therefore, if we understand
the concept five as an equivalence class in the set theoretic sense described above,
then the equivalence class is not determined by its extension, it is rather determined
intensionally, namely the “schema of magnitude” which amounts to the capacity of
producing bijections. Only this intensional aspect can guarantee that number con-
cepts remain the same over time. Therefore, if the x and y are number concepts,
possibly ‘found’ at different moments in time, then the equality of x and y is deter-
mined not by their extensions but by the bijections—understood as rules—on which
they are generated. In other words x = y, if and only if, the two canonical bijections
are the same.
Thus we understand a concept of a certain number as a cardinal number being a
type whose tokens are members of the corresponding equivalence class. The “schema
of magnitude” decides the relation between the type n and the tokens falling under
this type. It is due to the intensional aspect that the properties a particular number
concept are independent of time. Moreover, each and all of the (finite) cardinal num-
bers are founded by the same schema. See Figure 2.2 for a diagram representing my
interpretation.15
So the schema and the concept of number certainly are different.
2.3 The arithmetical schema and universality
In the case of geometrical schemata we saw that they make reasoning about say the
general triangle possible through reasoning about one particular. My claim is that
Kant holds the view that we are in a similar position in the case of arithmetic. The
form of universality which emerges in the case of arithmetical schemata can be gained
by using “the schema of magnitude”. On the face of it, this may seem problematic
as the extension of an arithmetical equivalence class is not constant. On the other
15Although generally my interpretation is different from the one given by Longuenesse (1998) I think
my understanding of the difference between the concept number and the schema is close to her’s being
“that the concepts of number is the concept of a determinate quantity, and that number as a schema is
the schema of determinate quantity” (1998, 256).
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hand, the members of the geometrical equivalence classes are pure intuitions and a
pure intuition belongs to the type triangle, if and only if, it can be constructed in pure
intuition by the schema of triangle. This property is invariant over time—therefore
the geometrical types are extensionally determined. Nevertheless, when explaining
the synthetic nature of propositions in arithmetic Kant writes:
The concept of twelve is by no means already thought merely by my
thinking of that unification of seven and five, and no matter how long I
analyze my concept of such a possible sum I will still not find twelve
in it. One must go beyond these concepts, seeking assistance in the
intuition that corresponds to one of the two, one’s five fingers, say, or (as
in Segner’s arithmetic) five points, and one after another add the units
of the five given in the intuition to the concept of seven. For I take
first the number 7, and, as I take the fingers of my hand as an intuition
for assistance with the concept of 5, to that image of mine I now add
the units that I have previously taken together in order to constitute the
number 5 one after another to the number 7, and thus see the number 12
arise. (B15–6)
This quote is central for an understanding of Kant’s conception of numbers and
arithmetic. Kant is claiming two important properties of arithmetic:
1. The simple propositions of arithmetic like 7 + 5 = 12 are not analytic; “[o]ne
must go beyond these concepts, seeking assistance in the intuition” in order to
realize that it actually is the case that 5 added to 7 yields 12.
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2. For the verification of the correctness of 7 + 5 = 12 I can use contingent em-
pirical representations of 5—fingers on my hand.
I will treat the syntheticity of numbers in the next section. Here I focus on the second
point. How can I obtain a necessary proposition about all possible sets with cardinal-
ity 5 by using one particular set with cardinality 5? It could happen that I by accident
could loose a finger, or that my concept of “finger-on-my-hand” would change over
time such that a thumb would no longer be a finger. The answer is of course that
due to the “schema of magnitude” we realize the following: When we use the set
of (temporized images of the) five fingers we use it only with respect to its magni-
tude: We understand that we could have used any other set with five members, i.e.,
we could have used any other member of the equivalence class 5 for the verification.
The situation is strikingly close to geometrical schemata only there, however, it is
about construction and not reflection:
The individual drawn figure is empirical, and nevertheless serves to ex-
press the concept without damage to its universality, for in the case of
this empirical intuition we have taken account only of the action of con-
structing the concept, to which many determinations, e.g., those of the
magnitude of the sides and the angles, are entirely indifferent, and thus
we have abstracted from these differences, which do not alter the concept
of the triangle. (A713–4/B741–2)
In the case of the set of five finger-images, we realize they represent “the concept
without damage to its universality, for in the case of this empirical intuition we have
taken account only” of its size, i.e., its cardinality, as determined by the “schema of
magnitude”. The construction which takes place is on a higher level, namely that
we think of the five fingers as constituting a set. We realize, however, that we could
have used any other set with this magnitude, and the similarity to the geometrical
reasoning is striking: When we prove a proposition about a concept, say the number
five or a triangle, we take an intuition representing the concept together with the rules
determining any intuition falling under that concept. The “schema of magnitude”
thus secures that we can operate with specific images of numbers, taking them as
representatives of their types, prove properties about the images and be sure that
these properties apply, not only of the specific images (i.e., the tokens) but to any
image representing the type.
Precisely this aspect of Kant’s schematism was not understood by Frege (1980).
In §,13 Frege ascribes to Kant’s position that “each number has its own peculiarities.
To what extent a given particular number can represent all the others, and at what
point is own special character comes into play, cannot be laid down generally in
advance.” Well, the schema will take care of this, according to Kant.
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It should be noted that in contrast to geometry it is not by first-order construction
rather it is by reflection the determination of cardinality takes place. By this is meant
the following. The construction which takes place in geometry is construction of pure
intuitions which are first-order objects belonging to U . On the other hand arithmetical
reflection is construction of second-order objects, subsets of images, belonging to U .
Let me end this section by noting that now we are in a position to fully appreciate
the diagrammatic proof given on 7 of
1+2+ . . .+n =
n(n+1)
2
There are at least two types of universality arising. First we realize by the “schema of
magnitude” that an empirical intuition, a square, really represents the concept univer-
sally. Secondly, the property we prove about the particular token, is really—it is seen
by geometrical schemata—about any token square. Finally, again by the “schema
of magnitude” we realize that the property about any square can be transfered to the
number any such square represents universally.
2.4 Syntheticity of arithmetical propositions: Space and time
Both space and time ground our notion of number. Kant’s point when saying
“[t]houghts without content are empty” is precisely that if, say the equivalence class
corresponding to some number is empty, then thinking about that particular number
is not possible. The elements of the equivalence classes are mental objects, of which
there are two kinds: pure intuitions and images referring to empirical objects. But in
either case they are referring mediately or immediately to spatial objects. This rela-
tion between concepts and intuitions is exemplified in the relation between numbers
as types and equivalence classes, by saying “[o]ne must go beyond these concepts,
seeking assistance in the intuition” (B15). Pure intuitions, however, gain objectivity
through and only through the empirical:
Now the object cannot be given to a concept otherwise than in intuition,
and, even if a pure intuition is possible a priori prior to the object, then
even this can acquire its object, thus its objective validity only through
empirical intuition, of which it is the mere form. Thus all concepts and
with them all principles, however a priori they may be, are nevertheless
related to empirical intuitions, i.e., to data for possible experience. With-
out this they have no objective validity at all, but are rather a mere play,
whether it be with representations of the imagination or of the under-
standing. One need only take as an example the concepts of mathemat-
ics, and first, indeed, in their pure intuitions. Space has three dimensions,
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between two points there can be only one straight line, etc. Although
all these principles, and the representation of the object with which this
science occupies itself, are generated in the mind completely a priori,
they would still not signify anything at all if we could not always exhibit
their significance in appearances (empirical objects). [. . . ] In the same
science [mathematics] the concept of magnitude seeks its standing and
sense in number, but seeks this in turn in the fingers, in the beads of an
abacus, or in strokes and points that are placed before the eyes. The con-
cept is always generated a priori, together with the synthetic principles
or formulas from such concepts; but their use and relation to supposed
objects can in the end be sought nowhere but in experience, the possi-
bility of which (as far as its form is concerned) is contained in them a
priori. (A239–40/B298–9)
If the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 had been analytic then merely thinking about the con-
cepts of 5,7 and + would yield the result 12. But this is not possible. Our concept of
5 is not a collection of marks, rather it is an abstract type, whose semantics is deter-
mined by the “schema of magnitude” when the subject is interacting with the world,
and therefore numbers only have meaning in connection with intuitions. We have
to operate with particular tokens which are found “in the fingers, in the beads of an
abacus, or in strokes and points that are placed before the eyes”. A consequence of
this is that the notion of number is meaningless, only if all equivalence classes in U
are empty. In other words, our notion of number is meaningless, only if no objects
are representable. Thus it becomes an issue to guarantee that these classes are not
empty, and this seems to lead to a problem about large numbers. As Frege puts it:
I must protest against the generality of Kant’s dictum: without sensibility
no object would be given to us. [. . . ] Even those who hold that the
smaller numbers are intuitable, must at least concede that they cannot
be given in intuition any of the numbers greater that 10001000
1000
, about
which nevertheless we have plenty of information. (Frege; 1980, 101)
Tait formulates in the paper Finitism a similar criticism, which is extended to a cri-
tique of Kant’s notion of number through a critique of Kant’s dictum (in the words of
Tait) that “existence is restricted to what can be represented in intuition” (2005, 7).
Tait writes:
It is clear—and was so to Kant and Hilbert—that there are numbers, say
1010 or 30, which are not in any reasonable sense representable in intu-
ition. Kant seems to have responded to this by saying that at least their
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parts are representable in intuition [. . . ] The real difficulty, however,
is that the essence of the idea of Number is iteration. However and in
whatever sense one can represent the operation of successor, to under-
stand Number one must understand the idea of iterating this operation.
But to have this idea, itself not found in intuition, is to have the idea of
number independent of any sort of representation. (Tait; 2005, 35)
In should be clear from my exposition of Kant’s notion of number that Kant is
not in any way affected by the latter part of Tait’s criticism. Kant does not hold
an empirical understanding of number—rather the concept of a general number is
founded on the “schema of magnitude” which flows from the intellect, certainly not
from the empirical.
In the former part of the criticism Tait seems to have the same premise as does
Frege. Intuition in their understanding does not include pure intuition. Granting that
we have pure intuition Kant would respond by saying that by the very writing of
10001000
1000
and 1010 or 30 we in fact have intuitions. The very inscriptions provided
by Frege and Tait are intuitions. They are understood in terms of the exponenti-
ation function which is basically a primitive recursive function. Thus, principally
we can determine the equivalence-class-membership of these inscriptions—they are
numbers, as we have an intuition and a rule determining how to operate with this
intuition.
Let me give a general solution concerning meaningfulness of large numbers. As
it turns out it is our concept of space which ultimately provide arithmetic with its
objects. Our primary geometrical schemata (some equivalents of Euclid’s postulates)
lead to a production of a sequence of finite spaces,
S1,S2, . . . ,Sn, . . .
where Si is smaller than S j , if i < j. This sequence of pure spaces is a constructive
but potential infinite sequence. Thus given any natural number the equivalence class
corresponding to that number is inhabited, at least due to this sequence of increasing
finite pure spaces. But the justification of this argument, which refutes Frege’s crit-
icism, rests on Kant’s notion of space which I will take up in the next chapter. The
chapter following includes a general account of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics
and incorporated in this is an elaboration of the status of the natural numbers and
their axiomatization.
Time, however, is also a necessary condition for the concept of magnitude. The
concept of iteration is a necessary element in the “schema of magnitude” (“the suc-
cessive addition of one (homogeneous) unit to another”). Without iteration it would
be impossible to determine the magnitude for any given thing. Kant assumes nothing
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particular about the objects for numbers—they can be anything—but adding unit to
unit always takes place in time: “this how–many–times is grounded on successive
repetition, thus on time” (A242). Therefore, the natural numbers as a sequence of
numbers can only be represented as a progression in time. Furthermore, also the
most simple operations of arithmetic, say addition, takes place in time according to
Kant. In a letter to Schultz Kant writes: “If I view 3 + 4 as the expression of a
problem” then the results found “through the successive addition that brings forth the
number 4, only set into operation as a continuation of the enumeration of the number
3” (Ak. 10, 556). So I can take first three fingers together with four fingers and enu-
merate all of them. This enumeration ends by judging the fingers to constitute a set
with cardinality 7.16
So, number as schema generates under the condition of inner sense (time) the
synthesis of representations of objects subsumed under a concept. Thus cognition,
number, pure concept, representations of objects falling under empirical concept,
transcendental time–determination and the transcendental imagination are closely re-
lated in inner sense, as also Figure 2.1 illustrates: It all takes place under the condi-
tions of inner sense.
On the other hand Kant claims in the same letter to Schultz as quoted above that:
Time, as you correctly notice, has no influence on the properties of num-
bers (as pure determinations of magnitude) [. . . ] The science of num-
bers, notwithstanding the succession that every construct of magnitude
requires, is a purely intellectual synthesis, which we represent to our-
selves in thought. But insofar as specific magnitudes (quanta) are to be
determined in accordance with this science; and this grasping must be
subjected to the condition of time. (Ak. 10, 556-57)
The natural numbers are pure concepts (types) of the understanding, in the sense
that they are not derived from experience, but from the structure of our representa-
tion.17 Time has no influence on these types, as they are not dependent on time. The
rules determining the tokens (members of the equivalence classes) are pure intellec-
tual rules, which remain the same over time. This is the intensional aspect of number.
The objects in the equivalence classes, on the other hand, are ultimately empirical
objects, therefore spatial. But reasoning about numbers proceeds necessarily by way
16See also A164/B205.
17It is of course an interpretation to say that the numbers are pure concepts of the understanding, as
Kant claims there are only 12 of these categories. It would, however, not make much sense, I think, to
regard the numbers as nothing but pure. In this respect I completely agree with M. Young (1992, 174),
and I am generally sympathetic towards his short interpretation of Kant’s schematism.
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of mental images over time. When we do mathematics and examine the properties
of numbers, time is a necessary condition for the representations of numbers.18 The
interplay between pure concepts, tokens, time and space is summarized by Kant in
Dissertation by saying that
there is a certain concept which itself, indeed belongs to the understand-
ing but of which the actualization in the concrete (actuatio in concreto)
requires the auxiliary notions of time and space (by successively adding
a number of things and setting them simultaneously side by side). This is
the concept of number, which is the concept treated in ARITHMETIC.
(Ak. 2, 397)
Thus both space and time conditions our access to and the constitution of the nat-
ural numbers: They are constituted by non-temporal schemata but any use will be
temporal, and the meaning is ultimately provided by intuitions.
2.5 Conclusions on schemata
Numbers are not characterized extensionally—this would not be meaningful in
Kant’s framework. Number is rather given an intentional characterization in terms a
collection of rules. In order to fully appreciate this and to give a coherent account
we need Kant’s full theory of schemata—all the way through empirical, geometrical
and transcendental schemata. On the other hand we really get a coherent interpreta-
tion when the unwinded theory of schemata is taken into consideration. I think that
Charles Parsons failed to realize this in his article “Arithmetic and the Categories”
when concluding that “Kant did not reach a stable position on the place of the con-
cept of number in relation to the categories and the forms of intuition” (1992, 152).
In contrast to this, I hope my interpretation of Kant’s theory of schemata has shown,
precisely how Kant’s notion of number relates to the categories, and to the two forms
of intuition: Space and time.
I do agree with Shabel (2003a, 109) claiming that Euclidean reasoning provides a
handle for an understanding of the general theory of schemata. I think it is clear, that
Kant anticipates the type–token distinction by the triple: Concept–schema–image.
This is the heart of his theory: A schema gives an account for the relation between a
concept understood as a type and the objects to be subsumed under the concept. The
objects to be subsumed can be either pure or empirical. In the first case the objects are
given to us immediately in pure intuition by construction in a finite number of steps.
In the latter case the objects are subsumed mediately by temporized images. This
18Therefore, the situation is not as in mechanics, where time is studied together with the alteration of
placement in space.
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difference find expression in the aspects concerning construction and reflection and
in the not very well-explained notion of transcendental time determination which only
relates to the pure schemata. But common to both the geometrical and arithmetical
schemata is, that they are rule-governed procedures carrying universality, in such
a way that schemata found concepts and provide them with meaning through the
particular.
CHAPTER 3
Kant on Space, Schemata and Geometry
Infinity is perhaps the most important but philosophically the most difficult notion
in mathematics. When it comes to Kant it is certainly not trivial to give an account
of the role of the infinite in his theory of knowledge. The forgoing chapters dealing
with Kant’s (pre-)theory of schemata helps, nevertheless, immensely when trying to
understand the role of the infinite in Kant’s theory.
When arguing for space as being, not a concept, but an a priori intuition he writes
in the Transcendental Aesthetic that “[s]pace is represented as an infinite given mag-
nitude [Größe]” (B40).1 It has always been difficult for me to understand Kant’s
claim here as anything but a positive claim saying that space is actual infinite. This
impression is confirmed by the letter exchange between Kant and Schulze from 1790
(belonging to the Kant-Eberhard dispute). Here Kant discusses the ideality of space
and claims that “actu infinitum (the metaphysical given) is non datur a parte rei, sed
a parte cogitantis [not given on the side of the object, but on the side of the thinker]”
(Ak. 20, 421). On the face of it we could understand actu infinitum simply as an
idea, but this is not in agreement with Kant’s continuation: “This latter mode of rep-
resentation [actu infinitum], however, is not for this reason invented and false. On the
contrary, it absolutely underlies the infinitely progressing construction of geometrical
concepts” (Ak. 20, 421).
The nature of space and the the understanding of infinity are also central to Kant’s
investigations in Metaphysical Foundation where he provides (or tries to provide) an
epistemological foundation for Newtonian mechanics. Here Kant writes that “motion
in absolute (immovable) space” “in general natural science is unavoidable” (Ak. 4,
558–9), and that “[a]bsolute space is therefore necessary, not as a concept of an ac-
tual object, but rather as an idea”, i.e., as a concept of reason (Ak. 4, 560).2 The
confusion, however, does not diminish when the First Antinomy is read as Kant here
attempts to prove physical space to be—given our conceptual framework—neither
infinite nor finite.
It thus comes as no surprise that Kant’s understanding of infinity has been criti-
cized from various points of views. In The Principles of Mathematics Bertrand (Rus-
sell; 1903, §§ 249, 435–6) simply finds Kant to be inconsistent in this respect. And
throughout the 1920s and 1930s Hilbert and Bernays continuously attacked Kant’s
claim that space is “an infinite given magnitude”. In the programmatic article “On
1In comparison with the first edition “given” is emphasized in the second. This only stresses the
difficulties when interpreting the sentence.
2The translation given here is Friedman’s; (Kant; 2004).
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the infinite” Hilbert writes:3
In the attempt to prove the infinitude [Unendlichkeit] of space in a specu-
lative way, moreover, obvious errors were committed. From the fact that
outside of a region of space there always is still more space it follows
only that space is unbounded but by no means that is is infinite. (Hilbert;
1926, 374)
In this chapter I will present my analysis of the Kantian conception of infinity. In
doing this I will resolve the apparent disagreement between Kant and Hilbert/Bernays
by showing that Hilbert and Bernays misunderstood Kant. What they failed to under-
stand is that Kant uses magnitude (Größe) with two different meanings. Magnitude
can mean both quantum and quantitas. Given a quantum the “schema of magnitude”
can try to determine the quantitas of that quantum. The schema can succeed, if and
only if the size of the quantum is finite. Thus, in case the schema does not succeed the
quantum is not finite, therefore in-finite. My analysis will in fact show that Kant and
Hilbert are (in a certain sense) in complete agreement with respect to the objectivity
of the infinite.4
My analysis will in turn take us to Kant’s understanding of what it means to be an
object. This will be important for understanding why—on Kant’s view—there are no
postulates for number theory. Central here is that the role of postulates in the Kantian
epistemology is to produce objects—but numbers are rules of the understanding and
cannot be objects. The only real objects of mathematics thus turns out to be the
geometrical objects.
These questions concerning the Kantian notions of infinity, space and objects
have of course been dealt with quite extensively in the literature. I think, however,
that my analysis of the role of geometrical and arithmetical schematisation allows us
to make a reinterpretation of most of the central notions in Kant’s theory. Among
these are the notion of infinity and the notion of object.
But let us first of all see how space as a pure intuition both warrants and con-
straints the geometrical schemata.
The Transcendental Aesthetic is divided in two parts according to the two differ-
ent forms of intuition. The former part about space serves as a model for the latter
part about time; both concerning structure and argumentation. I find the section on
space more original and thorough and I concentrate my exposition on that.
3In (Hilbert; 1933) precisely the same critique is formulated with explicit reference to Kant. Another
place where Hilbert’s criticism is expressed is in (Bernays; 1930).
4This is important for the understanding of the development in the philosophy of mathematics in
the 20th century as it was precisely understanding of infinity which led Hilbert and Brouwer in two
incompatible directions. I will return to these matters later in this thesis, but see also (Posy; 1998).
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It is impossible not to compare the Aesthetic with the Schematism. Whereas
the Schematism is difficult and certainly in need of an interpretation the Aesthetic is
quite clear (at least according to Kantian standards). As noted in the previous chap-
ter the Schematism is (surprisingly) revised only with respect to a running header,
whereas the Aesthetic is given a thorough revision. The B-version of the Aesthetic is
a laudable presentation which will be my point of departure here.
The part on space has three sections: The Metaphysical exposition, the Transcen-
dental exposition, and the Conclusions. In the Metaphysical exposition §2 Kant gives
what in contemporary mathematics would be termed an intuitive or perhaps meta-
physical5 discussion of space. In a certain sense it is a pre-mathematical account of
some general and—according to Kant—a priori properties of space and spatial ca-
pacities that we as humans have. After having established what these properties are
Kant elaborates in the Transcendental exposition §3 on the connection between ge-
ometry as a science and these general properties of space. Stated briefly we can say
that the essence of these sections is that space is infinite and a pure (a priori) intuition
and that it is the structure (or pure form) of sensibility. In the Conclusions it is further
established that space is nothing more than pure intuition and structure of sensibility
leading to Kant’s empirical reality and transcendental ideality of space.
Although the whole section is generally clear there are of course difficulties in
the Metaphysical exposition. The full title of the section is “On space. §2 Metaphys-
ical exposition of this concept”. The surprising element is that space seems to be a
concept. This presents a curiosity as Kant is about to analyze sensibility—why does
he begin with a concept? Moreover, later in the very same section Kant concludes
that “space is an a priori intuition, not a concept” (B40). That space is introduced as
a concept could be a slip of the tongue, but when outlining the purpose of the section
Kant writes:
[W]e will expound the concept of space first. I understand by exposition
[Erörterung] (expositio) the distinct (even if not complete) representa-
tion [Vorstellung] of that which belongs to a concept; but the exposi-
tion is metaphysical when it contains that which exhibits the concept as
given a priori. (B38)6
We know that Kant divides the elements of human cognition exhaustively into intu-
itions and concepts. Concepts belong to reason and to the understanding, but “[t]he
5These terms of course bear on Kant’s own designations.
6In the first edition the first sentence of this quote runs “we will first consider space.” The rest of the
quotation is new in the second edition, which suggest Kant’s persistence on the conceptual element of
space.
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understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of
thinking anything. Only from their unification can cognition arise. But on this ac-
count one must not mix up their roles” (A51-2/B75-6). We have empirical concepts,
say of a dog, but we also posses pure concepts (categories) such as the concept of
magnitude (totality). In addition to these concepts we have “pure sensible concepts”
(A140/B180). Such a concept is constructible in the sense that an image can be con-
structed in a finite number of steps which together with the schema allow for univer-
sal reasoning about the concept. A category, on the other hand, is not constructible,
this “is something that can never be brought to an image at all” (A142/B181).7 From
what Kant writes later in the Critique it is clear that space is neither an empirical nor
a pure concept of the understanding. It could be that space is a pure sensible concept.
But this does not harmonize, for instance, with the fact that the sensible concepts are
constructible. We can construct finite spaces, but how should we construct a paradig-
matic image of space as such?
3.1 The notion of Vorstellung
Related to the problem outlined in the foregoing paragraphs is the problem of un-
derstanding what is meant by “the representation of space”—a term which is used
throughout the Aesthetic. In a large part of the important secondary literature on the
Critique focus is put on “the representation of space” and not just on “space”.8 What
could be meant by the expression “the representation of space”? And is there a differ-
ence between “space” and “the representation of space”? On pages A319-20/B375-7
Kant outlines his rather technical terminology concerning representation:
The genus is representation [Vorstellung] in general (repraensentatio).
Under it stands the representation with consciousness (perceptio). A
perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a
sensation (sensatio); an objective perception is a cognition (cognitio).
7See also A57/B81, where Kant introduces aesthetic concepts in addition to empirical and pure
concepts.
8See for instance (Allison; 2004) and (Warren; 1998). Warren opens his important article like this:
“The first major section of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Transcendental Aesthetic, is concerned
with the nature of space and time, and with the nature of our representation of them.” This more than
suggests that there is an important difference between say, “space” and “the representation of space”
(1998, 179). Warren also has a brief, but not really satisfying, discussion of what is meant by the
expression “the representation of —” (1998, 182n). Allison (2004, 117) writes, for instance in his
comments to B40: “It should be noted that the question concerns our representation of space, not
space itself.” Allison’s use of representation is not completely unambiguous it seems. Sometimes he
uses representation with a meaning close to Kant’s Vorstellung, sometimes he uses it with a modern
meaning, as “the representation of objects” (Allison; 2004, 173).
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The latter is either an intuition or a concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The
former is immediately related to the object and is singular; the latter is
mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things. A
concept is either an empirical or a pure concept, and the pure concept,
insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in a pure image
of sensibility), is called notio. A concept made up of notions, which goes
beyond the possibility of experience, is an idea or a concept or reason.
(A320/B376-B377)
From these pages it is clear that a representation—eine Vorstellung—can be vari-
ous elements within human cognition.9 It can be a sensation, an intuition, an object
falling under a concept a so on. Vorstellung is the very general word Kant uses
in very much the same way as Locke uses idea.10 Space is a very crucial element
within human cognition and in the course of determining its function Kant denotes
it sometimes as a concept, sometimes as a Vorstellung; both understood as a notion
of human cognition, whose role we are about to determine. Thus space as a concept
should be understood, not in some precise sense,11 but broadly as a notion, and rep-
resentation should be understood as an element of human cognition. The latter, by
the way, completely in parallel to how the “pure schema of magnitude [. . . ] is a
representation” (A142/B182).
In the two arguments—which I will treat below—for the a prioriness of space
given on A23-4/B38-9 Kant uses both “the representation of space” (die Vorstellung
des Raumes) and “[s]pace is a [. . . ] representation”. I propose that both should be
understood as ‘space as a representation’. It is certainly not the case that there is a
space which we try to represent in some way or another and that it is the latter which
is the object of our analysis. Although, It is true that Kant uses this understanding of
representation when e.g., he talks about representing time spatially as a continuous
line,12. A variant of this usage of representation is our modern understanding of
representation, which is used when we say that a mental image of dog is representing
9But note that Vorstellung is also used in a more non-technical way as—what we today would
term—a linguistic presentation. See for instance the quote from B38 as given above on page 52; or see
the subtitle on A158/B197. Both of these instances are standardly translated as representation (Kant;
1998), although I find “presentation” to be the semantically correct translation.
10With implicit reference to Locke, Kant writes that he wants to “preserve the expression idea in its
original meaning, so that it will not henceforth fall among the other expression by which all sorts of
representations are denoted in careless disorder” (A319/B376).
11Such as being either a category, an empirical concept or a pure sensible concept.
12“[W]e cannot even represent time without [. . . ] drawing a straight line (which is to be the external
figurative representation of time)” (B154).
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an empirical object dog.13 But this is not what is at stake here. Here Kant discusses
space as a Vorstellung.14
Thus space is a notion, a representation, a principle which this section is an expo-
sition of. Now, an exposition (expositio) in the Kantian terminology is a discussion
of a notion, but the discussion is not necessarily a complete and final explication or
presentation of everything which is contained in the notion.15 In §3 the exposition
is furthermore metaphysical, which means a priori. Therefore, metaphysics is under-
stood as a priori to geometry which it epistemologically precedes. Consequently the
Metaphysical exposition is a (possibly partial) outline of an epistemological foun-
dation of space in the first place, geometry in the second. That is, an outline of an
underlying capacity which partially warrants but also constraints our specific abilities
to construct and understand spatial objects.16 In chapter 1 we have seen that Kant’s
analysis of these abilities sums up to the fundamental geometrical schemata, which
are conceptualized first and foremost in the Euclidean postulates. In consequence
of this the Metaphysical exposition should be seen as a kind of pre-mathematics. A
pre-mathematics where Kant examines certain primitive spatial procedures and their
presuppositions.
Kant seems to have two options: Either he can analyze our concept of space,
completely independent of geometry, or he can grant that we have some geometrical
capacities, first and foremost the geometrical schemata, which we seek some episte-
mological foundation for. I argue that Kant primarily goes for the second option. The
main target of the exposition is to discuss space as a principle which warrants and
constraints capacities, whose codification are the fundamental geometrical schemata.
The Metaphysical exposition is therefore about epistemic presuppositions and its re-
sults are epistemologically prior but presupposed by geometry as a science. Let us
take a look at this non-mathematical and perhaps only partial outline of what the
properties of space are.
13Kant is close to this usage of representation on A69/B94.
14Thus, my understanding is different from Warren’s (1998) and Allison’s (2004)—see footnote 8.
Their interpretation implies that there is a space which we try to represent in some way or another.
Space as such would then be a kind of Nomenon, of which we have no access. Nevertheless we are able
to represent it. And this, certainly, seems not to be in accordance with Kant’s general understanding of
Nomenon.
15An exposition is understood in contrast to a definition. Kant uses the term “exposition, which is al-
ways cautious and which the critic can accept as valid to a certain degree while yet retaining reservations
about its exhaustiveness” (A729/B757). See also page 9 for a discussion of Kant’s use of definition.
16Although my approach is different from the approach found in (Shabel; 2003b) I end up very much
with the same general view on space, namely the view just formulated.
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3.2 The a prioriness of space
The section contains four numbered arguments. When I go through the different
arguments I will take Kant’s idea of schematism as serious as possible and relate the
arguments to geometrical schemata as much as possible. The first argument is:
I) Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer
experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related to some-
thing outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that
in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside
<and next to> one another, thus not merely as different but as in dif-
ferent places, the representation of space must already be their ground.
Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of
outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself
first possible only through this representation. (A23/B38)17
I see myself and other objects as occupying different places. I have a capacity to
spatially relate such objects to myself and I can, likewise, relate one object to another
one. This capacity, I suggest, that Kant has in mind is the capacity which mathemat-
ically is codified by Euclid’s first postulate: “To draw a straight line from any point
to any point” (see page 11). From me to an outer object I can pre-mathematically
think a relation; mathematically speaking this relation is an (imagined) line drawn
from me to the object. Kant’s claim here is that there must be a space in which this
takes place. Space precedes and makes possible the relations we can make between
ourselves and outer objects. This is necessarily so, and therefore space cannot be
empirical.18 Note that Kant is modest in this argument: He claims only that some
kind of space precedes (and is therefore a priori to) the capacity to spatially relate
objects. Nothing except a prioriness is claimed about the nature of the space. Such
a space has to be presupposed in order to partially explain the possibility of a very
basic non-mathematical feature of our experience, namely that we can spatially relate
objects.
17The three words between < and > are only found in the second edition.
18A great number of commentators have found this understanding of the first a priori argument both
to be “tautologous” and that it “proves too much”; see for instance (Allison; 2004, 100–4), but see
also (Guyer; 1987, 346) and (Strawson; 1966, 58). It is difficult for me to see that because we can use
relations (which we happen to call spatial relations) such as ‘outside’, ‘next to’, . . . , then by a tautology
space exists. Given that a tautology is something like a logically true formula in propositional logic it
is difficult for me to see how the argument could be a tautology and at the same time prove too much.
Warren (1998) gives good arguments why the tautologous argument does not prove to much. He shows
how the argument does not work for an empirical concept like brightness: From the existence of an a
posteriori relation like ‘is brighter than’ it does not follow that a one-dimensional so-called brightness-
space is presupposed.
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The connection between the pre-mathematical discussion given here in the Meta-
physical exposition and the fundamental geometrical schemata was already seen, I
suppose, by Johann Schultz. Schultz was a colleague of Kant at the University of
Königsberg and a true defender of Kant’s critical philosophy, who wrote the very
first commentary to the First Critique. Schultz wrote: “If I should draw a line from
one point to another, I must already have a space in which I can draw it” (Allison;
2004, 113). The argument here (or perhaps one should say claim) is the same as
Kant’s, except that the context here is geometry and not space as such. I will return
to this thought after presenting the last three arguments in §3.
Kant’s second a priori argument has the same target, although it is even more
simple than the first.
2) [. . . ] One can never represent that there is no space, though one can
very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is
therefore [. . . ] an a priori representation. (A24/B38–9)19
The argument is that we cannot even imagine an experience of an (outer) object
without the object is given in some space. We can imagine an empty space, but not
an object not presented in a space. Therefore space is not a posteriori to the objects,
and space cannot be derived from the experience of objects.
‘Imagine’, ‘imagination’ and ‘power of imagination’ are very important concepts
in the discussion of space. Imagination and pure space are deeply connected accord-
ing to Kant. This is an important premise for him when arguing for the infinity of
space, as we will see below. The scientific study of space as done in geometry is
when it comes right down to it a study of our spatial power of imagination as codified
by the geometrical schemata. The schemata are a product of the transcendental imag-
ination. Following this line of thought makes it clear that the geometrical counterpart
of Kant’s argument here is, that we can construct geometrical spaces which are empty
regarding figures; but we can not construct figures independent without some space
in which these figures are constructed. Our spatial procedures for construction of
spatial relations between objects need some kind of space to exercise and live in. In
this sense space precedes and warrants geometrical schemata.
19Again we see subtleties in the translation of Vorstellung. The German text is: “Mann kann sich
niemals eine Vorstellung davon machen, daß kein Raum sei”. I think one should understanding Vorstel-
lung in this context, not as having the technical meaning, such as being a sensation or an object or
something like that, but rather as one cannot imagine that there is no space. The hypothetical subjunc-
tive in “sei” supports this understanding. The second use of Vorstellung, however, in: “Er [. . . ] is eine
Vorstellung a priori” is of course to be understood in the technical sense. (The italic of “a priori” is only
in the English translation [sic!]).
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3.3 The arguments for space as intuition
Until now Kant has only argued that there must be a space, but we know nothing
about it, except that it is a priori. The last two arguments numbered as 3) and 4)
of the Metaphysical exposition purports to show that space cannot be a concept. As
cognition is either conceptual or intuitive it follows that space must be intuitive.20
More specifically, by analyzing the pre-mathematical notion of space Kant wants to
show in the first intuition argument that space cannot be a general concept. A general
concept to Kant is—not surprisingly—a concept which generally applies to a variety
of things and thus gives rise to a collection of objects, such as the collection of all
men or the collection of all triangles.
The first of the intuition arguments runs as follows (note that, as usual Kant begins
with the conclusion):
<3)> Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations
of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent
a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by
that only parts of one and the same unique [alleinigen] space. And these
parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its
components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather
are only thought in it. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus
also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations.
(A25/B39)21
On the face of it we could understand the argument in the following way. We
can only imagine one space. We can construct and experience many spaces, but we
can only imagine them as being part of one space—being in an all including singular
space. Therefore the all-including singular space is the foundation for all kinds of
spaces, because we cannot imagine the situation in any other way. But the argument
is, of course, more subtle than this.22
What is at stake here are the epistemological relations between a general concept
of space, particular (finite) spaces and the all-including singular space, which Kant
20“[B]esides intuition there is no other kind of cognition than through concepts” (A68/B93).
21It is the sentence “erstlich kann man sich nur einen einigen Raum vorstellen” which is translated
into “first, one can only represent a single space”.
22In the literature there is a general discussion on the so-called ‘argument from geometry’, which is
a transcendental argument with the structure, that as we have a geometry with certain characteristics it
follows that space must be intuitive. Allison (2004, 116–8) claims that this argument is found in the
Transcendental exposition whereas Friedman (1992, 70) and Shabel (2004) claim to find the argument
in the Metaphysical exposition. To my best knowledge we find it in its clearest form here in the first
intuition argument.
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wants to demonstrate exists as something different from the general concept. More-
over, he wants to show that the all-including space has priority over and precedes
both the ‘smaller’ particular spaces and the general concept of space (of which the
particular spaces are instances).
A central claim of my chapter 1 is that throughout the Critique Kant argues that
humans are able to perform general spatial procedures which can be reduced to a
codification given by some fundamental geometrical schemata. Such procedures,
however, need to exercise in some kind of space—this we partially know from the
a priori arguments. By using our schemata we can construct spatial objects like tri-
angles and finite spaces. In chapter 1 I also gave an analysis of how the concept of
triangle is founded on the schema of triangle, which in turn rests on the fundamental
schemata. A similar analysis could be given with respect to the general concept of
space and its schema.
I claim that this relation between general spatial concepts and the fundamental
schemata is what Kant is thinking of in the sentence “these parts [the finite spaces]
cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components”. This
view is reflected in the conclusion of the Schematism, namely that our pure sensible
concepts are possible, only because of schemata. From this it follows that the singular
space is epistemologically prior to the general concept of space. Let S denote the all-
including singular space, and let Si be the smaller parts of S which are constructed
on the basis of schematic limitations of S. Then, the argument says, S cannot be




because S precedes epistemologically any Si.
Understood in this way Kant’s argument makes sense.23 The argument is also
found in the Kant-Eberhard discussion:
[T]he representation of space (together with that of time) has a peculiar-
ity found in no other concept, viz., that all spaces are only possible and
thinkable as parts of one single space, so that the representation of parts
already presupposes that of the whole. (Ak. 20, 419)24
23As already noted, Allison does not understand the first intuition argument in this way. He finds
the argument to be based on the notion of (Kantian) intension (see below for explanation of this term).
Thus space cannot be a general concept because the intensions of concepts “are logically prior” to the
concept itself (Allison; 2004, 110). It is firstly unclear what is meant by “logically”; secondly, certain
general concepts can precede intensions not yet determined.
24The translation is Allison’s (1973, 176).
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Or at least the argument makes sense inasmuch as it shows that space cannot be
a general sensible concept. It is, however, much more problematic to see that the
argument should demonstrate the all-including singular space to be unique. This is a
problem I will elaborate on in ??
Turning to the infinity of space Kant argues:
4) Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now one must, to
be sure, think of every concept as a representation that is contained in an
infinite set of different possible representations (as their common mark
[Merkmal]), which thus contains these under itself; but no concept, as
such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations
within itself. Nevertheless space is so thought (for all the parts of space,
even to infinity, are simultaneous). Therefore the original representation
of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept. (B39–40)
The standard way to understand this deals with the Kantian notions of intension
and extension of a concept. The extension of a concept A is the collection of concepts
which have A as their common marks (Merkmale). In the graph below all the concepts
standing under ‘Physical body’ are contained in the extension of it. The intension,
on the other hand, is made up by the sub-concepts (Merkmale) which constitute the
concept; ‘human’, for example, is constituted by ‘rational’ and ‘animal’. In this sense
the intension of a concept is an unlimited but finite conjunction of concepts, whereas






The usual understanding of the second intuition argument is thus that no con-
cept, according to Kant, can have “an infinite set of representations within itself”.
Of course, Kant claims this in opposition to Leibniz. According to Leibniz certain
complete concepts exist. A complete concept is a concept completely describing a
unique object, or monad as Leibniz prefers to call the objects. Two objects x and y
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x 6= y →∃P(P(x) ↔¬P(y))
)
.
A complete concept is thus a possibly infinite conjunction of primitive concepts.
Aggregates, on the other hand, are made up of more objects, and disjunctions can
occur in their descriptions. According to Kant Leibnizean complete concepts are
meaningless, because we as human finite beings do not have access to them.25
Now, another premise for Kant’s argument is that “[s]pace is represented as an
infinite given magnitude [Größe]”. Before presenting the implicit argument for this
premise let me introduce Kant’s distinction between quantity and quantum. In his
Lectures on Metaphysics Kant says:
Quantity: determination of a being, how many times it is posited [Quan-
titas: determinatio entis, quoties sit positum].
Quantum: it is one thing, in which there is quantity [Quantum: est unum,
in quo est quantitas]. (Ak. 28, 21)
The following argument showing space to be infinite is again an instance of the ‘argu-
ment from geometry’. Let us suppose that we can construct some initial finite space
S0. Given the category of unity26 we can use S0 as a measure for determining the
magnitude of other finite spaces. Using our geometrical schemata (basically Euclid’s
second postulate) we can construct a sequence of finite spaces
S0,S1, . . . ,Sn, . . .
such that Si+1 is precisely 1 unit bigger than Si. If we assume the all-including space
S to be finite, say of size m, then Sm would be 1 unit bigger than m. But Sm is part
of S, thus S cannot be finite. It is infinite. Thus S is a quantum but the quantitas in
it is indeterminable. Kant uses Größe for both quantum and quantitas. Thus S is an
infinite given Größe (quantum) in the sense that it is a real, non-fictional epistemo-
logical pre-condition, in which there is quantitas. In this sense also the singularity of
space can be understood under “infinite given magnitude”. Any attempt, however, to
determine its magnitude, its quantitas, is doomed to fail. The schema of magnitude
determines infinity in the sense that a quantum Q is infinite just in case the schema
is not able to determine the size of Q. Therefore S is in-finite.27 Note that for Kant
25See (Posy; 1995) for an elaboration of the connection between Kant’s and Leibniz’ paradigms.
26Which in Prolegomena is termed “Einheit (das Maß)”.
27“[O]ne can only view as infinite a magnitude in comparison to which each specified homogeneous
magnitude is equal to only a part” (Ak. 20, 419).
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there is only one type of real (or objective) size, namely the finite. The contemporary
mathematical understanding of the size of infinities such as ℵ0 is as remote to Kant
as can possibly be. S is infinite in precisely the same sense as the real numbers are
uncountable to an intuitionist. In fact it is intuitionist understanding of negation; it is
a negative claim: We can prove that any attempt to ascribe a finite number to S, like
any any attempt to enumerate the real numbers will necessarily fail. If ⊥≡ (0 = 1)
then we can express it like this:28
“S is infinite” ≡ “(S is finite) →⊥”.
S is infinite in actu in the sense that S is a space which cannot be finite although
it necessarily exists. It is not potential like an acorn is an oak tree in potency, or
like a cold body is hot in potency, or like the sequence S0,S1, . . . ,Sn, . . . is potentially
infinite. It is actual as an epistemological warrant of our geometrical schemata and
henceforth of our geometrical concepts.
We are now in a better position to understand Kant’s second intuition argument.
S contains an infinite collection of spaces. Thus S has—in the words of Kant—”an
infinite set of representations within itself”. But no concepts has infinite intensions
(no complete concepts) in the Kantian epistemology, therefore S is not a concept, but
an intuition.
To finish the section let me give Schultz’ transcendental arguments (as found in
(Allison; 2004, 113)):
If I should draw a line from one point to another, I must already have a
space in which I can draw it. And if I am able to continue drawing it as
long as I wish without end, then this space must already be given to me
as an unlimited one, that is, as an infinite one.
Schultz is crystal clear here, but Kant has the same argument in §12 of Prolegomena,
where postulate 2 presupposes space as intuition and they also belong to the Kant-
Eberhard controversy.29
28See footnote 9 for an elaboration on the intuitionistic meaning of the logical symbols such as
implication and negation. This meaning amount to the so-called Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK)
interpretation.
29Kant writes, in Allison’s (1973, 176) translation: “[T]he geometer expressly grounds the possibility
of his task of infinitely increasing a space (of which there are many) on the original representation of a
single infinite space, as a singular representation, in which alone the possibility of all spaces, proceeding
to infinity, is given” (Ak. 20, 420).
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3.4 Evaluation of the arguments given in the Metaphysical exposition
I hope to have provided evidence for my general view on the Metaphysical exposition.
Basically it is an argument in favor of epistemic presupposition. More precisely, it is
here we find Kant’s ‘argument from geometry’: Humans posses certain fundamental
spatial procedures. In the Metaphysical exposition Kant discusses what can warrant
but also constrain such procedures. He argues that there must be some a priori space
in which these can operate and that this space cannot be conceptual as concepts,
themselves, are founded on corresponding schemata. So far so good.
There are, however, certain problems with some of the details of the arguments.
Firstly, the claim that the all-including space should be unique is stated without
giving any evidence. Viewed historically, it is not surprising that Kant find it difficult
to argue for this. Perhaps it is not settled by now, what the structure of space is.
General relativity theory tells us that locally space is Euclidean but globally it is
hyperbolic. Thus the constitutive principles of space depends on the perspective.
What Kant shows is, that there is necessarily some space—but he does not tell us
much about that space. In fact he only examines that space in the light of basically
the first two Euclidean postulates. For sure there is nothing about orthogonal, nor
parallel lines (Euclid’s postulate four and five). Therefore, after the Metaphysical
exposition we only know that space as a governing principle for basic schemata must
be a priori, infinite and in some sense non-conceptual.
Secondly, the arguments for space as intuition also have problems. Of course,
the premise that cognition can only arise on the basis of concepts or intuition is dis-
putable. Moreover, the analogy in the last argument between Vorstellungen in con-
cepts and space, respectively, is perhaps a poor analogy. In the following I will use
a modern linguistic approach to analyze this problem. Say an expression A has B
and C as its intension. Using this we can syntactically identify A as B∧C.30 Now,
according to Kant, if a concept is expressible by an expression with an intension,
then this intension consists of a finite conjunction of expressions, say B1 ∧ . . .∧Bn.
On the other hand, suppose we have a sequence of spaces (Si) which are definable
by expressions Ci, such that Si = {x | Ci(x)}, then if we want to have the full space S
which is the union of all Si, then
30For the following it does not matter whether we use the syntactic approach or the semantic approach
which Kant used. If we let Ā denote the Fregean extension of A, that is the collection {x |A(x)}, then to
say A = B∧C is the same as Ā = B̄∩C̄.




= {x | there exists Ci such that Ci(x)}.
= {x | C1(x)∨C2(x)∨ ·· ·∨Cn(x)∨ ·· ·}
In this way we see, that intension are conjunctions, where as spatial inclusions are
disjunctions. Thus the analogy is perhaps only a weak analogy, and consequently
the argument does not carry the power Kant thought it had. And then I have not
even mentioned another problem. Suppose that the analogy between the intension
of a concept and the concept itself works. Then at least for empirical concepts it
is (perhaps) true that the Merkmale constituting the intension of a concept precedes
epistemologically the concept itself. But what about pure concepts, like causality?
Here Kant would probably claim that the concept, causality, and its intension, cause
and effect, are given simultaneously. If this is true, then the second intuition argument
attempts to show that space cannot be an empirical concept. But this seems strange
given the fact that the two a priori arguments show space not to be a posteriori.
What however strikes me when reading the two intuition arguments is that Kant
does not use the following argument. Given the unbounded infinite increasing se-





simply because it is impossible to imagine any operation realizing the union of the
spaces, here denoted by ∪. No human can ever posses a schema uniting an infinite
union of increasing unbounded spaces. A union which in modern non-constructive
terms is possible through transfinite recursion. Thus the equation is simply mean-
ingless within Kant’s framework. But in fact, later in the Critique Kant uses this
argument together with an infinite variant of the first intuition argument:
[I]t is by no means permitted to say of such a whole, which is divisi-
ble to infinity, that it consists of infinitely many parts. For though all
the parts are contained in the intuition of the whole, the whole division
is not contained in it; this division consists only in the progressive de-
composition, or in the regress itself, which first makes the series actual.
Now since this regress is infinite, all its members (parts) to which it has
attained are of course contained in the whole as an aggregate, but the
whole series of the division is not, since it is infinite successively and
never is as a whole; consequently, the regress cannot exhibit any infinite
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multiplicity or the taking together of this multiplicity into one whole.
(A524/B552)
Space is not made up of its parts.
3.5 Pure space, geometry and the empirical space
Kant begins the Transcendental exposition by:
I understand by a transcendental exposition the explanation of a con-
cept as a principle from which insight into the possibility of other syn-
thetic a priori cognitions can be gained. For this aim it is required 1) that
such cognitions actually flow from the given concept, and 2) that these
cognitions are only possible under the presupposition of a given way of
explaining this concept. (B40)
The “concept” Kant is talking about here is, of course, space as intuition, which can
also be understood as a principle governing human space. The difference between
the metaphysical exposition and the transcendental exposition is that, in the former
we consider presuppositions which precede geometry as science and in the latter we
explain the relation between the metaphysical space and geometry.
Human spatial procedures are not as such part of the mathematical science ge-
ometry. They are basic epistemological capacities. They are, however, the subject
of geometry and as such they are, according to Kant, codified by the postulates of
Euclidean geometry. Therefore geometry, as a scientific study of space and the ob-
jects which we can construct in it on the basis of schemata, is possible only because
these representations (Vorstellungen)—space as intuition and schemata—exist in the
first place. Precisely in this sense do geometry and geometrical concepts “flow from”
space as intuition, which therefore ground them in the first place. As geometry stud-
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As the account in chapter 1 showed the primary method in geometry is based
on schematic construction in pure intuition. Now, how is this precisely to be under-
stood? Kant thinks that Euclidean geometry as a science is a complete and correct
codification/description of human spatial capacities. Therefore, constructions based
on Euclidean postulates stands in a one-to-one correspondence with schematic con-
struction in pure intuition. Thus geometrical knowledge is synthetic a priori.
3.6 The relation between pure and empirical space
In this section I will give my interpretation of the relation between pure and empirical
space. I basically build on the Conclusions given just after §3 in The Transcendental
Aesthetic—the part on space. These conclusions need to be seen together with the
Axioms of Intuition. But we will again see that Kant’s theory of schematism provide
us with important tools in our understanding.
The Metaphysical exposition took for granted that we posses some basic capac-
ities which puts us in a position where we can use concepts like ‘inside’, ‘outside’,
‘outside at different places’, ‘several spaces’, ‘is related to’, and so on. Such con-
cepts presuppose a space which has certain features. Space is a pure form of outer
intuition. As opposed to the pure intuition we have empirical intuition and the de-
cisive point here is how these two are related. Now, Kant actually claims that pure
intuition provides us with a structure of the outer empirical sense, which is a con-
sequence of the fact that “the empirical intuition is only possible through the pure
intuition” (A165/B206). As with the Transcendental Aesthetic this is put forward
under the premise that matter and form are separable. And as it turns out, the form is
our perceptual grid.
The important lesson to draw from the Axioms of Intuition is that all intuitions,
including physical objects, are extensive magnitudes, i.e., are objects which are ca-
pable of some mathematical description. How come it is like this? This fact of
sensibility is explained by the fundamental role categories of quantity play in human
cognition:
All appearances [. . . ] cannot be apprehended, [. . . ] except through the
synthesis of the manifold through which the representations of a deter-
minate space or time are generated, i.e., through the composition of the
homogeneous manifold in intuition in general, insofar as through it the
representation of an object first becomes possible, is the concept of mag-
nitude (Quanti). Thus even the perception of an object, as appearance, is
possible only through the same synthetic unity of the manifold of given
sensible intuition through which the unity of the composition of the ho-
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mogeneous manifold is thought in the concept of a magnitude, i.e., the
appearances are all magnitudes. (B202–3)
In order to have an experience of an object, we need to experience a collection of
units, which are homogeneous with respect to some property. Thus we experience a
plurality of homogeneous units in which we judge unity. This is due to the “schema of
magnitude”.31 This very fact of the constitution of the objects of the empirical world
ensures that mathematics—at least numbers—are applicable. But of course, this does
not tell us that the empirical space conforms according to the pure geometrical space.
“Space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of outer sense”
Kant says (A26/B42). This he can claim on the basis that space is a priori, it is a
necessary condition which human acquiring knowledge has to obey. As we know
from the a priori arguments, space precedes all objects and therefore all objects are
arranged according to space. Space is empirical real in this sense. But now, “if one
abstracts from these objects, it is a pure intuition, which bears the name of space”
(A27/B43). What does Kant mean by ‘abstracting from objects’. Again the Schema-
tism provide us with help.
The opening of the chapter on Schematism begins with the fundamental question
of how do we subsume appearances under concepts. This is very question which
the Schematism needs to answer. The example Kant gives deals with the relation
between pure sensible forms and empirical forms met in objects. As we know, the
central aspect which is necessary is homogeneity between different elements within
our cognition. “Thus the empirical concept of a plate has homogeneity with the pure
geometrical concept of a circle, for the roundness that is though in the former can be
intuited in the latter” (A137/B176). This example is nothing but a reminiscence of the
discussion on how an empirical intuition can be pure. Remember32 a triangle drawn
on paper can function as a pure intuition for universal reasoning, when the image
(the token on the paper) is taken together with the constructing method of that token,
i.e., when the image of the triangle is understood only together with the schema of
the triangle. This applies of course to all kinds of empirical objects. This turns an
empirical intuition into a pure intuition is precisely what is lies in the act to “abstract
from these objects”. It means simply, to give a geometrical description of the spatial
form by geometrical schemata. In such a geometrical description all breadth of lines,
extension of points, inaccuracies in angles and the like is ignored. We could say that
one geometricalizes the object.
Geometrical schemata do not exist without a space, these two elements of human
cognition belong together. They form an a priori structure which is the structure we
31See the forgoing chapter on arithmetical schematism.
32See pages 5 and 22.
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apply—and have to apply, according to Kant—to the sensible world. Objects have to
be given in some space, and the science of space is geometry. Therefore, Kant says,
the objects must conform to what we learn in geometry.
One must not think however, that space exists in any other sense than relatively
to humans. Space is nothing in itself33
“All things are next to one another in space,” is valid under the limitation
that these things be taken as objects of our sensible intuition. If here I
add the condition to the concept and say “All things, as outer intuitions,
are next to one another in space,” then this rule is valid universally and
without limitation. (A27/B43)
This is the transcendental ideality of space.
33Precisely this property of Kantian space makes it really puzzling, why there seems to be a difference
between “the representation of space” and “space in itself” in the treatments by, say, (Warren; 1998)
and (Allison; 2004).
CHAPTER 4
Truth, Knowledge and the Determination of Kantian Objects
In the foregoing chapters a question has been lying just underneath the surface which
now need to be answered. The question is: ‘what does it mean to be an object?’. For
our purpose this is interesting for a variety of reasons. First and foremost we need
to know what Kant counts as a mathematical object. In the previous chapters we
have encountered the problem concerning the natural numbers. Apparently natural
numbers cannot be objects to Kant—they are rules of the understanding, which give
rise to abstract concepts in sense of intensional types. Are there good reasons to
maintain this position? Secondly, it is of course interesting in itself to clarify this
notion of object within the Kantian epistemology. Thirdly, for a re-interpretation
of the Kantian theory of knowledge taking schematism as a central concept it is an
important test whether it can provide a useful characterization of the notion of object.
There is in the literature a surprising consensus with respect to the Kantian un-
derstanding of object.1 Now, x is an object in case at least two conditions obtain:
1. x can be found in space or time.
2. x is understood as a unit, there is something that unites it.
Nothing surprises about 1. This is the at the core of the Transcendental Aesthetic,
where we learn that all thought must “ultimately be related to intuitions, thus, in our
case to sensibility, since there is no other way in which objects can be given to us”
(A19/B33). Item 2 is also not so surprising. An object is a certain unity found in an
appearance. But to cognize an object as an object we need more, we need concepts.
[T]here are two conditions under which alone the cognition of an ob-
ject is possible: first, intuition, through which it is given, but only as
appearance; second, concept, through which an object is thought that
corresponds to this intuition. (A92/B125)
Apparently there is a distinction here between an object given as an appearance and
the object that “corresponds to this intuition”. An intuition is an object, or perhaps,
rather a kind of pre-object, because it does not make sense to talk about objects which
are objects independently of any cognition. Thus to be an object means that there is
(at least) the possibility for the object to be judged as being an object. This seems
to lead towards schematisation as an ingredient in the characterization. So to be an
object means to be an intuition which can be subsumed under a concept. This thought
1See for instance (Posy; 2000), (Allison; 2004) and (Longuenesse; 1998).
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is expressed later in the Transcendental deduction: “object is that in the concept of
which the manifold of a given intuition is united”.2
That we are able to experience objects as substances3 is an important theme in
the Deduction. It will, however, take me to far away to treat this here. Nevertheless,
I want to note the following. According to Kant we can experience objective spatial
groupings which are not merely accidental combinations.4 It is due to the unity of
the understanding that there is an objective element in our experience.5 But our
perceptions are qua intuition embedded in a network of imagined possible (past) and
future events and this is a subjective element. The objective element, however, enters
the picture when we experience a substance, as a substance, that is, something which
is not changed over (the objective) time. This element of invariance over time which
is inextricably bound up with the notion of object takes me to an aspect which Posy
(1998, 316) terms Kant’s “principle of complete determination for intuited (and thus
existent) objects” or “Predicative Completeness” (Posy; n.d., 7).
4.1 The complete determination of objects
Every thing [Ding], however, as to it possibility, further stands under the
principle of thoroughgoing determination; according to which among
all possible predicates of things, insofar as they are compared with their
opposites, one must apply to it. (A571/B579)
The principle is rather interesting and has striking similarities with the Leibnizean–
Wolffian principle that each individual thing is completely determined through its
complete and individuating concept.6 Now, the principle has at least two different
interpretations: 1. It is only an ontological principle; every thing has fixed truth values
once it becomes an object of experience, or 2. It a principle in the sense of 1 but also
2See also: “Wenn [. . . ] durch den Verstandesbegriff die Verknuepfung der Vorstellungen [. . . ] als
allgemeingueltig bestimmt wird, so wird der Gegenstand durch dieses Verhaeltsnis bestimmt, und das
Urteil ist objektiv.” (Prolegomena, §19)
3‘Substance’ is here used, not as the category, but rather as “substantia phaenomenon”; see for
instance A265/B321 and A277/B333.
4“Since, however, if representations reproduced one another without distinction, just as they fell
together, there would in turn be no determinate connection but merely unruly heaps of them, and no
cognition at all would arise; their reproduction must thus have a rule in accordance with which a rep-
resentation enters into combination in the imagination with one representation rather than with others”
(A121).
5See instance B142.
6See for instance the note made by Guyer and Wood (Kant; 1998, 746n). They point out that this
Leibnizean principle is, in fact, called the “principle of thoroughgoing determination” by Baumgarten,
for instance. To use another term by Posy, here we again see how Kant humanizes central elements of
the Leibnizean paradigm.
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an epistemological principle; truth values are only given insofar as they can be known
to us—there are no transcendent truth values.
The argument for the first interpretation of the principle is intrinsically bound of
with the deduction of the categories. Nevertheless, I claim that Kant has the second
interpretation in mind. A brief argument for this is the following. Below I argue for
an alternative characterization of object, namely that objects are appearances which
are capable of being subsumed under a concept, through the schema of the concept.
Therefore, due to the schema we have principal access to all aspects of a given object.
This understanding of object leads to both an ontological and epistemological aspect
of the principle of complete determination. Kant departs, given this understanding
of the principle, from Leibniz/Wolff in a very essential ways. Given any primitive
predicate P and an object x we will sooner or later be able to decide whether P(x) is
true or not. On the other hand, Kant does certainly not claim that there is a complete
concept of a given object. This can only be an idea.7 This is partially due to the
fact that the collection of all possible predicates is a potential infinite collection, thus
the whole collection can only be an idea;8 partially because an infinite conjunction
of concepts is incomprehensible to finite human beings. Therefore, the complete
concept of an object, which is the real concept to Leibniz, can only be a limit-concept
to Kant. Kant therefore only works with local decidability rather than global: Given
an object, we have decidability for that object. But we do not have decidability for
all kinds of questions, such as “is the empirical world finite?”.
According to Posy (1995, 1998) the principle of complete determination is ex-
pressible by the formula:





where P is a primitive predicate-symbol and free variables need not denote. The
formula expresses that if an object is given then tertium non datur applies to the
object. This is in contrast with a global version of tertium non datur:
P(x)∨¬P(x). (4.2)
7The denial of a complete concept is stated by Kant on A580/B608).
8“The proposition Everything existing is thoroughly determined signifies not only that of every
given pair of opposed predicates, but also of every pair of possible predicates, on of them must always
apply to it [. . . ] the thing itself is compared transcendentally with the sum total of all possible predicates.
What it means is that in order to cognize a thing completely one has to cognize everything possible and
determine the thing through it, whether affirmatively or negatively. Thoroughgoing determination is
consequently a concept that we can never exhibit in concreto in its totality, and thus it is grounded on an
idea which has its seat solely in reason, which prescribes to th e understanding the rule of its complete
use.”(A573/B601)
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Although I certainly am sympathetic towards Posy’s idea, it is not completely clear
and it needs some elaboration. It is not clear, for instance, which interpretation—the
ontological or the combined ontological/epistemological—the formula models. This
question is connected with the question of logic; it is not clear over which logic the
formulae should be read. If we take classical logic as basic logic then the interpreta-
tion must be the ontological, but over this logic formulae (4.1) and (4.2) are clearly
equivalent. Thus we need another logic. Posy is probably thinking of intuitionistic
logic. Let us interpret (4.1) with the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation.9
If I claim (4.1) to be valid then I should posses a method Φ such that given evidence of
truth of the antecedent then Φ converts this into evidence of truth of the consequent.
To make the antecedent true means to provide an object witnessing the existential
quantifier. On the other hand, to make a disjunction true means to posses a method
which shows that at least one of the disjuncts is true and show which one it is. Thus
Φ should be a function which takes any intuited object x and any predicate P and
decides whether P(x) is true or false. As I argued above it is reasonable to interpret
Kant as saying that in fact humans have such a method. On this view, Φ applied to P
gives us the schema corresponding to P. Thus Φ is a generally a method which goes
from concepts to schemata. Here we see again that a concept and the corresponding
schema are two different Vorstellungen. The predicate P corresponds to the concept,
whereas Φ(·,P) is the schema; a rule governed method.
But when one investigates the details of this understanding of (4.1) problems
show up.
Firstly, the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation really is not an
9The BHK-interpretation is a heuristic interpretation based on the notions of informal proof and
construction. A proof should be understood as a construction which verifies a statement. The interpre-
tation takes the meaning of prime formulae for granted. For complex A, BHK explains “p proves A”,
which we abbreviate by p : A, in terms of p′ : B for ‘immediate’ sub-formulae B of A. The defining
clauses relevant for our problem are:
(⊥) ⊥ denotes contradiction and there is no proof of contradiction.
(∨) p : A∨B iff p is a pair (p0, p1), p0 ∈ {0,1} and p1 : A if p0 = 0 and p1 : B if p0 = 1.
(→) p : A → B iff p is a construction taking any q such that q : A into p(q) such that p(q) : B.
(¬) p : ¬A iff p is a construction taking any q where q : A into p(q) such that p(q) : ⊥.
(∀) p : ∀xA(x) iff p is a construction taking any t from the intended domain into p(t) such that
p(t) : A(t).
(∃) p : ∃xA(x) iff p is a pair (p0, p1), where p0 is an object and p1 : A(p0).
The interpretation tells us under which circumstances we can (constructively) claim or assert a certain
formula A: We can claim A, when we can constructively prove it. And BHK then analyzes this notion.
For instance, a proof of an existential statement is constructive if it provides a witness together with a
constructive proof of the desired property of that witness.
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interpretation—it is only a heuristic reading of the intuitionistic symbols. It does
not provide a real semantics.10
Secondly, intuitionistic logic—as a formal11 language—does not really represent
that we can talk about ‘things’ which cannot be intuited. An example of such a thing
is ‘the empirical world’. The problem is that if we have a term t being a name for
that, then in connection with an interpretation in a model, t will denote. All terms in
intuitionistic logic denote.
Thirdly, time does not enter the picture (in any correct way) when using only
intuitionistic logic. It is correct though that somehow, in the Kripke semantics for
intuitionistic time does show up: The possible worlds can be seen as states in time,
and when a proposition is proved, then it becomes true. But before that moment, it
was false. This, however, is not the notion of truth we want. We want a notion of truth
with striking similarities to the concept of truth found in constructive mathematics.
If we at time t1 can formulate and understand a certain proposition then perhaps we
can prove the proposition, perhaps we cannot. In the latter case we do not know at
t1 whether or not the proposition has a truth value. But if we at a later time t2 are to
discover that in fact the proposition is true (or false) then the proposition had a truth
value also a t1 and it was, of course, the same as that at t2. Thus, in constructive math-
ematics the notion of truth is the following: P is true, if and only if P is understood
and P is provable (perhaps at some later time). Take for instance Fermat’s conjecture:
The Diophantine equation
xn + yn = zn,
has no nontrivial solutions for n > 2. The conjecture has now been shown true. Thus,
it was also true at Fermat’s time.
Due to these considerations I therefore propose an elaboration on (4.1) within a
tensed version of modal logic.
4.2 A modal logic for Kantian epistemology
In the following I develop a mathematical model of some very central aspects of the
Kantian theory of knowledge. The most important aspects being modelled are ob-
jects of experience, ideas of reason, truth, time and knowledge. As with all kinds of
mathematical modelling idealization plays a significant role. We can therefore not
expect a complete representation of all aspects of Kant’s theory. I hope, on the other
hand, that the reader will agree that central properties of the Kantian notions of ob-
jects of experience, ideas, truth, time and knowledge are in fact faithfully represented
10Semantics meant as a semantics in the sense of a model for a logic.
11In the sense that it needs a mathematical semantics.
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in the model. Modelling using mathematics is a very important tool in science, as
reflected in physics, computer science, biology, economics, etc. In order to predict
and understand the interplay between elements we model these elements. It is for
the same reasons that I now propose the model. I pretend in no way that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between my model and Kant’s theory, but what I hope for
is the discovery of a structure which can represent central notions. This representa-
tion is for the benefit of thinking things through. In following R. Montague (1975)
this is called Formal Philosophy.12 The following model will be a true generalized
mixture of models and elements found in (Kleene; 1952; Fagin et al.; 1995; Fitting
and Mendelsohn; 1998; Hendricks; 2001).
Suppose we have the a first-order two-dimensional modal language L(2, #) with
symbols for variables x,y,z, . . .; the propositional connectives ∧ and ¬; an existential
quantifier ∃; equality =; predicates (i.e., unary relation symbols) P,Q; and two modal
operators 2 and #.13 The intended meaning of 2 is ‘always in the future’ and # means
that ‘the agent knows’.14 Other symbols such as ∨,→ and ∀ are defined classically
in terms of the primitive symbols. Likewise we have a symbol 3 which should be
interpreted as ‘possible in the future’. Let me approach a modal understanding of
(4.1) semantically using Kripke semantics.
A possible world is to be understood as a situation. I will be consist of a moment
in time and a flow of states up to that moment. Thus we will need a non-empty set S
consisting of states. Time-moments will be represented by a set T together with a lin-
ear order < on T . A full flow of states is then a function f from T to S. Let G denote
some non-empty set of functions from T to S. A possible world is a flow of states up
to a certain moment in time; in other words, a function restricted to a time-moment.
Let f |t denote the restriction of f to t.15 With this notation, if f ∈ G and t ∈ T , we
have that f |t is a possible world (or a situation). One can think of a possible world as
a snap-shot together with a history. We want individual objects to be elements of a
domain belonging to a possible world. An element of such a domain is to be under-
stood as an object (in the Kantian sense) which the agent—whose epistemic access
to the world we are now modelling—has experienced. Thus a domain of a world
f |t simply consists of the cognized objects at time t in the flow of states represented
12“Formal methods are a hope for certainty in an uncertain profession.” (Fitting; 2005, 13).
13In order to keep the simplicity of the logic at a minimum I refrain from adding constant symbols.
Adding constant symbols can be done, but this should take into account the difference between rigid
and non-rigid designators. Nevertheless, due to monotonicity in the time argument of the interpre-
tation function i constants will locally be rigid in the models considered here. See also (Fitting and
Mendelsohn; 1998, Chap. 9).
14The correct intuition about ‘the agent’ is, that it corresponds to a research community. Not as
common knowledge, but as a community searching everywhere for truth.
15More precisely, f |t(x) = f (x) for all x ≤ t and undefined otherwise.
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by f restricted to t. Our description of a model will therefore include a function D
which ascribes a domain to any possible world f |t. The models we are working with
are therefore varying domain models. This means that the domains ascribed to the
possible worlds are not the same. The reason for modelling knowledge-acquisition
in this way is obvious: As time goes by we cognize more and more object. Therefore
we will require that if g|t ′ is temporally accessible from f |t then the domain of f |t
should form a subset of g|t ′.
The domain of a possible world f |t is (thought of as ) a set of cognized objects.
The future, however, is open in the sense that it is not a priori determined which
objects are going to be cognized. This is subjectively determined by the acts of the
agent. On this understanding the future is open and is definable by a partial order.16
Now, g|t ′ is accessible from f |t if and only if, t < t ′ and f restricted to t and g
restricted to t represent the same flow of states; in symbols:
f |t ≺ g|t ′, if and only if, f |t ⊆ g|t ′.
Therefore, if f |t ≺ g|t ′ then t < t ′ and f |t = g|t. Our models will have, as mentioned
above, varying domains; they are, more precisely, monotone in the sense that the
domain function D is monotone, meaning that f |t ≺ g|t ′ implies D( f |t) ⊆ D(g|t ′).
The relation ≺ will be the accessibility relation providing a semantics for 2A. But
we also need a relation R defining the truth of #A. This is more complicated and
can be done in various different ways, which I will discuss below. Relatively to a
definition of R we can now define what a model is.
A monotone domain model
 
(hereafter just model) consists of a (monotone
domain) frame M and an interpretation i. Let T be the set of time-moments and S the
set of states, and let G be a non-empty set of functions from T to S. We define from
these two sets another set W which consist of the worlds, i.e.,
W = { f |t | t ∈ T and f ∈ G}.
Then a frame F is a quadruple
(W,≺,R,D)
16There is a choice regarding the temporal accessibility relation—a least two different notions of
time/future are available. We could at the beginning have taken possible worlds to be pairs (t, f ) with
t ∈ T and f ∈ G. Then a possibility is to take (t ′,g) to be temporally accessible from (t, f ) if and only
if, t < t ′ and f = g. This concept of future will, however, imply a realist understanding of the future.
We can understand a possible world as a situation within a full flow of states. Thus, once a a possible
world is given, then the future of that situation is fully determined in the model. Here I have chosen the
open understanding of the future
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where ≺ and R are binary relations on W , telling us how the worlds are temporally
and epistemically related, respectively. D is a monotone domain function ascribing a
domain to each world f |t ∈W and the domain of the whole frame is the union of all
the different world-domains. An interpretation of L(2, #) in a frame F is a function
i which assigns to each predicate symbol P and to each world f |t a subset of D( f |t).
Thus
(P, f |t) 7→ i(P, f |t) ⊆ D( f |t),
with the important restriction that i is monotone in the time-argument in the sense
that:
t < t ′ implies i(P, f |t) = D( f |t)∩ i(P, f |t ′).
This monotonicity requirement ensures that determinate truth values of atomic for-
mulae at f |t are embedded into g|t ′ whenever f |t ≺ g|t ′.
This leads to the definition of model.
 
is a model if
 
is a frame together with
an interpretation in the frame, i.e.
 
= (W,≺,R,D, i).
As we also want to talk about truth values of formulae with variables, we need a val-
uation of the variables of the language. A valuation with respect to the model
 
will
be a function assigning elements to variables. A valuation function will take any vari-
able from L(2,#) in to the domain of the whole model together with countable set I.
The elements of I are thought of as quasi-objects, thus D(
 
)∩ I = /0. Consequently,
if
 
is the model and V the set of variables, then a valuation v is a function, such that
v : V → dom(   )∪ I. The valuation of variables ensures that we can speak of things
which do not exist: When valuating the free variables in a model, a variable can ‘re-
fer’ to either something which does not exist at all, or which only exist at certain
times.17 From this it follows, for instance, that ∀xP(x) → P(y) is not generally valid,
because the valuation of y may be non-existent at a particular world f |t, although P is
actually true for every object in the domain of f |t. This flexibility implies that we can
express in the language what it means to exist: E(x) is an abbreviation of ∃y(y = x).18
In consequence, the interpretation of quantifiers is the actualist interpretation,
which means that quantifiers are ranging over what actually exist at a given time.
17Through a valuation function v free variables act like constants; i.e., if v(x) = a then x as free vari-
able functions as name for a everywhere in the model. The denotation of a free variable will therefore
vary from valuation to valuation. A solution to this problem is to work with constant symbols. But as
mentioned above, I have chosen not to do this here in order to keep the complexity at a reasonable level.
The generalization is, however, trivial.
18In consequence of this ∀xP(x)∧E(y) → P(y) is valid (where ∀x binds stronger than ∧ which again
binds stronger than →). See generally (Fitting and Mendelsohn; 1998) for details on this kind of logic.
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This way of modelling truth of first order formulae ensures that universal formulae
can change truth value over time. Suppose A(x) is true of black cats. If all the cats
which are experienced in the situation f |t are black, then ∀xA(x) is true at f |t. But if
the agent at a later situation g|t ′ experiences a cat with some (other) color, then ∀xA(x)
is false a g|t ′. Thus a formula has a truth value relatively to a context; a possible world
(a situation) and the objects which are experienced there. This also has consequences
concerning the truth value of future events. First of all, future events are not possible
objects of experience at the present. Thus a property, such as the Germans will win
the sea-battle the first coming Saturday, will not have a truth value. Moreover, once
we arrive at Saturday, when the battle becomes a possible object of experience, then
it is possible both to have a situation where the Germans win and to have a situation
where they loose. This example, however, also shows that we need to work with a
three truth values.
We have to kinds of atomic formulae. If P is a predicate symbol, and x a variable
then P(x) is an atomic formula. Moreover, if x and y are variables, then x = y is also
an atomic formula. Literals are atomic formulae and negations of atomic formulae.
Now, suppose P(x) is an atomic formula of the first kind, then P(x) is false in a bi-
valent logic at all worlds where x does not denote. This, however, will conflict with
another feature that we want to represent. A formula like P(x) with x not denoting
should correspond to assertions about ‘things’ which are not yet, possibly never, ob-
jects of experience. Therefore, if x is not denoting at the moment then the truth-value
of P(x) should be neither true nor false, but undetermined. On the other hand, once
x denotes an object in the domain of a world then P(x) should be either true or false;
and this truth-value should remain the same in the future. We will therefore follow
Kleene (1952) and have a logic with three truth-values {0, 1/2,1}, with 0 being false,
1 being true and 1/2 is undetermined. 0 and 1 are called determined truth-values and
determined truth values of literals, will not change over time. Once it is true or false
that the Germans won the battle, then this should remain as a fact for the future.
In fact we want this property to hold for the class of purely existential formulae.19
Below I will prove that this property is contained in every model. The behavior of
the undetermined truth value should, however, be compatible with an increase of ex-
perience/information; thus a literal can go from undetermined to a determined truth
value. Kleene used the term regularity for this property—today monotonicity is used
(the undetermined truth value being below both of the determined truth values).
We can now give a definition of truth at a world. We let JAK
 
,v
f |t denote the
19A purely existential formula A is either a propositional formula or a propositional formula prefixed
with only existential quantifiers. Thus the class of purely existential formulae is a pendant to the Σ1
formulae of recursion theory.
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truth value of A at f |t in the model   under the valuation v. In taking notational
complexity into account we only write JAK f |t when it is clear which model and which
valuation we are talking about. The truth value function is defined recursively on the
complexity of formulae. Let
 
and v be given:20




0, if v(x) /∈ i(P, f |t) and v(x) ∈ D( f |t),
1/2, if v(x) /∈ D( f |t),
1, if v(x) ∈ i(P, f |t),
Jx = yK f |t =
{
0, if v(x) 6= v(y),
1, otherwise.
The connectives are simple (and give rise to a version of Kleene’s strong three-valued
logic): The truth value of ¬A is 1 minus the truth value of A and the truth value of
A∧B is the inf of the truth values of A and B.21 The truth value of ∃xA(x) is 1 at f |t
in case there is an object a ∈ D( f |t) such that A[a] has value 1; otherwise it is 0.22
The semantics of the modal operators are defined as follows:
J2AK f |t = inf{n | JAKg|t ′ = n, and f |t ≺ g|t ′},
J#AK f |t = inf{n | JAKg|t ′ = n, and f |t Rg|t ′}.
The set {g|t ′ | f |t Rg|t ′} should contain the situations the agent believes possible
relatively to f |t. As for a definition of R there are many choices. One requirement
could be that f |t Rg|t ′ obtains only if t = t ′. Such an R would imply that the agent
knows the time. But we need a stronger R, as with this definition R is not even
reflexive. Why should R be reflexive? If we want knowledge of A to imply truth of
A, then R need to be reflexive, i.e. reflexivity of R implies that, if #A is true, then
also A is true. An attempt to define R more specifically could be the following: Let
R be the union of some subset of ≺ and the identity relation on worlds, then Kant’s
principle—in a proper modalized version—would be validated (in a certain sense, to
be explained below). Such a definition would, however, be a very strong notion of
20That equality is always interpreted by the mathematical identity relation means that we are only
working with normal models.
21A consequence of this definition is that validity is not a very interesting concept anymore. At least
not, if it is understood in the classical meaning: A formula is valid, iff it has truth value 1 everywhere
in every model. In our three-valued logic we loose for instance tautologies, as if A is indeterminate,
then so is A → A. Generally, the truth of → is given from the truth of ¬ and ∧. Thus JA → BK f |t =
1− inf{JAK f |t ,1− JBK f |t}. But as we will see below, we can refine the classical meaning of validity in
order to take this problem into account.
22More precisely, by saying ‘A[a] has value 1 at f |t’ means that there is a valuation w which agrees
with v on every variable, except (possibly) x with w(x) = a and JA(x)K
 
,w
f |t = 1.
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knowledge, as the agent in a situation would know everything which can be known,
principally, in that situation.
But in fact we do not need a precise definition of R at the moment. We can view
the definition of R as a parameter giving rise to different classes of models. As we
want the most general definition of R it suffices to note that there is a non-empty
class in which the Kantian principle is ‘validated’ (this will become completely clear
when we below modally define Kant’s principle and our concept of ’validation). Let
us therefore attack the analysis from another point of view, assuming only that R at
a minimum is reflexive. Thus we turn to an analysis of the formulae we want to be
‘validated’. What can ‘validation’ mean in a three-valued logic? Note first of all, for
a literal A, if JA(x)K f |t = 1 then also JE(x)K f |t = 1. It is this type of entailment we are
interested in. But note also that although we have this entailment,
A(x) → E(x),
will not be valid (meaning having truth value 1 everywhere), because we can always
provide a model containing a situation such that A(x) is undetermined, thus also E(x)
is undetermined and in consequence of this also A(x) → E(x) is undetermined.23 We
will therefore work with a notion of ‘universally true’ which, in the context of three
values, is weaker. It is a generalization in the sense that over classical logic the two
notions are the same.
For the rest of this chapter, when I talk about models I mean monotone domain
models of the type defined above where ≺ is serial (reflecting the infinity of time)
and R is at a minimum reflexive.
Definition (K -semi-validity). Let K be a class of models. We say that a formula
A → B,
is K -semi-valid, if and only if, for any model
 
in K , any world f |t in   and any
valuation v, if A is true at f |t, then B is true at f |t, i.e.,
JAK f |t = 1 implies JBK f |t = 1.
The principle which we want to be semi-valid is Kant’s principle of complete deter-
mination. Based on Posy’s formula (4.1) a candidate for a formulation within our
framework is
E(x) → 23#P(x) ∨ 23#¬P(x),
23See footnote 21 for the definition of truth value of an implication.
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where P is any predicate symbol. Thus the notion ‘P(x) is knowable’ is formalized
by 23#P(x).24 But in fact, as for a formalization of Kant’s principle, we can do with
A(x) → 23#A(x), where A is any literal, as the two formulae are semi-valid for the
same classes of models.:
Observation 1. Suppose K is a class of models and P any predicate symbol, then
E(x) → 23#P(x) ∨ 23#¬P(x), (4.3)
is K -semi-valid, if and only if,
A(x) → 23#A(x), (4.4)
is K -semi-valid for any literal A.
Proof. We need to show that under the assumption of K -semi-validity of (4.3), then
given any K -model
 
= (W,≺,R,D, i), any world f |t from W and any valuation v,
the truth of the premise of (4.4) at f |t will imply the truth of the conclusion of (4.4)
at f |t; and vice versa.
Only if. Let a literal A be given and assume JA(x)K f |t = 1. From this it fol-
lows via the definition of truth that JE(x)K f |t = 1. As (4.3) is K -semi-valid we
have J23#P(x) ∨ 23#¬P(x)K f |t = 1, for any P; therefore J23#P(x)K f |t = 1 or
J23#¬P(x)K f |t = 1. Assume without loss of generality that A is Q for some
predicate symbol Q and, furthermore, for the sake of obtaining a contradiction,
J23#Q(x)K f |t 6= 1; but then J23#¬Q(x)K f |t = 1 would be the case. Now, as ≺ is se-
rial this implies existence of g|t ′ being accessible from f |t such that J#¬Q(x)Kg|t ′ = 1.
By reflexivity of R and the definition of truth of negation we get JQ(x)Kg|t ′ = 0.
This, however, contradicts JQ(x)Kg|t ′ = 1 which follows from the assumption that
JQ(x)K f |t = 1, and the fact that the interpretation i embeds determined truth values of
literals in future worlds.
If. Let P be given and assume JE(x)K f |t = 1. Now, either JP(x)K f |t = 1 or
J¬P(x)K f |t = 1. In both cases we use K -semi-validity of (4.4); here we only treat
the former case. If JP(x)K f |t = 1 then J23#P(x)K f |t = 1; therefore J23#P(x) ∨
23#¬P(x)K f |t = 1. a
Due to Observation 1 we take
A(x) → 23#A(x), (4.5)
24As Baire Space can be used to give a concrete model of the type treated in this chapter, our notion
of knowability generalizes (perhaps not surprisingly) Kelly’s notion of identification in the limit. See
(Kelly; 1996, 219). Another variant of this is found in (Hendricks and Pedersen; 2003, 353) under the
name “Limiting convergence”.
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for any literal, to be the formalization in L(2, #) of Kant’s principle of complete
determination, and we can use this formula to define the class M consisting precisely
of all those models which semi-validate Kant’s principle:
M = {   |   semi-validates A(x) → 23#A(x), A being literal}.
This class is well-defined, non-trivial and closed under intersection and union of sub-
classes.
We have in fact, for any given class K , (4.5) is K -semi-valid, if and only if,
A(x) ↔ E(x)∧23#A(x)
is K -semi-valid. This leads to:




The philosophical consequence of this equivalence is that Kant is operating with a
strong notion of local knowability of primitive facts. Once a ‘thing’ becomes an
object of experience then the truths about that object are characterized by what we in
principle can know about this object. Kant therefore operates with precisely the same
notion of truth as is the common understanding of truth in constructive mathematics:
A proposition is true, iff it is understood and provable. See also my discussion on
page 73.
Suppose now that x is cognized in a situation f |t. Let t0 be the least time-moment
such that x is cognized at f |t0. Now form the set Ux such that
Ux = {g|t ′ | f |t0 ≺ g|t ′},
Then we have that, if A is a literal
J23#A(x)K f |t = 1, iff for all g|t ′ ∈Ux : JA(x)Kg|t ′ = 1
iff, there exists g|t ′ ∈Ux : JA(x)Kg|t ′ = 1
This can probably be strengthened to purely existential formulae.
Furthermore, this property of the operator 23# has properties being similar with
an S5 operator. In fact the S5 axiom
¬23#A(x) → 23#(¬23#A(x)), (4.6)
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is semi-validated locally in every context Ux, by putting extra conditions on the ac-
cessibility relation R; if for instance R is also symmetric and transitive, then (4.6) is
semi-validated locally. These conditions are, however, for obvious reasons to strong.
Now, what kind of logic is this? The general logic is a first order modal version
of Kleene’s strong three valued logic. This corresponds generally to some kind of
intuitionistic logic. But underneath this there is a stronger logic. Once objects are
intuited the truth-values are transcendentally determined. This is the principle of
complete determination. This gives us an ontological relation of truth living unknown
to (or as a transcendental principle for) the agent’s understanding. Namely, in case x
is intuited then the truth value for any predicate symbol is determined at the situation
and in all later situations. Moreover, 23#P(x) follows the ontological determination
(if it is P(x) which is true, otherwise its negation). The relation determining where
23#P is to be found is living its own local life, so to speak. Thus, once an object
x comes into being, transcendentally, truth values are decided. The locality is well-
defined by Ux.
In our modelling of Kant’s theory we thus have two different logics around. We
have the global logic which concerns generally all terms, whether they denote objects
or not. In this logic we can formulate propositions which we cannot be sure have
determined truth values. This corresponds to the problem we generally face in the
natural sciences:
[I]n natural science [Naturkunde] there are an infinity of conjectures in
regard to which certainty can never be expected, because natural appear-
ances are objects that are given to us independently of our concepts, to
which, therefore, the key lies not in us and in our pure thinking, but out-
side us, and for this reason in many cases it is not found; hence no certain
account of these matters can be expected. (A480–1/B508–9)
On the other hand, underneath the global logic, which cannot be classical, a local
logic which applies to objects we have experienced. This is stronger logic, where
truth and knowability go hand in hand. This also shows how in Kant’s theory, epis-
temology and ontology are two sides of the same coin. Note, that it is the fact that
a term may denote or not denote which enables us with structure having the conse-
quence that we can separate the two layers.
4.3 Distinguish-ability of objects
A consequence of the principle of complete determination for intuited, and thus ex-
istent, objects is the property that an object can be distinguished from other objects:
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• Any object x can ultimately be distinguished from any other object y.
Actually, this property is a characterizing property of an object. x is a legitimate
object only if it can be distinguished from any other object:
[S]ince the agreement of cognition with the object is truth, only the for-
mal conditions of empirical truth can be inquired after here, and ap-
pearance, in contradistinction to the representations of apprehension, can
thereby only be represented as the object that is distinct from them if it
stands under a rule that distinguishes it from every other apprehension,
and makes one way of combining the manifold necessary. That in the
appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of appre-
hension is the object. (A191/B236)
The principle of complete determination is indeed a useful principle. The prin-
ciple also gives us a rule which works the other way around: in the case we want to
show that something is not an object. If for a certain ‘thing’ we can show that there is
a (well-typed) property, which the ‘thing’ is neither true nor false for, then the thing
cannot be an object. Precisely this way of formulating the principle is what Kant uses
when he demonstrates that the whole world is not a possible object of our experience.
We are not, and will never be, in a position where we can show the world to be finite,
nor infinite—understood as not being finite. Thus the principle is a powerful tool
when we are to identify ideas of reason.
The principle has furthermore an important consequence for equality relations.
Given any class of objects equality on that class will be decidable as different objects
are ultimately distinguishable.25
4.4 The notion of mathematical objects
We know what it means to be a physical object. Now, Kant’s answer to the question,
‘what gives mathematics its objectivity?’ is, however, somewhat provocative. Let us
therefore be careful in the examination of it.
[A]ll concepts and with them all principles, however a priori they may
be, are nevertheless related to empirical intuitions, i.e., to data for pos-
sible experience. Without this they have no objective validity at all, but
are rather a mere play, whether it be with representations of the imag-
ination or of the understanding. One need only take as an example the
concepts of mathematics, and first, indeed, in their pure intuitions. Space
25See also (Posy; 1998, 316).
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has three dimensions, between two points there can be only one straight
line, etc. Although all these principles, and the representation of the ob-
ject with which this science occupies itself, are generated in the mind
completely a priori, they would still not signify anything at all if we
could not always exhibit their significance in appearances (empirical ob-
jects). (A239–40/B298–9)
Apparently the only real objects are the empirical objects. Mathematics is without
meaning had it not been for the empirical. Now, this indeed sound drastic and sounds
like Kant is having some kind of empiricist foundation in mind. The claims, however,
has to be seen in connection the transcendental ideality of space and the resulting
Axioms of intuition. What Kant says in the quote does not downgrade the importance
of geometry, nor its apodictic nature. On the contrary. Geometry is constitutive for
empirical objects as geometry describes the a priori structure of human perception.
Therefore, as geometry provides pure results synthetic a priori, these are valid for
empirical objects. Geometry in this way provide us with knowledge about both the
conditions of our sensible representations and—in consequence of this— also about
the objects that appear to us under those conditions. Given this, it can come as no
surprise that the objective validity of geometry has a necessary connection with the
empirical.
And moreover, as with almost all central aspects of Kant’s theory of knowledge,
this standpoint is connected with Kant’s doctrine of schematism. Above, Kant says
“rather a mere play” and thus he refers to “[t]houghts without content are empty,
intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51/B75). The concept of a triangle, for
instance, means nothing without images. Now we can imagine an image of a triangle,
but this again, means nothing without the possibility of an experience of a physical
triangle.
But there is another problem with the quote given above. The claim, that math-
ematical concepts are meaningless without the possibility of empirical exemplifica-
tion. The problem is that the claim is made on behalf of all of mathematics. Again,
this is not a slip of the tongue:26 “The mathematician can not make the least claim in
regard to any object whatsoever without exhibiting it in intuition” (Ak. 11, 44).27 As
there can be no such thing as a number-intuition, number theory receives its objects,
26Another place in the Critique with the same message is from the B-deduction: “[A]ll mathematical
concepts are not by themselves cognitions, except insofar as one presuppose that there are things that
can be presented to us only in accordance with the form of that pure sensible intuitions. Things in
space and time, however, are only given insofar as they are perceptions (representations accompanied
with sensation), hence through empirical representation. (B147)
27The translation is Allison’s (1973, 167).
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ultimately, from the empirical intuition. The problem here is that there is only room
for geometrical objects. Now, this only reflected the standard view on mathematics
from the Antique to the 17–18th century: Geometry was in good shape with a solid,
Euclidean foundation. Number theory, on the other hand, had no foundation, had no
axioms. Although—as we have seen in chapter 2—Kant gives in fact a foundation for
number theory. But in this foundation numbers are rules rather than objects. Or more
precisely, number theory is founded on the “schema of magnitude” and numbers are
not really perceivable, not like geometric objects. Tokens of numbers are found as
sets of first order empirical objects, and therefore numbers are not really objects, as
their tokens are second order objects.
Mathematics is about constructibility in pure intuition, but because of the axiom
of intuition, this means that the objects for number theory come from geometry, and
thus ultimately from empirical intuition.28
4.4.1 Schematisation and mathematical objects
Having concluded that the real mathematical objects are the geometrical objects let
me finish with a different approach to the characterization of mathematical objects.
I propose that to understand geometrical, and thereby mathematical, objects like
this:
• x is a geometrical object, if and only if, x can be schematised.
Space is an a priori structure. Together with the fundamental geometrical schemata
it gives us our perceptual grid. This perceptual grid is the form of all outer intuition.
Therefore, the form of any sensible object is ultimately describable by schemata.
Such a definition of object also explains why space, the all-including intuitive
space, cannot be an object: It is not schematisable. No operation can construct the
full space out of its parts. No schema can complete the operation
[
Si.
And this also explains why the geometrical spaces, as treated in the science of geom-
etry, have to be finite. Otherwise, they would not be objects.29
The question, however, as to how this single infinite space is given, or
how we have it, does not occur to the geometrician, but concerns merely
the metaphysician. Moreover, it is just here that the Critique proves that
28“Mathematics does not merely construct magnitudes quanta, as in geometry, but also mere magni-
tude (quantitatem)” (A717/B745).
29See again (Ak. 20, 419–20).
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space is not at all something objective, existing apart form us (außer
uns), but rather consists merely in the pure form of the mode of sensible
representation of the subject as an a priori intuition. (Ak. 20, 421)30
Thus we have a schematic understanding of a methodological difference between the
metaphysician and the geometer. The metaphysician analyzes Vorstellungen which
cannot be treated in any schematisable and therefore scientific way. This is just an-
other way of saying that the Metaphysical exposition is a kind of pre-science.
As we know, quantum is something in which there is quantity. Sometimes the
quantitas of a quantum is determinable by the “schema of magnitude”. Sometimes
it is not. The situation is similar from modern class–set theory. Some classes have
size determinable by an ordinal, some do not. This distinction between reason and
understanding has many of the consequences that the distinction between set and
class in set theory has. Some concepts are objective, can be experienced, like some
classes are sets. But not all concepts, like not all classes can be intuited. This idea is
also found in (Tiles; 2004), where it is even claimed that Kant foreshadowed some of
Gödel’s insights.
Now, a speculative claim of mine is the following. Just like we can characterize
the notion of geometrical object by the geometrical schemata, it should be possible to
characterize the notion of empirical object by the ‘empirical’ schemata. This, how-
ever, is something which needs a full theory of Kant’s schemata; something which—
to my knowledge—still has to be done.31
30Translation due to Allison (1973, 176).
31Evidence showing that this indeed was an idea of Kant, is found in two important places:
A200/B245 and A280/B236.
CHAPTER 5
A Critical Discussion of Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics
Kant certainly is one of the founders of the constructive philosophy of mathemat-
ics, as he provides an epistemological foundation for the constructive mathematical
reasoning he finds, primarily, in Elements. The corner stone in this foundation is
schematism.
5.1 Schematisation of mathematical concepts
What Kant claims in Schematism is that any concept is founded on a schema. Without
a schema any concept is void of meaning as we cannot bring the concept together with
the objects which should be subsumed under the concept. This is in particular true of
mathematical concepts.
In case of geometry Kant says that geometrical concepts are definable. A concept
is given by an intension and in geometry this can be done a priori in an exhaustive
way.1 Take Kant’s paradigmatic example, triangle:
x is a triangle, iff, x is a polygon with three vertices
and three sides which are straight lines.
Thus, the concept of triangle is something passive. It does not tell us how to produce
or manipulate triangles. It gives us necessary and sufficient conditions for judging a
given object to be a triangle. The concept, however, is useless without a schema.2
The schema of triangle is basically a rule which puts us in a position where we can
produce any triangle. This means that any object x which can be subsumed under
the concept triangle is in principle constructible in a finite amount of time by the
schema. Using modern terminology we say that the extension of triangle is exhausted
by the schema, thus the schema determines the meaning of the concept. In this sense,
Wittgenstein’s dictum “meaning is use” is a derivative of Kant’s theory of schemata.
As I discussed in section 4.4, schematism provides an alternative definition of
geometrical objects. The geometrical objects are precisely those objects that are con-
structible through a geometrical schema. As it turns out, the only true mathematical
1“[T]o define properly means just to exhibit originally [urspr ünglich] the exhaustive concept of a
thing with its boundaries” (A727/B755).
2In the words of Kant: “Give a philosopher the concept of a triangle, and let him try to find out in
his way how the sum of its angles might be related to a right angle. He has nothing but the concept of a
figure enclosed by three straight lines, and in it the concept of equally many angles. Now he may reflect
on this concept as long as he wants, yet he will never produce anything new. He can analyze and make
distinct the concept of a straight line, or of an angle, or of the number three, but he will not come upon
any other properties that do not already lie in these concepts.” (A716/B745)
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objects are the spatial—therefore geometrical—objects. This was expressed, for in-
stance, in the long quotation found on page 44. Thus, on Kant’s view all mathematical
reasoning is ultimately based on what can be constructed in space. The notion of ge-
ometric constructibility is therefore at the end of the day responsible for the so-called
mathematical optimism that Kant advocates. What precisely does this optimism con-
sist of?
I discussed in chapter 4 that generally in science, the global logic is different from
and weaker than the local logic. In the Doctrine of Methods Kant discusses this theme
which connects ideas of reason, objects of experience and the logic of reasoning in
mathematics and the natural sciences, respectively:
Apagogic proof, however, can be allowed only in those sciences where it
is impossible to substitute that which is subjective in our representations
(Vorstellungen) for that which is objective, namely the cognition of what
is in the object. Where the latter is the dominant concern, however, then
it must frequently transpire that the opposite of a certain proposition
either simply contradicts the subjective conditions of thought but not the
object, or else that both propositions contradict each other only under a
subjective condition that is falsely held to be objective, and that since the
condition is false, both of them can be false, without it being possible to
infer the truth of one from the falsehood of the other. (A791/B819)
Kant gives on A793/B821 the obvious example of the latter: The magnitude of the
sensible world. The underlying subjective representation (Vorstellung) is the whole
sensible world, which has been substituted for an object. This gives rise to the false
assumption that the whole sensible is either finite or infinite. This would, according
to Kant, be a misuse of the principle of complete determination; let x refer to the
“whole sensible world” and let F represent the concept finiteness, then3
E(x) → F(x)∨¬F(x).
We will, however, never find a situation where x is an object of our experience, there-
fore F(x)∨¬F(x) will never have a determinate truth value.
The sentence following the long quote above is: “In mathematics this subreption
is impossible; hence apagogic proof has its proper place there” (A792/B820). Given
his general epistemology, Kant can only have one good argument in support of this
point of view:
1. All mathematical propositions have determinate truth values.
3Here the ontological version of the principle suffices.
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This, I claim, is in fact equivalent to each of the following statements:
2 All mathematical objects are schematisable,
3 All mathematical objects are constructible in a finite amount of time,
4 Ideas, whether regulative or not, play no role in mathematics,4
5 Every mathematical ‘thing’ is complete determined,
6 The mathematical universe is epistemically complete.
Take the model I provided in the foregoing chapter, and suppose we want it to be
a model of the mathematical epistemology and ontology as Kant sees it. The set I
containing the quasi-objects is empty, as all terms in mathematics denote. An object
of experience is now, not an object that we actually have an experience of, but an
object which we can principally have an experience of:
E(x) is true, iff, x is constructible by a schema.
As all mathematical objects in the Kantian epistemology are finitely constructible,
we are not in need indeterminate truth values for prime formulae. Thus, the global
tertium non datur
P(x)∨¬P(x), (5.1)
is true in any situation, for any mathematical object x and any predicate P. Thus for
any mathematical object x, we will always be in the context Ux. In consequence of
this, the ontological tertium non datur (5.1) is equivalent to an unconditioned global
epistemological version of the principle, .i.e.,
23#P(x)∨23#¬P(x).
In fact, the mathematical universe is determinate in the sense, that there is no distinc-
tion between the local and the global, i.e., for any mathematical object x, Ux = W .
Using a term from recursion theory, we would say that the mathematical universe
is decidable—according to Kant!
4In the new edition of The Cambridge Companion to Kant, Shabel (n.d.) has a paper with the title
“Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics”. It is surprising that she does not mention this essential property
of Kant’s mathematics.
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5.1.1 Friedman and Kant
Michael Friedman (1992) purports the view that Kant compensated ingeniously for
the logical resources of his time and used ‘construction in intuition’ instead of logic.
Thus Friedman suggests, it seems, that if Kant had had access to modern logic he
would not have needed construction in intuition. In other words if Kant had had quan-
tifiers, then he would not have formulated construction in pure intuition as something
governed by rules, rather he would have used quantifier expressions like ∀x∃y · · · . As
evidence for this, Friedman points out that in fact Kant only had polyadic logic which
is not capable of expressing infinity. Thus Kant had to develop a theory of intuition.
In formulating this point of view Friedman is partially repeating Russell’s critique
from the beginning of the 20th century.
I think this view on Kant is quite wrong. Kant viewed Euclidean geometry as
paradigmatic for mathematics. The reasoning style Kant found in Elements was—
as I described in Chapter 1—based on diagrammatic reasoning. This is a premise
for Kant. Then he wants to formulate a philosophy which can account for this and
arrives at the notion of intuitions being constructible in accordance with schemata.
His notion of constructibility is at the heart of his philosophy of mathematics, and
thus it is very remote from a Kantian point of view to say that Kant developed his
notion of intuition because he lacked a timeless notion of logic which could generate
infinity. On my view, if Kant had lived today and should he follow Friedman’s and
Russell’s view he should give up his whole philosophy. Schematisation in finite time
is at the heart of Kant’s epistemology; and, moreover, it is a crucial feature of Kant’s
theory of knowledge that he needs only one kind of epistemology which works for
both the empirical and the mathematical.
If quantifiers should play any role then I would say, following Posy, that Kant
would read quantifiers constructively (this seems obvious due to the fact that Kant
always talks about constructivity)! But then quanfifiers are only abbriviations for
constructive procedures, and the play no principle role.
5.1.2 Consistency and existence
As mathematical objects are schematisable it follows that the mathematical objects
have to be in accordance with intuition. Thus consistency does not entail existence.
This feature is in fact true for any proposed object:5
That in [. . . ] a concept no contradiction must be contained is, to be sure,
a necessary logical condition; but it is far from sufficient for the objective
5See also B14 for the mathematical case and A218–21/B266–8 for the general case of the categories
of modality.
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reality of the concept. (A220/B267–8)
5.2 What are numbers?
According to Kant numbers cannot be objects, as arithmetic has no axioms.
The self-evident propositions of numerical relation [. . . ] are to be sure,
synthetic, but not general, like those of geometry, and for that reason also
cannot be called axioms, but could rather be named numerical formulas.
(A164/B205)
The numerical formulae Kant is thinking of are propositions like “7 + 5 = 12”. But
“[s]uch propositions must [. . . ] not be called axioms (for otherwise there would be
infinitely many of them)” (A165/B205). In a sense Kant is very right: There was
no axiomatization of number theory at the time of Kant. In fact Kant reflects, once
again, the Euclidean paradigm. Euclid has no axioms for numbers. Number theory
is treated in Book VII, and already in proposition 2 (the gcd of two numbers) he uses
well-ordering of the natural numbers, but with out reference to some first principle.
But if Kant had had axioms for number theory, would he have regarded them
as genuine axioms? Axioms should be synthetic a priori in analogy to the way that
Euclid’s postulates reflect schematic spatial procedures.
According to Kant geometrical schemata produce true objects in pure intuition.
These are genuine objects in the sense that they are possible objects of experience.
Let us use the terminology of a first-order universe U and a second-order universe
U , which I introduced on page 38. Thus the objects which the geometrical schemata
produce are elements of U . Representations of numbers, however, are elements in the
second-order universe U . Thus, they are not really objects to Kant as the only true
objects are first-order objects. This also explains why the pure “schema of magni-
tude” deals more with reflection than construction. The elements of U are according
to Kant not really constructed, they rather reflect a certain relation between objects
living in U . I think this is the only good reason Kant has when claiming that the
numbers are not objects.
In the course of history we have learned—due to relativity theory—that space
is only approximately Euclidean. Thus it seems that the objects we produce in Eu-
clidean geometry are only approximations of possible objects of experience. On the
other hand, the number five is still represented by the set of fingers on a normal left
hand. If we allow second-order objects to be genuine objects, then in fact they are
more objective (in the Kantian sense) than the objects of Euclidean geometry.
Today we can give an axiomatization of the natural numbers, which relatively
to the slight generalization of the Kantian notion of object, is a set of axioms in the
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Kantian sense.
We can define an arithmetic Q called Robinson arithmetic in which there is a con-
stant 0 called zero, a unary operation S, called successor and two binary operations
+ and · called plus and times, which satisfy the following axioms:
1. ∀x(0 6= Sx).
2. ∀x,y
(





0 6= x →∃y(x = Sy)
)
.
4. ∀x(x+0 = x).
5. ∀x,y
(
x+Sy = S(x+ y)
)
.
6. ∀x(x ·0 = 0).
7. ∀x,y
(
x ·Sy = (x · y)+ x
)
.
The first three axioms are realized by the “schema of magnitude”. They claim
existence of a concept of iteration S which taken together with a symbol 0 gives rise
to a paradigmatic representation of the natural numbers:
0, S0, SS0, SSS0, . . .
Due to our ability of producing bijections, these paradigmatic numbers as intuitions
put us in a situation where we can use and reason universally about any representa-
tion of the numbers. Recall, the schema together with any representation, whether
empirical or pure, allow for universal reasoning. The sequence is furthermore poten-
tially infinite, thus for any type n, the number n is meaningful. The realization of the
latter axioms is also due to our ability to produce and operate with bijections. Plus
corresponds to composition of functions, which we found on page 43 was validated
by the “schema of magnitude” and times iterates this concept.
If we thus allow second-order objects to be objects and accept the above axiom
system, then there are numbers, just as much as there are triangles—or perhaps even
more. We meet them as tokens, and it should be clear that the principle of complete
determinability holds for numbers. Any number n is schematisable in the sense that
we can produce a representation S · · ·S0 such that the representation together with the
schema allows for universal reasoning. This also makes certain elements found the
first Critique more coherent, as for instance when Kant writes about number images
(A149/B179; A240/B299).
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5.3 On the infinite
Kant only allows the potential infinite in mathematics. But there are, at least, two
different notions of potential infinity: One in geometry and one in number theory.
5.3.1 Infinity in geometry
What does Kant understand under the term, ‘the mathematical space is infinite’? We
saw in Chapter 3 that space as intuition is claimed by Kant to be actual infinite in
the sense that for which ever magnitude we might want to ascribe to space, that
magnitude will not suffice. It is “an infinite given magnitude” in the sense that it is
actual as a necessary presupposition of our geometrical schemata and henceforth of
our geometrical concepts. Itself, being a presupposition for schemata, can however
never be schematised. The only infinity we have in geometry is the infinity we find
when we construct a non-convergent increasing sequence of spaces
S0,S1, . . . ,Sn, . . . (5.2)
such that for any number n, the space Sn is constructible and we can construct another
space Sn+1 which is larger than Sn. This gives us a mathematical notion of infinity.
This is the potential infinite. This concept is a real mathematical concept with a
schema. The schema realizing it is the procedure which produces any paradigmatic
sequence in the style of (5.2), each element in the sequence being constructible. This
is a genuine concept of infinity, and we have a corresponding schema, which realizes
the concept. This is the core of the theory of schematism.
Note, that the metaphysical infinities of time and space as the two forms of intu-
ition are necessary conditions for a notion of potential infinity in mathematics. Time
is a necessary condition for the concept of magnitude, as the concept of magnitude
is realized by iteration—the schema of magnitude. Without iteration it would be
impossible to think of the magnitude of any given thing.
As the concept of the potential infinite is fully schematisable it poses no problem
in mathematics. But the concept of the actual infinite is. According to Kant we
cannot form the set—it cannot be an object, it cannot be schematised. In the case of




cannot form an object, as there can be no corresponding schema.
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5.3.2 Infinity in arithmetic
The number sequence is also infinite. Of course this can also only be a potential infi-
nite. But in comparison with the infinity found in geometry, the arithmetical infinity
is to a certain extent more general. Recall that numbers are intensional, they are not
extensionally determined.6 Therefore (tokens) of numbers can be anything, they are
not necessarily spatial objects, they can also be mental states. But as to the class of
all numbers Kant writes in §26 of Critique of Judgment that this can only be an idea.7
In that paragraph Kant writes that the potentiality of the sequence of numbers is an
objective fact. The potential infinity here is essentially of same kind as the potential
infinity of the Euclidean space. We have a procedure realizing the sequence, namely
the “pure schema of magnitude”. We do, however, force ourselves—Kant says—
and go to the limit of this sequence of numbers and form the class of all numbers.
This is necessarily so, but only as an idea; therefore an incomplete object. There can-
not be anything in intuition corresponding to the class of all numbers. We know that
realization (schematisability) of mathematical concepts are what provides objective
reality to the concepts, thus the class of all numbers can only be a regulative idea. It
is a true class in the sense that it has no size; it cannot be schematised; it cannot be a
mathematical object. And here we see a conflict in Kant’s philosophy: It cannot even
a regulative idea in mathematics, as there are no ideas or other subjective notions in
mathematics—according to Kant.
5.3.3 Does Kant’s notion of infinity suffice?
There are, however, problems with Kant’s understanding of infinity in mathematics.
Some notion of actual infinity is needed in mathematics. Also at the time of Kant.
There are many examples of this. It is clear, that the sequence of increasing spaces
as given above,
S1,S2, . . . ,Sn, . . . ,
is schematisable, because we can provide an algorithm realizing it. But when do
such algorithmic processes have limits? Using contemporary language we would say
precisely when they converge. Suppose we have a metric for our spaces. Then, for
6See page 41 for my discussion of this aspect of numbers.
7“Nun aber h ört das Gem üt in sich auf die Stimme der Vernunft, welche zu allen gegebenen Gr ößen,
selbst denen, die zwar niemals ganz aufgefaßt werden k önnen, gleichwohl aber (in der sinnlichen
Vorstellung) als ganz gegeben beurteilt werden, Totalit ät fordert, mithin Zusammenfassung in eine An-
schauung, und f ür alle jene Glieder einer fortschreitend-wachsenden Zahlreihe Darstellung verlangt,
und selbst das Unendliche (Raum und verflossene Zeit) von dieser Forderung nicht ausnimmt, vielmehr
es unvermeidlich macht, sich dasselbe (in dem Urteile der gemeinen Vernunft) als ganz (seiner Totalit ät
nach) gegeben zu denken.”
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example, if Sn+1 is only a little bigger than Sn, e.g., 1/2n+1 then
[
Sn
should be a Kantian mathematical object, whereas if Sn+1 is 1/n bigger than Sn, then
it is not. The notion of convergence was not at all clarified at the time of Kant, and
it is somewhat peculiar that Kant had not considered this to be a problem. Take for
instance the method of exhaustion which is used for measuring the circumference
of the circle. The circumference is found by inscribing polygons with more and
more vertices in the circle. As the edges of the polygons get smaller the difference
between the circumference and the total length of the sides of polygons gets smaller
and smaller. In the limit we have the circumference. We know that Kant worked with
this method,8 but apparently he did not feel the foundation questionable.
Euler worked intensively in the so-called infinitesimal analysis. He wrote text-
books which contained mathematical concepts like “function”, “sum of infinite se-
ries”, “integral”, “solution to a differential equation”—concepts which in no way
were clearly schematisable in the strict Kantian sense.
A series which caused endless dispute was
1−1+1−1+1−1+ . . .
Now, we could treat the series in the following way:
0 = (1−1)+(1−1)+(1−1)+ · · · = 0+0+0+ . . .
but then again,
1 = 1+(−1+1)+(−1+1)+(−1+ . . .
is also a possibility. Still another sum might be reasonable:
T = 1− (1−1+1−1+1 · · ·) = 1−T,
thus the whole sum should be 1/2. Guido Grandi argued in 1703 (68 years before the
first Critique) that this was indeed the result. He used the geometric series
1
1+ x
= 1− x+ x2 − x3 + · · · ,
with x = 1.9 According to Kline (1983, 308) this argument was accepted by Daniel
Bernoulli and Leibniz, though Leibniz found the argument more metaphysical than
mathematical.
8Although with great difficulty (Addickes; 1924, 19).
9According to Kline: “He also argued that since the sum was both 0 and 1/2, he had proved that the
world could be created out of nothing” (Kline; 1983, 307).
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Euler also worked with this example. He took the series
1
1− x = 1+ x+ x
2 + · · · , (5.3)
and substituted −1 for x and obtained Grandi’s result. But Euler worked with other
examples as well. For instance, by substituting −1 for x in
1
(1+ x)2
= 1−2x+3x2 −4x3 + · · ·
he obtained
∞ = 1+2+3+4+ . . . (5.4)
Simultaneously he substituted 2 for x in (5.3) and with the following result:
−1 = 1+2+4+8+ · · · . (5.5)
Euler treated infinity algebraically simply as another number and, moreover, con-
cluded that −1 is larger than infinity, since the terms of (5.5) exceed the correspond-
ing terms of (5.4).10
We see that Euler treated divergent series algebraically and really did not care
much about whether the series were finite or infinite. Sometimes he was not so lucky
(as above) but sometimes he was, as with:
1 − 1/3 + 1/5 − 1/7 + · · · = π/4
1 − 1/32 + 1/52 − 1/72 + · · · = π2/8
1 − 1/33 + 1/53 − 1/73 + · · · = π3/32
The experience in mathematics of such phenomena led the Berlin Academy in
1784 to offer a prize for a “clear and precise theory of what is called the infinite
in mathematics.” Although the Academy was not entirely satisfied with any of the
entrants the prize was awarded to the Swiss mathematician Simon Antoine Jean
L’Huillier (1750–1840). And all in all, these strange results were finally understood
due to work of mathematicians like Bolzano and Cauchy who introduced the notion
of convergence of infinite series in the beginning of the 19th century.
Kant could perhaps dismiss some of the infinite series by saying that they are just
thought-experiments which do not really have anything to do with mathematics. This
would certainly have been very non-typical for him, as his agenda generally was that
we have science, and it is this science he wanted to give a theory of knowledge for. π
10See Kline (1983).
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is objective, Kant says, because we can describe it by geometrical schemata. Thus π
is a quantum. But obviously it is then a finite object in the sense that the figure has a
finite area or a finite circumference. As both of these depend parametrically on π we
need π if want to measure such finite magnitudes. How do we know that our method
for determining π converges? Another example is the constant e. This number can















These were problems known at the time of Kant, but it is apparently not truly legiti-
mate methods.
Another challenge to Kant’s philosophy of mathematics is the ‘vibrating string
controversy’. I will not go into this here, but let me just note that Euler carved the way
for a whole new theory of partial differential calculus by introducing a new concept
of function. When doing this Euler allowed very irregular functions in analysis, as
long as these were used for describing phenomena in space, such as a vibrating string.
Many of these functions are only describable by heavy infinitary methods.
In conclusion let me say that it is not in any way clear how Kant wants to treat
the use of infinitary methods in mathematics. They are necessary, when for instance
measuring the area of a circle, or when describing a vibrating string. Infinitary meth-
ods were used throughout the mathematical landscape in the 18th century. But none
of this is taken into account in Kant’s philosophy of mathematics. Moreover, to my
best knowledge, he does not even comment on it!11
All this points to a dissatisfying fact about Kant’s philosophy of mathematics.
First of all, it did not fit to the mathematics, even, of his time. Second of all, and
this is somehow disappointing, Kant had opportunities to be updated on the newest
results in mathematics. He was in contact with Lambert, and most probably Kant
knew of consistent non-Euclidean geometries from Lambert. Kant wrote admiring
about Euler. But he does not mention the obvious problems anywhere, seemingly.
5.4 Partial versus total schemata
For Kant, a natural number n is the equivalence class consisting of sets with n ele-
ments. This equivalence class is not determined extensionally by its elements, rather
it is determined by the “schema of magnitude”. This schema is the human ability
11This somehow runs counter to some of Friedman’s understanding of Kant’s philosophy. Friedman
is of the opinion that Kant’s epistemology is “a fruitful philosophical engagement with the sciences”
(Friedman; 1992, xii). This was perhaps the case in physics, but not the case in mathematics.
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to decide (in the sense of computability theory) whether or not a collection of ob-
jects belongs to this equivalence class. As I also mentioned in the forgoing chapter,
given any collection of mathematical objects, the equality relation on the collection
is decidable.
Consequently it is a total notion of computability that Kant ascribes to schemata,
they are functions defined everywhere—not partial functions. But as soon as we gen-
eralize the notion of object, such that we will also accept the class of natural numbers
as an object, then we also loose this nice property of the mathematical schemata. Say,
we have infinite collections as objects and suppose we are asked to decide whether
an object is finite. This can connot be done in any case. Thus, if we allow ideas to be
objects, then we can only expect schemata to be partial functions.
5.5 Kant’s two dogmas
5.5.1 Complete determination of mathematical objects
Given decidability of the methods for constructing objects, it is natural for Kant to
formulate his Dogma: Any mathematical question can be decided. Therefore Kant
has complete optimism with respect to mathematical problems as for instance for-
mulated on A480/B508 and also in the Doctrine of Method, as discussed above: We
are allowed to use full classical logic in mathematics. But this really is a disputable
dogma of Kant. We need infinitary methods in mathematics—and these methods
were needed, even at the time of Kant. We need to work with some notion of infinity
when we want to describe space. In consequence of this it seems natural to introduce
some subjective elements in mathematics, such as the set of all natural numbers, or
an absolute space.
5.5.2 Sharp and unique borderlines between intuition, understanding and reason?
Why can space not be conceptual to Kant? Because then he would loose the construc-
tive aspect. He needs space to be intuitive because he wants construction. Mathemat-
ics is not based on concept analysis, it is based on constructions in time. I accept the
arguments Kant gives in the Transcendental Aesthetics for the a prioriness of space.
But the arguments for the intuitiveness and uniqueness of space are not conclusive,
see my discussion on page 63. Thus, the sharp borderlines between intuition and
understanding are questionable.
But there are other reasons why the sharp borderlines cannot be maintained. We
see that Kant is against the view that in arithmetic and in geometry there are sub-
jective elements. This is because he wants arithmetic to be the unique codification
of the objective interplay between the quantitative categories and the transcendental
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imagination. Geometry is the unique codification of the objective interplay between
space as form of intuition and the transcendental imagination. There should be a
one-to-one correspondance between the human abilities and the mathematical con-
ceptualizations. Therefore, as soon as one allows concepts of reason to be involved
in arithmetic and in geometry the absoluteness of the understanding and the abso-
luteness of space as form of intuition are destroyed. Such subjective elements are,
nevertheless, involved. Thus, ‘interests’ of reason have a decisive factor when the
structure and the properties of space are decided. The same applies to more advanced
arithmetic including infinite series and the like.
Kant also claims a sharp borderline between inner and outer. Nevertheless it is
also claimed that we cannot think spatial concepts such as lines and circles without
drawing them in thought, i.e., picturing them in the inner sense. On the other hand, we
cannot think temporal concepts without representing them in time (B154); see page 5
for a discussion of these elements. Thus it seems that sharp borderlines between the
two forms of intuition—time and space—cannot be drawn as strict as Kant wants it.
In fact this is compatible with some of the results from relativity theory, namely that
time and space are not completely separable.
CHAPTER 6
A generalization of Hilbert’s Philosophy of Mathematics
David Hilbert was perhaps the most important mathematician in the period from 1880
to 1940. He contributed in an impressing amount of areas within mathematics and
mathematical physics. Moreover, together with L.E.J. Brouwer he was the main
figure in the so-called Grundlagenstreit in the 1920s, and he became well-know for
his program. I will not treat the program here. Rather, I want to show that his general
philosophical view on the mathematics can be seen as a generalization of Kant’s
philosophy of mathematics.
6.1 Introduction
The infinite is realized nowhere; it does not exist in nature, nor is it
admissible as a foundation of our rational thought. And yet we cannot
dispense with the unconditional application of the tertium non datur and
of negation, since otherwise the gap-less and unified construction of our
science would be impossible. (Hilbert; 1931, 488)1
Hilbert developed his philosophy of mathematics in order to incorporate a
modern theory of the infinite. When doing this he founded his views on Kant’s
epistemology—on his philosophy of mathematics, his philosophy of science in gen-
eral, and his general theory of knowledge.
Hilbert was not a philosopher, he was a mathematician. But he was very inter-
ested in philosophy of science and epistemology. It is clear that Hilbert read Kant in
the 1880s and -90s. This was standard among intellectuals in Germany at that time.
Perhaps Hilbert’s interest in Kant stems from his reading of Hertz’ The Principles of
Mechanics, which influenced him strongly by the end of the 19th century.2 Later on,
in 1918 Paul Bernays was appointed as Hilbert’s assistant, and Bernays took a very
active part in the preparation of a series of lectures Natur und mathematisches Erken-
nen (Hilbert; 1919). Bernays—being both mathematician and philosopher—became
a life-long assistant of Hilbert and had a great influence on Hilbert’s conception of
mathematics. In fact, I think it is reasonable to claim that with respect to philosophy
of mathematics in the 1920s and 30s Hilbert’s and Bernays’ views are inseparable.3
Therefore, when I write Hilbert in the following I often mean Hilbert and Bernays.4
1Translation due to William Ewald, as found in (Mancosu; 1998, 269).
2See (Corry; 2000) and (Rowe; 2000).
3This is something which I have also discussed with Paolo Mancosu who agrees with this point of
view.
4If it is not clear from the context what is meant, I will state it explicitly.
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I will not give a contextual nor a historical accurate account of Hilbert’s posi-
tion. Others have made rather precise historical analyzes of Hilbert’s and Bernays’
development.5
On the other hand, a thorough philosophical discussion of Hilbert’s position is
still missing, I think. Although M. Tiles (1991) has made initial steps in this direction,
and Michael Hallet is working on a monograph on the topic, I still think that we are in
need of a broader philosophical discussion of the relation between Hilbert and Kant.
In such a discussion, schematism should be a cornerstone.
There is, however, a problem which connects with an interpretation of Hilbert.
Hilbert and Bernays were from time to time unclear and confusing.6 Hilbert’s view
certainly underwent changes over time. But instead of a accurate historical account of
this, I will selectively collect from what they said when the position was developed in
its most mature form. This was primarily around 1930. From this I will re-construct
a coherent picture of the position. Now, as it turns out their position is, nevertheless,
partly non-coherent or at least incomplete. Let me mention the following:
1. With respect to one of the most important aspect, namely the status of the
infinite Hilbert (and Bernays) misunderstood the Kantian account of infinity.
2. Kant’s philosophy of mathematics includes—as we have seen— the dogma
that every mathematical problem is solvable, basically because all objects in
Kant’s mathematics are schematisable—this is equivalent to saying that there
are no ideas in mathematics. Hilbert on the other hand generalized the concept
of object in mathematics and allowed ideas (ideal elements are his words) as
objects also in mathematics. It is a question whether he maintains the Kantian
dogma—which has now become known under the name Hilbert’s Dogma. If
he does that his position becomes highly problematic.
3. Hilbert’s characterization of the finitary has turned out to be, incomplete and
not satisfying. At best. Completely wrong at the worst. This problem is ul-
timately connected with the fact, that Hilbert had only an implicit theory of
schematism.
In consequence of these problems I will make a re-interpretation of what Hilbert’s
and Bernays’ position perhaps could or should have have been.
5See for instance (Sieg; 2000), (Mancosu; 1998, 149–188) and (Zach; 2001).
6An example of this is that according to (Mancosu; 1998, 169) Hilbert and Bernays went from
so-called intuitive perception to pure intuition as the intuitive foundation of mathematics.
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6.2 Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics
Hilbert understands mathematics as consisting of a finitary part and an ideal part. Be-
low I will treat more precisely what these two parts include; but very shortly described
we can say that the finitary is viewed as completely safe and epistemologically un-
problematic, whereas the ideal part is not unproblematic. This is due to the use of
highly abstract, impredicative and non-constructive principles and styles of reasoning
coming from the ideal. Criticism against ideal methods in mathematics was formu-
lated by Jordan, Kronecker, Brouwer, Borel and Weyl—just to mention a few. Hilbert
was terrified by the alternatives presented by the critics and in consequence of this
he formulated his program: Basically an attempt to give a (transcendental) deduction
within the secured context, namely the finitary; a deduction showing consistency of
the most important ideal elements. Now, as it turned out, the program failed; his more
general philosophy of mathematics, however, is still of great interest.
6.2.1 Hilbert’s general description of the finitary
Hilbert described the domain of finitary reasoning in a well-known paragraph which
appears with the same content in almost all of Hilbert’s later philosophical papers
(Hilbert; 1922, 1926, 1927, 1930, 1931).
Even if today we can no longer agree with Kant in detail, nevertheless
the most general and fundamental idea of the Kantian epistemology re-
tains its significance: to determine the intuitive [anschauliche] a priori
mode [einstellung] of thought, and thereby to investigate the condition
of the possibility of all knowledge. In my opinion, this is essentially
what happens in my investigations of the principles of mathematics. The
a priori is here nothing more and nothing less than a fundamental mode
of thought, which I also call the finite mode of thought: something is
already given to us in advance in our faculty of representation [Vorstel-
lung]: certain extra-logical concrete objects that exist intuitively [an-
schaulich] as an immediate experience before thought. If logical infer-
ence is to be certain, then these objects must be completely surveyable in
all their parts, and their presentation, their differences their succeeding
on another or their being arrayed next to one another is immediately and
intuitively given to us, along with the objects, as something that neither
can be further reduced to anything else, nor needs such a reduction. This
is the fundamental mode of thought which is a necessary precondition
for mathematics in particular and for science, thought and communica-
tion in general. (Hilbert; 1931, 485–486)
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Hilbert is not exactly precise here—it is unclear in which sense “the Kantian episte-
mology retains its significance”; but we know that he quite early subscribed to a clear
anti-logicist conception of mathematics:
Mathematics is not without presuppositions. But they are not self-evi-
dent. (Hilbert; 1919, 15)
Let me elaborate on the longer quote above by using the concept of number as an
example.
In number theory we have the numerals
1, 11, 111, 11111, [sic!]
each numeral being perceptually recognizable by the fact that in it 1
is always again following by 1 [if it is followed by anything]. These
numerals, which are the object of our consideration, have no meaning
at all in themselves. In elementary number theory, however, we already
require, besides these signs, others that mean something and serve to
convey information [. . . ] (Hilbert; 1926, 377)
When Hilbert talks about numerals he cannot possibly mean anything but what we
today would call tokens. Tokens do not mean anything in themselves. They are
meaningful, only when their relations with axioms are taken into consideration:




+   merely as the communication of the fact
that the numeral   +

is the same as

+   . Here too, the contentual cor-
rectness of this communication can be proved by contentual inference,
and we can go very far with this intuitive, contentual kind of treatment.
(Hilbert; 1926, 377)
My interpretation of these statements are the following. Certain objects are given
to us a priori. These include proto-types 1 . . .1 of the natural numbers. These num-
bers, however, mean nothing unless they are take together with schemata. As Kant
says, schemata are rules expressed by axioms, and one of the axioms determining the




+   . This axiom expresses one of the properties





+   can be used. This provides meaning in the sense, that the axiom give
rise to operative knowledge which shows us how we can operate with and manipulate
the representations of numbers. The numbers are “completely surveyable in all their
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parts”, i.e., schematisable and in consequence of this they satisfy the Kantian princi-
ple of complete determination; “their differences, their succeeding on another [are]
given to us, along with the objects”. ‘Along-nes’ here refers the intensional aspect
of numbers, namely that two numbers are different, iff, the corresponding schema
separates the two numbers.
If we generalize this interpretation to all the finitary concepts, then a finitary
concept is a concept which can be fully schematised and therefore constructed in
intuition.
[I]t must be possible to survey these objects completely in all their
parts, and the fact that they occur, that they differ from one another,
and that they follow each other, or are concatenated, is immediately
given intuitively, together with the objects, as something that can nei-
ther be reduced to anything else nor requires reduction. This is the basic
philosophical position that I consider requisite for mathematics and, in
general, for all scientific thinking, understanding, and communication.
(Hilbert; 1926, 376).
The intensional rules determining equality on the finitary objects cannot be reduced
to anything else. They are basic rules necessary “for all scientific thinking, under-
standing, and communication.”
In one Bernays’s most mature presentations of Hilbert’s philosophy of mathe-
matics (Bernays; 1930), Bernays clearly has the distinction between type and token.
Now the objects of finitism are characterized as formal objects—Bernays’ term for
types. These are recursively generated by a process of repetition; the stroke symbols
are concrete representations of these formal objects:
If we want to have the ordinal numbers [. . . ] as unique objects free
from all inessential features, then we must take as object in each case
the bare schema of the respective figures obtained by repetition; this re-
quires a very high degree of abstraction. However, we are free to repre-
sent these purely formal objects by concrete objects (“number signs” or
“numerals”); these then possess inessential arbitrarily added characteris-
tics, which, however, can be immediately recognized as such. (Bernays;
1930, 31–32)7
Bernays ads an interesting note:
7Translation is due to Paolo Mancosu and Ian Mueller, as a part of the so-called Bernays Project.
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[T]he representing thing contains in its constitution the essential proper-
ties of the object represented, so that the relationships to be investigated
among the represented objects can also be found among the represen-
tatives and can be determined by consideration of the latter. (Bernays;
1930, 32)8
This is precisely Kant’s point when discussing the universality of schematic reason-
ing. We can use concrete intuitions, i.e., tokens, when reasoning universally about all
tokens of the same type, only if the reasoning about the token is taken together with
the schema.9
Hilbert were never precise with respect to the content of the finitary. In the pro-
grammatic article (Hilbert; 1926) he mentions finitary reasoning about the natural
numbers—what we today would understand as reasoning using only bounded quan-
tifiers. This is generalized by Hilbert and Bernays to:
A universal judgment about numerals can be interpreted finitistically
only in a hypothetical sense, i.e., as a proposition about any given nu-
meral. Such a judgment pronounces a law which must verify itself in
each particular case. (Hilbert and Bernays; 1934, 32)
This is the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation:10 ∀xA(x) is finitarily mean-
ingful if we have a procedure Φ such that for any a, if A(a) is well-formed, then Φ(a)
verifies finitarily A(a).
An existential sentence about numerals, i.e., a sentence of the form
“there is a numeral   with the property

(   ),” is to be understood fini-
tistically as a “partial judgment,” i.e., as an incomplete communication
of a more specific proposition consisting in either a direct exhibition of
a numeral with the property

(   ), or the exhibition of a process to ob-
tain such a numeral,—where part of the exhibition of such a process is a
determinate bound for the sequence of actions to be performed. (Hilbert
and Bernays; 1934, 32)
This interpretation is, perhaps, more restricted than the BHK-interpretation as a
specific bound needs to be given, in case the witness can only be devised principally.
The quotations given here are the most precise statements they gave. Generally,
Hilbert was vague about what constitutes finitary reasoning. But let me give other
examples could:
8Translation is due to Paolo Mancosu and Ian Mueller, as a part of the so-called Bernays Project.
9See my discussion of this aspect in the case of natural numbers on page 43.
10See footnote 9 on page 72 for a definition of the BHK-interpretation.
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1. Simple reasoning about geometrical figures and finite graphs, such as triangles,
circles, constant functions, simple real functions and the like.
2. The computation of simple functions on the rational numbers (and some ex-
pansions hereof).
3. Integration and differentiation of (some of the) functions given in 2. For exam-
ple constant functions and simple real functions.
One, who has tried to make precise what Hilbert understood under ‘finitary rea-
soning’ is (Tait; 1981, n.d., 2005).
6.3 Tait’s thesis
Tait formulates the thesis that the functions of mathematics which are finitary mean-
ingful are precisely the primitive recursive functions (Tait; 2005, 29); in other words:
A function f is finitary, if and only if, f is primitive recursive.
The class of primitive recursive functions is the smallest class of functions:11
1. containing initial functions for zero, successor and projection.
2. closed under composition and under primitive recursion: Given primitive re-
cursive g, h we have
f (x,0) = g(x)
f (x,y+1) = h(x,y, f (x,y))
Let us evaluate critically Tait’s thesis.
The first problem we face is how to understand the expression ‘the function f is
finitary’. There are at least two possibilities:
1. ‘The function f is finitary’ means that given any x the operation f applied to x
is epistemically unproblematic.
2. ‘The function f is finitary’ means that we have a concept f of a function. This
concept has a corresponding schema which allows us to decide whether a given
representation is an instance of f and to use this function, i.e., to compute it in
the sense of 1.
11See (Odifreddi; 1989, 22) for details.
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I understand Tait as promoting the former understanding.12 In fact, the former
can be derived from the latter in most cases. Suppose we have a definition of a prim-
itive recursive function f . This is given as a finite piece of text which is generated
according to the rules given in the definition above. We can understand this as an
intensional definition of f which works simultaneously as a proto type for our con-
cept of f ; any other (definition of a) primitive recursive function g is the same if it is
defined in precisely the same way. Thus intentional equality between primitive recur-
sive functions is reduced to equality between literal definitions of primitive recursive
functions. As the latter equality is completely unproblematic, 2 reduces in the inten-
sional case to 1. The extensional case is more complex and I will treat it below in the
case of general recursive functions.
It seems, however, that Hilbert and Bernays perhaps had the intensional under-
standing of a finitary function in mind:
A [finitary] function, for us, is an intuitive [anschauliche] instruction
[Anweisung] which on the basis of a numeral, or a pair of numerals, or
a triple of numerals, . . . , assigns another numeral. (Hilbert and Bernays;
1934, 26)
If f is primitive recursive, then computing f (x) is unproblematic with respect to
‘complete surveyability in all parts’, ‘immediacy’ and ’intuitivity’:
6.3.1 Tait’s “if”
Given a primitive recursive function f and any number x computing f (x) is com-
pletely unproblematic. The only ‘complicated’ element in a definition of a primitive
recursive function can be the two operations: substitution and iteration. Say that g is
given and that we define f by f (0) = a0 and f (x+1) = g(x, f (x)). Suppose we want
to compute f (x). If x is 0 then a0 is given. If x is not 0, then x = 1 or x > 1. In the
first case we have f (1) = g(1,a0) which by assumption is finitarily computable—say
the result is a1. If x > 1 then x = 2 or x > 2. In the first case finitary reasoning gives
us a2. This process goes on until we reach x. The process is guaranteed to terminate
as g is finitary and x is a (finitary) natural number.13
12“So how can the finitist understand f : A → B [. . . ] he can understand it as recording the fact that
he has given a specific procedure for defining a B from an arbitrary A or, we shall say, of constructing
a B from an arbitrary A. (Tait; 2005, 24).
13The logician could make a counter argument here by asking: “How do we know that the given
number x is not a non-standard number being infinitely large”. This is actually a skeptic counter-
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6.3.2 Tait’s “only if”
Let us define a function ϕ in the following way. Suppose ϕ1(a,b) = a + b and




(aa)), . . .
Continue an unfolding definition of ϕn in this way. That is, ϕn+1(a,b) is an iteration
of ϕn(a,a) b times.
The Ackermann function ϕ : N → N is defined as ϕn(n,n).14 It grows really fast:
ϕ(1) = 2, ϕ(2) = 4, ϕ(3) = 9, ϕ(4) = 44294967296 .
The function is not a primitive recursive function as it majorizes any function which
is primitive recursive. This was observed by Ackermann in 1928. It is a relevant
question, however, whether Hilbert considered (or should have considered) it to be
finitary?
The Ackermann function is defined as a recursive function using nested recursion.
This gives rise to a rule which allows that we can compute the values of ϕ from below.
In principle we can compute any value of in the sequence ϕ(1),ϕ(2), . . . ,ϕ(n), . . ..
Arguments for finitariry are:
• It fulfills the ‘surveyability’, ‘immediacy’ and ’intuitivity’ criteria.
• It is mentioned by Hilbert (1926) in the programmatic article.
• In volume II of Grundlagen der Mathematik Hilbert and Bernays write:
Certain methods of finitistic mathematics which go beyond recur-
sive number theory (in the original sense [i.e., primitive recursive])
have been discussed in §7 [of volume I of Grundlagen], namely the
introduction of functions by nested recursion [e.g., the Ackermann
function] and the more general induction schemata. (Hilbert and
Bernays; 1939, 354)
• Ackermann (1924) usestransfinite induction up to ωωω for showing consistency
of a second order version of PRA. In this system ϕ is definable . Moreover, this
consistency proof was considered in the Hilbert school to be finitistic.
argument. Well, we are not working with non-standard numbers. Our objects are not formal objects—
the are contentual or semantic objects. Thus our numbers are not interpreted in some kind of model.
They are numbers and not reducible to or interpretable in anything. But the problem becomes a real
problem once we allow for ideal elements.
14See page 126 for a definition of the function in G ödel’s system T.
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I find these reasons sufficient as a refutation of Tait’s “only if”.15 But let me give
another argument also.
Any primitive recursive function is defined by a finite piece of text. We can
therefore provide an algorithm which enumerates all primitive recursive functions;
f1, f2, . . . , fn, . . .. Based on this algorithm we can construct a finitary function U
which is the universal function taking two arguments n and x and then picks the n-th
primitive recursive function and applies it to x.16. In other words U(n,x) = fn(x). It
can be argued that U is a finitary function. Thus also U(n,n) + 1 is finitary. It is,
however, not primitive recursive. Assume it is. Then there would exists an m such
that
fm(n) = U(n,n)+1. (6.1)
On the other hand, because U is the universal function we have fm(m) = U(m,m),
which, however, contradicts (6.1) if we substitute m for n. Therefore, there are more
finitary functions than primitive recursive functions.
Let me mention one crucial point. In the logic community there is a tendency to
equate Hilbert’s finitism with primitive recursive arithmetic, perhaps even with PRA
as a formal theory. Hilbert talked about the contentual content of the objects. He
looked at it semantically; what are the objects. Perhaps, in PRA we can code many of
the mathematical objects, functions and operations which Hilbert found finitistically
meaningful. But it can only be a codification, in which we loose the mathematical
intuition which is connected in a semantic way with the finitary objects.
An example of this is expressed by Caldon and Ignjatović. They are “accepting
Tait’s analysis and delineation of finitism [. . . ]. Thus, we take Finitism to be the
part of mathematics that corresponds to the theory of natural numbers formalized as
Primitive Recursive Arithmetic” (2005, 779).
Today there is no agreement on what should be considered as the finitary. Later in
this chapter I will present arguments showing that there is no unique characterization
of the finitary. Just as with Kant’s faculty of understanding the specification of what
can be regarded as finitary depends on certain interests of reason. This is in complete
line, actually, with what the later Bernays formulated: “[T]he sharp distinction be-
tween the intuitive and the non-intuitive, which was employed in the treatment of the
problem of the infinite, can apparently not be drawn so strictly” (Bernays; 1976, 61)
15A more detailed analysis is given by Richard Zach in his thesis 2001.
16For simplicity I have assumed that the primitive recursive functions are 1-ary.
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6.3.3 The ideal
The ideal elements were supposed by Hilbert to be abstract elements introduced in
the development of mathematics in order to simplify, generalize and complete already
existing mathematics. In such a process new mathematics would also arise and this
was how Hilbert saw the expansion and progression of mathematics.
Thus, in sharp contrast to Kant, Hilbert introduces regulative ideas in the philos-
ophy of mathematics:17
The role that remains to the infinite is, rather, merely that of an idea—if,
in accordance with Kant’s words, we understand by an idea a concept of
reason that transcends all experience and through which the concrete is
completed so as to form a totality–an idea [. . . ] ((Hilbert; 1926, 392)
Hilbert (1926) gives instructive examples:
• The set of natural numbers being a number ω. Based on ω we can develop a
theory of Cantor’s transfinite numbers. (Hilbert; 1926, 374-5)
• The complex number
√
−1, giving rise to the fundamental theorem of algebra.
(Hilbert; 1926, 379)
• Introduction of ideal factors “so that the simple laws of divisibility could be
maintained even for algebraic integers”. (Hilbert; 1926, 379)
• The completion of Euclidean geometry by supplying with elements at infinity.
This becomes projective geometry which has particular simple and beautiful
properties such as the duality principle. (Hilbert; 1926, 372–371) Geometry
combined with the axiomatic method opens for a whole new discipline, namely
algebraic geometry as also discussed on page 29.
• Full classical logic in all of mathematics and the axiom of choice. The latter is
introduced through Hilbert’s elegant ε operator. (Hilbert; 1926, 382)
According to Hilbert ideal elements are indispensable to mathematics: “we can-
not dispense with the unconditional application of the tertium non datur and of nega-
tion, since otherwise the gap-less and unified construction of our science would be
impossible” (Hilbert; 1931, 488).
The mathematical universe is filled up with other examples, such as:
17“Die Rolle, die dem Unendlichen bleibt, ist vielmehr lediglich die einer Idee – wenn man, nach den
Worten Kants, unter einer Idee einen Vernunftbegriff versteht, der alle Erfahrung übersteit und durhc
den das Konkrete im Sinne der Totalit ät erg änzt wird [. . . ]”.
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• The completion of the ring of rational numbers (i.e., the reals).
• Transfinite recursion and limit constructions in general.





They give new mathematics; generalize existing mathematics; complete, system-
atize existing mathematics. And they are essential for discoveries. Let us have a
closer look at some examples:
Fractals are ideal elements. Here we take the von Koch curve and the Serpinski
triangle.
Both of the fractals are obtained by letting a generating algorithm ‘run’ to infinity.
In the case of Serpinski we will denote the n-th approximation by Sn. Now, S being
the Serpinski triangle is constructed as the limit of this sequence of approximations.
If we let C(Sn) be the circumference of Sn and A(Sn) be the area of Sn, then it is clear
that
A(Sn) −→ 0, as n −→ ∞
C(Sn) −→ ∞, as n −→ ∞
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In this way we see that no one-dimensional dimension seems to fit the Serpin-











Apart from broading our concepts, the fractals—being characterized by their bro-
ken dimensions—are useful and fruitful objects. Sometimes (or perhaps even in most
cases) they give rise to a deepening of more ‘basic’ mathematical concepts. Thus the
von Koch curve was introduced, just as the continuous nowhere differentiable Weier-
straß function (as discussed on page 6) in order to scrutinize the concept of continu-
ity. From the curve K it was realized that it was possible for a continuous curve to be
nowhere differentiable. This came as a big surprise in the late 19th century and led
into investigations of our concept of continuity.
6.3.4 Generating functions
Let me discuss a really characteristic part of the mathematical method: The embed-
ding of ‘simple’ problems in ‘complex’ contexts. An example of this is the prime
number theorem, which says that there is a certain order in the distribution of prime






This theorem has basically two different proofs. There is an ‘analytic’ proof, which
was the first proof. This proof goes via complex analysis and uses the Riemann zeta
function. There is also a more simple proof, the so-called ‘elementary’ proof due to
Erdös and Selberg (discovered independently). Their proof uses only real analysis
and is therefore considered to be more simple than the original proof, although the
later presupposes much more analytic machinery. Moreover, it is generally granted
that the complex proof is far less intricate and more easily understood, and much
shorter than the ‘elementary’ proof.
The Fibonacci numbers, probably introduced by Leonardo de Pisa around 1200,
will serve as another example. Here another simple problem is easily solved when
translated into complex analysis. And moreover, the discovery of the solution is very
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difficult to find, perhaps, unless the complex method using formal power series is
used.
The sequence of the Fibonacci numbers is inductively defined as
f (0) = 0, f (1) = 1 and for n ≥ 2, f (n) = f (n−1)+ f (n−2).
If we let χ be the characteristic function of the predicate “being equal to 1”, i.e.,
χ(n) =
{
1, if n = 1,
0, otherwise
and let ψ be the characteristic function of the predicate “being strictly greater than 0”
then we can define the (slightly generalized) Fibonacci numbers in one formula:
∀n ∈ Z : f (n) = ψ(n)( f (n−1)+ f (n−2)+χ(n))) (6.2)
The problem which now interests us is how to find a direct expression for the
n-th Fibonacci number. In order to compute the n-th number we will, given the
definition, have to compute the whole sequence of numbers between 0 and n in order
to compute f (n). This is of course very inefficient and we would thus like to have
a closed expression telling us how to compute directly. This is seems to be a purely
number theoretic question but the trick which makes the solution particularly easy
and elegant is to embed the problem in complex analysis. Specifically we will look
at the so-called generating function for the Fibonacci sequence.
In order to introduce and use generating functions we need some complex ana-
lysis. For any sequence (ak)k≥0 of complex numbers we can form the formal power













z ∈ C. Thus P(z), which is also called the generating function for (ak), is a sequence
of finite sums. If the sequence (∑∞k=0 akzk) converges then the formal power series
converges. Irrelevant whether formal power series converges, we have certain op-
erations we can perform on them. If P(z) and Q(z) are formal power series with
coefficients (ak)k≥0 and (bk)k≥0, respectively then we can add Q to P and obtain
(P + Q)(z) with coefficients (ak + bk)k≥0. Likewise we can multiply with a scalar,
form a certain Cauchy product and so on.
When we return to the Fibonacci numbers the formal power series with these
numbers as coefficients is:





f (n)zn, z ∈ C.







































f (n)zn + z
= F(z)(z+ z2)+ z.




This is a well-defined function whenever 1− z− z2 is different from 0. If |z| is
close to 0 this function is analytic and can therefore be developed as a power series
using for instance Taylor polynomials. There is, however, something which is more
elegant in our case. For γ = 1+
√
5
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Interestingly, this also makes us able to say something about the asymptotic behavior
of f (n), namely when n is large then f (n) is approximately 1√
5
γn, thus the theo-
rem reveals information about how the sequence of the Fibonacci numbers, being a
sequence of natural numbers, are connected with the real numbers. If there are ex-
planations in mathematics, then they are to be found in examples like this. The direct
expression of the n-th Fibonacci number can, of course, also be proved (easily) by
induction. This proof, however, explains nothing about why the expression looks the
way it does. Moreover, one need to know the theorem in advance when proving it. It
is difficult to see how an induction proof could lead to some kind of discovery—this
is more easily seen to be possible in the case the method using generating functions
is used.
This Fibonacci-example, however, is nothing but a special case of a much more
general well-known theorem:18
Theorem. Suppose d ∈ N, and let q1, ...,qd ∈ C,qd 6= 0. Put q0 := 1 and let α1, ...αe
be the roots of the polynomial q(z) = ∑dk=0 qkzd−k . Then for any sequence of numbers
(ak)k∈N in the following are equivalent:
1. The sequence is recursively given, that is for every k ∈,k > d
ak +q1ak−1 +q2ak−2 + · · ·+qdak−d = 0
2. There are polynomials g1(z), ...,ge(z) where grad(gi) < c, for a certain c ∈ N,






The proof of theorem reveals a method for finding the explicit expression and this
method uses generating functions as in the example of the Fibonacci numbers. Here
we use generating functions as a very powerful tool for solving questions of a much
simpler character. But it is the very translation of a problem in a simple domain in
to a complex domain which makes the solution particular easy, elegant and perhaps
discoverable.
18I have to admit that I do not know who discovered the following theorem. I learned about it at a
course I had in combinatorics.
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6.3.5 Consistency, existence and ideal elements
It is somewhat ironic that Hilbert normally is seen as a leading figure within formal-
ism. At least if Hilbert is a formalist to any extent it certainly is not the version being
outlined by Corry (1951), where mathematics is identified with formal theories. The
irony enters the picture as Hilbert is a neo-Kantian. And if there is something which
is remote to the Kantian philosophy of mathematics then it is un-interpreted formal
systems.19
Posy (1998, 301) mentions that the fact that intuitionistic logic as a formal theory
“is sometimes taken as the core of intuitionism was Hilbert’s ultimate victory”. I very
much agree with this. On the other hand, Brouwer also had a rather good victory:
Quite often Hilbert’s position is taken to be the core of formalism—this is certainly
wrong—but it is partly due to Brouwer, who introduced the term ‘formalism’ in a
lecture “Intuitionism and Formalism” which he gave in Amsterdam 1912 when he
became appointed as full professor.
Looking back at Kant with a contemporary understanding of logic, he must be
seen as an anti-formalist because of his sharp distinction between intuition and con-
cepts. Concepts can never capture fully a continuum such as space. Space is not a
concept, as I discussed intensively in Chapter 3.
According to Kant it is important to draw the distinction between logical and real
possibility. The former is only obliged to conduct in accordance with constraints
given by the intellect alone. The latter adds to these, the constraints of being a possi-
ble object of experience. That is, that there is a possibility for an object to be given
in intuition, which corresponds to the concept: “Whatever agrees with the formal
conditions of experience (in accordance with intuition and concepts) is possible.”
(A218/B265) Although consistency is a necessary condition it does not suffice:
That in such a concept no contradiction must be contained is, to be sure, a
necessary logical condition; but it is far from sufficient for the objective
reality of the concept, i.e., for the possibility of such an object as is
thought through the concept. (A220/B268–9)
But as we have seen earlier in this thesis, Kant only acknowledge objects in math-
ematics which satisfy the principle of complete determination, i.e., objects which are
fully schematisable. Hilbert, on the other hand, operates with two different kinds of
objects: real objects being schematisable in the sense of Kant and ideal objects being
only pseudo-schematisable. But existence in connection with ideas are of a different
19See also my discussion of this in the section entitled “Hilbert and the axiomatic method” found on
page 28.
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type and here it is perhaps enough with consistency. Take for instance the concept of
a completed infinity. Bernays and Hilbert (1934, §1) puts it precisely in this way:
The problem of the satisfiability of an axiom system (or a logical for-
mula) can be positively solved in the case of a finite domain of indi-
viduals by exhibition; but in the case where the satisfaction of the ax-
ioms requires an infinite domain of individuals this method is no longer
applicable because it is not determined whether an infinite domain of
individuals cannot be considered as settled; rather, the introduction of
such infinite domains is only justified by a proof of the consistency of an
axiom system characterizing the infinite.
6.3.6 Hilbert’s justification—the program
As seen by Hilbert the ideal elements of the mathematical method and universe are of
indispensable value. However, Hilbert was at the same time aware of the fact that this
progressiveness of the mathematical method was transcending the secured finitary
parts of mathematics and it was therefore in need of some kind of justification. For
this he developed his program, as mentioned on page 102
The program failed basically because of Gödel’s incompleteness results. But
how much of his philosophy can be saved? According to Bernays the problem is the
following:
[T]he epistemological perspective which motivated [the program’s] for-
mulation has become problematic [...] the sharp distinction between the
intuitive [Anschaulichen] and the non-intuitive [Nicht-Anschaulichen],
employed in the treatment of the problem of the infinite, can apparently
not be drawn so strictly, and the reflection on the formation of math-
ematical ideas still needs a more detailed elaboration in this respect.
(Bernays; 1976, 61)
This rest of this chapter mainly discusses the first of these problems: The distinc-
tion between the finitary and the ideal; i.e., the distinction between what can be fully
schematised and what cannot.
6.4 Is Hilbert’s position consistent?
There are some questions which we need to solve before turning to schematisation.
There are, at least, two conflicts with a Kantian philosophy which need to be solved:
Firstly, Kant and Bernays misunderstood the actual infinity of space as intuition;
secondly we need to analyze the so-called Hilbert dogma: Is it to be taken as a con-
stitutive or regulative principle?
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6.4.1 The objectivity of the infinite
Hilbert formulated a critique of some of Kant’s notions. In particular “the role and
content of the a priori was extremely exaggerated” (Hilbert; 1930). In the lecture
Naturerkennen und Logik it is clear that the problems Hilbert seem to find in the a
priori is the postulated Euclidean structure of space and the sharp distinction between
time and space.20 But in other places Hilbert was critical towards the infinite in
Kant.21 In On the infinite Hilbert implicitly refers to Kant:
In the attempt to prove the infinitude of space in a speculative way, more-
over, obvious errors were committed. From the fact that outside a region
of space there always is still more space it follows only that space is
unbounded but by no means that it is infinite. (Hilbert; 1926, 372)
And in 1933 in a handwritten manuscript Über das Unendliche Hilbert writes “Until
and with Kant, but also later in time, it was never doubted that space was infinite.
This was, however, a conceptual misunderstanding”.22
It it is, however, Bernays, who in the clearest way formulates the postulated ten-
sion:
Furthermore, one cannot point to infinitely extended things like infinite
lines, infinite planes, or infinite space as objects of intuition. In par-
ticular, space as a whole is not given to us in intuition. We do indeed
represent every spatial figure as situated in space. But this relationship
of individual spatial figures to the whole of space is given as an object
of intuition only to the extent that a spatial neighborhood is represented
along with every spatial object. Beyond this representation, the position
in the whole of space is conceivable only in thought. (In opposition to
Kant, we must maintain this view.) (Bernays; 1976, 36)
It is clear that Hilbert and Bernays did not really understand Kant in every detail.
They thought that Kant had actual infinity “as an object of intuition”. This, indeed,
is really a misconception of Kant’s notion of space. What Hilbert and Bernays most
probably thought about Kant, is that he postulated actual infinity of space as ob-
jectively given, with the size of e.g., ℵ0. Quite contrary to this—as I showed in
20Another general critique of Kant is “Even if today we can no longer agree with Kant in the details,
nevertheless the most general and fundamental idea of the Kantian epistemology retains its significance”
(Hilbert; 1931, 485–486).
21“The infinite is realized nowhere; it does not exist in nature, nor is it admissible as a foundation of
our rational thought. (Hilbert; 1931, 488)
22As quoted in (Majer; 1993, 75).
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Chapter 3—Kant maintained that space as intuition is infinite in the sense that it is
in-measurable. The only measure Kant had was the finite numbers, therefore, Kant’s
infinite should be understood as in-finite. On the other hand, the potential infinite was
objectively unproblematic. On the bottom line there is therefore no conflict between
Hilbert and Kant.23
6.4.2 Hilbert’s Dogma
In the following I want to discuss whether Hilbert’s dogma: “Wir müssen wissen, wir
werden wissen” is to be understood as a constitutive principle or regulative principle
(to state it in Kantian terms). The Dogma followed Hilbert for all his life.
Hilbert’s dogma (Hilbert; 1902c, 444). Any definite mathematical problem has a
solution. There are two kinds:
1. Provide “an actual answer to the question asked”, or
2. Give a “proof of the impossibility of its solution”.
In mentioning 2 Hilbert is explicit in saying that he is thinking of the problems
like the parallel-postulate or the squaring of the circle.
“We hear within us the perpetual call: There is the problem. See its solution.
You can find it by pure reason, for in mathematics there is no ignorabimus.” (Hilbert;
1902c, 402) Hilbert claims that every mathematician share this belief, but no one has
yet been able to prove it.
There are three interpretations of Hilbert’s dogma:
1. Either Hilbert completely follows Kant when he says that in mathematics every
question is definite and solvable.
2. The principle is to be taken only as a regulative principle of the pure reason.
This harmonies with “We hear within us the perpetual call” (Hilbert) with “we
hear the voice of pure reason” (Kant).
3. Hilbert could have meant that it is a constitutive principle in the sense that
solving a problem means providing a yes or a no, or showing that relatively to
a frame work, the problem is not solvable.
23Note that Majer thinks (1993, 76) that Hilbert was against both the actual and the potential infinite.
Thus, in Majer’s reading, for Hilbert the potential infinite is a an ideal element. “F ür Hilbert hingegen
– der Kants “Schluss” als Fehlschluss durchschaut hatte – stellt sich das Problem des Unendlichen von
Grund auf neu: Fuer ihn war nicht mehr die Frage nach dem Modus des Unendlichen, ob aktual oder
potentiell, die entscheidende Frage, sondern, ob das Unendliche – als die Verneinung des Endlichen
ueberhaupt – gerechtfertigt wernden kann”.
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The first interpretation is completely in line with Kant’s philosophy of mathemat-
ics as I discussed it in Chapter 5. The second interpretation is more in line with the
more general epistemology of Kant. And the third could be interpreted as a version
of Kant’s Vernunftkritik in the context of mathematics. I think that the status of the
principle changes over time. I the earlier years he considered it to be constitutive, like
something which can be proved, but in later years when he was more philosophically
reflected it became regulative:
As an example of the way in which fundamental questions can be treated
I would like to choose the thesis that every mathematical problem can be
solved. We are all convinced of that. After all, one of the things that
attract us most when we apply ourselves to a mathematical problem is
precisely that with us we always hear the call: here is the problem, search
for the solution; you can find it by pure thought, for in mathematics there
is no ignorabimus. Now, to be sure, my proof theory cannot specify a
general method for solving every mathematical problem; that does not
exist. But the demonstration that the assumption of the solvable of every
mathematical problem is consistent falls entirely within the scope of our
theory. (Hilbert; 1926, 384)
The principle is an ideal element. It is not fully schematisable: the proof “does
not exist”. But the principle is a reasonable ideal element, in the sense that we can
consistently add it, but only as a regulative principle. Thus Kant does not claim
Kant’s principle of complete determination to be unconditioned true in mathematics.
Hilbert realizes that by introducing ideal elements in mathematics he cannot expect24
E(x) → 23#P(x)∨23#¬P(x).
6.5 A neo-Kantian re-interpretation of Hilbert
6.5.1 The a priori
Hilbert was not completely clear on what precisely the a priori in mathematics con-
sisted of. The main reason for this, I claim, is that Hilbert only had an implicit schema
theory. If he had had a theory of schematism he could have been more precise here.
Let me attempt a re-interpretation using elements of mathematical logic which have
become known since the time of Hilbert.
It will be a result of the forthcoming pages that there is no unique a priori part of
mathematics. But let us start with Kant’s “schema of magnitude” which probably is
24Note the similarity between Hilbert’s conception as expressed in: Give “the proof of the impossi-
bility of its solution” (Hilbert; 1902c, 444) and Kant’s “no answer is an answer” (A478n/B507n).
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needed for most of our everyday life and certainly for all of the simple mathematics
of size which exist. But mathematics as science needs other basic objects and catego-
rizes. Here the natural numbers as a whole can be an object. Qua this generalization
of the number concept, the mathematical schema of number cannot be expected to be
total.25
6.5.2 A modern theory of schemata for basic and ideal mathematics
In general, concepts and schemata are intimately connected. Given any concept, say
the definition of a function, the schema is the human ability to use and operate with
this function. It is the ability to recognize and produce representations of the function.
For geometry we could simply follow the line from Kant. The objects are geo-
metrical objects which can be created in the mind as pure forms of things that can be
realized in the empirical world. To my best knowledge, Kant in fact never provided
arguments for schemata which exceeded Euclid’s first three postulates. As it there-
fore turns out, Kant’s restricted notion of space is to a certain sense compatible with
a non-Euclidean conception of space.
With arithmetic we leave Kant. As I argued on page 92 numbers are very naturally
also objects, though of second order. The schema of number can be taken to be a
primitive recursive functions realizing (in the sense of the BHK-interpretation) the
axioms of Robinson arithmetic.26 But as argued earlier in this chapter the primitive
recursive functions are not enough, and we cannot generally expect totality. Thus we
try the partial recursive functions: When they provide us with objects they lead us in
a finite amount of time to knowledge. If not, they will say, forever “I don’t know”.
This is completely satisfying given the fact, that we cannot know, if we are dealing
with ideal elements or not.
Partial recursive functions are functions from numbers to numbers. They can
be computed mechanically, step by step. It is a very robust class of functions and
they can be characterized in many different ways using Turing machines, Register
machines, lambda calculus, domain theory and Kleene schemata. All these different
formulations of the effective functions have turned out to be equivalent and this have
led to the so-called Church-Turing thesis: The partial recursive functions characterize
effective computability.
Definition. The class of partial recursive functions is the smallest class of func-
tions:27
25See my discussion on the previous chapter.
26See page 92 for the axioms of Robinson arithmetic.
27Here I use Kleene’s symbol ϕ ' ψ which is to be understood as “either ϕ and ψ are both undefined,
or they are both defined with the same value”.
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1. Containing initial functions for zero, successor and projection.
2. Closed under composition and also under primitive recursion which is: Given
ψ, γ we have
ϕ(x,0) ' ψ(x)
ϕ(x,y+1) ' γ(x,y,ϕ(x,y))
3. Closed under unrestricted µ-recursion, i.e., given ψ we have
ϕ(x) ' µy
(
∀z ≤ y(ψ(x,z) ↓) ∧ ψ(x,y) ' 0
)
.
The partial recursive functions are well-behaved. They can be given on a certain nor-
mal form, and as any partial recursive function is defined by a finite piece of text,
they can be enumerated. This is the Enumeration theorem: There is a sequence,
ϕ0,ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn, . . . of partial recursive functions, such that any partial recursive func-
tion is within that enumeration. Let 〈x〉 be the primitive recursive encoding of the
sequence x. Then there exists a universal partial recursive function ϕ(e,x) such that
for any partial recursive function ψ of n variables there is e such that
ψ(x) ' ϕ(e,〈x〉).
As discussed above we could understand these finitary functions either intension-
ally of extensionally. The intensional understanding is simple and unproblematic, but
what about the extensional notion.
Say that ϕn and ϕm are extensionally equal, in symbols,
ϕn ≈ ϕm, if and only if, for every x, ϕn(x) ' ϕm(x).
Then any definition of a partial recursive function ϕn generates an equivalence class
[ϕn]. The question now is, is such a concept schematisable? It is not trivially so. If
we consider [ϕn] as a type, then membership of that type is not recursively decidable.
The question of extensionality of functions is an interesting question, which I will
come back to below.
We could also provide some basic schematic rules for set theory. We have a deter-
minate concept of a set A in case we have a schema, say a partial recursive function,
which constructs a representation of A and the schema also recognizes representa-
tions of the concept. Given that two sets A and B are determinate objects, then also
A∪B and A∩B and (A,B) are determinate objects.
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But there are also quasi-schemata. These are ‘rules for constructing’ more ab-
stract objects, such as the first infinite number ω or a converging sequence of rational
numbers taken as a completed object. Characteristic for these quasi-schemata is that
we allow constructions to run in an infinite amount of time. This is in contrast with
the real schemata which are rules running only in a finite amount of time, if they give
output. Examples of quasi-schemata are:
1. Given a set A and a equivalence relation ∼ on A form the quotient set A/ ∼.
2. Zorn’s Lemma or any of its equivalents: The axiom of choice, the maximal
chain principle or the well-ordering principle.
3. Adjunction of ideal elements.28
4. Extensionality of functions and functionals.
5. Taking limits.
6. Power set construction.
Sometimes these principles are ideal, sometimes they are not. The axiom of choice
is in an intensional context with intuitionistic logic fully schematisable, whereas in a
set-theoretic context we have that extensionality and the axiom of choice imply full
classical logic, as shown by Carlström (2004). Power set constructions can be un-
limited or limited, as they can for instance be restricted to finite subsets or only the
first-order definable subsets.
A simple example of an ideal concept with schema could be the symbol ω which
can be seen as denoting the object
{n | n is a natural number.}
The schema for constructing this set is the quasi-schema: “Take the limit”.
The notion of schema and quasi-schema give rise to a relativised notion of con-
struction in mathematics. Here there are at least two different notions of construc-
tions.
Definition. Suppose X is an already constructed object, whether ideal or not. Then
we say that Y is (quasi)-schematisable relatively to X in case one of the following
situations obtains, either
• Y can be constructed using a (quasi) schema on X , or
28For example Q −→ Q(
√
−2).
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• Y is obtained by adding some already constructed (ideal) elements to X .
Thus there are basically two different types of ideal elements. Some simple examples
are
1. Z is schematisable relatively to N,
2. Q is schematisable relatively to Z,
3. R is quasi-schematisable relatively to Q,
4. C is schematisable relatively to R,
5. Projective geometry is schematisable relatively to Euclidean geometry.
This notion of ideal elements is open towards some dynamical aspects of ideal ele-
ments. Our constructions and construction-procedures are not fixed once and for all.
Thus it took historically a considerable amount of time to provide an interpretation
of the (imaginary) complex numbers, which reduces a complex number to a point
in the real plane. Also projective geometry arose by supplying Euclidean geometry
with points at infinity. Later on it was discover that we can in fact give a a model of
projective geometry within Euclidean geometry by moving up in dimension. There
seems to be, however, a very fundamental border between that which can be finitely
schematised and that which cannot. I find it very hard to believe that we can eliminate
the ideal element when we construct R out of Q.
In mathematics there are also more abstract ideal methods which do not directly
correspond to some kind of quasi-schema. Examples of such are a) in mathematics
there is no ignorabimus; b) seek generalizations; c) embed simple problems into to
complex areas; d) Axiomatization, i.e., making things abstract—lifting away from
intuition; and so on.
6.6 The relativised a priori
Let us come back to the question whether there exists a unique a priori. Recall
Bernays’ word:
[T]he sharp distinction between the intuitive [Anschaulichen] and the
non-intuitive [Nicht-Anschaulichen], employed in the treatment of the
problem of the infinite, can apparently not be drawn so strictly, and the
reflection on the formation of mathematical ideas still needs a more de-
tailed elaboration in this respect. (Bernays; 1976, 61)
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The following example is taken from the mathematical discipline proof theory and
will serve to prove, both that the sharp distinction between the intuitive and the non-
intuitive does not exist and that the formation of fully schematisable concepts de-
pends on interests of reason—on which ideal elements we include in our theories. I
will show that different ways of providing semantics to formal theories give different
collections of concepts being fully schematisable. For that we will need a generaliza-
tion of primitive recursive arithmetic.
6.6.1 Finite Type Theory
T is a type theory and thus it has a certain type structure. The ground type of T
is type o which represents the natural numbers. Now, the types of T are generated
inductively: if σ and τ are types then σ → τ is also a type. Each type is thought of
as representing a class of objects, and for o this is the natural numbers. Going to
higher types, σ → τ is the type containing operations/functionals from σ to τ. If F is
a functional of type σ→ τ, then we write this as is standard in mathematics F : σ→ τ.
Thus F : (o → o) → o is a functional taking an arithmetical function as an argument
and gives a natural number. The question now is of course: Which objects inhabit T?
The language of T is multi-sorted, meaning that each symbol is assigned a certain
type. It includes a symbol for the number zero, 0 : o and a symbol for the successor
function S : o → o.29 T has axioms concerning these objects stating for instance that
0 : o is the first number and that S : o → o is injective. T also has the standard axioms
from propositional logic, but in order to do, among other things, primitive recursive
arithmetic it has combinators k, s and recursor R. The axioms concerning these are30




One can think of the equations as reduction rules: The terms on the left ‘reduce’ to
the terms on the right, thus defining rules for calculations. As such it is seen that the
prescribed operations are step-by-step calculable.
By using projector k and combinator s one can introduce the λ-operator as a
defined notion. The operator behaves in the following way: if λx.t[x] is a term of type
σ → τ and s is a term of type σ then (λx.t[x])s = t[s] where t[s] is of type τ. With the
29The intended meaning of S : o → o is of course the mathematical function f : N → N defined by
n 7→ n+1.
30With respect to terms, parentheses are associated to the left; thus t1t2 . . .tn is short for
(. . .((t1t2)t3) . . .tn).
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lambda-notation it is simple to define basic arithmetical operations as for instance +
which is of type o → (o → o). A definition of +xy, or in more usual notation x + y,
can be given by Rx(λw,u.Sw)y.
As I have already discussed a version of the Ackermann function is found in
Hilbert’s classical article Hilbert (1926). The Ackermann function, as introduced on
page 108, is the number theoretic function ϕ defined as n 7→ ϕn(n,n). The function is
not primitive recursive, but as argued above it is computable. It is definable in system
T by recursion with function parameters. Let the iteration function be
I :≡ λ f ,x,y.Ry(λu,v. f v)x.
Then the Ackermann function is definable by
ϕ :≡ λx.R(Sx)(λx,ψ,y.Iψyy)x.
Let me give some reasons why functionals of T should be considered as schemati-
sable. For sure, one can define fairly complicated functionals in T. But the more com-
plicated functionals are always defined inductively by a chain of definitions where
each step defines a new functional in terms of previously defined ones. Now, the
single steps describe simple calculations. However, given a concrete well-formed
closed term we cannot directly read of how many calculations we have to perform
before the overall calculation is done.31. However, we are given inductive rules in
order to do the computation—but at the beginning, however, we just do not know
how many computations we will have to perform.
Therefore, when we define new procedures (or functionals) out of previously de-
fined ones by the schemes we get a calculable functional, since the equations defining
k, s and R prescribe constructive operations. Epistemologically, I consider it as a gen-
eral human ability to carry out such inductive operations and consequently, I find it
justified to consider Gödel’s functionals as schematisable—at least in the intensional
sense.
6.6.2 Reductions
Given we have accepted T as constructively unproblematic the next task is to con-
sider elements which are ideal elements, at least on the face of it. These elements
can perhaps be given an interpretation relative to T. Let us analyze the following
principles:
1. Extensionality of functionals.
31By (non-constructive) mathematical reasoning we can, of course, give bounds for any such term
6.6 The relativised a priori 127







3. Independence-of-premise (for certain classes of formulae). If A → ∃yB(y) holds













I have already discussed some of the problems which seem to be connected with
extensional notions of recursive functions. To see why, say, 3 is not immediately
schematisable let the following be noted. The constructive reading (which is the
BHK-interpretation) of A → ∃yB(y) is that given a proof of A we can construct an
object t and a proof of the fact that t has property B, i.e. B(t). The principle says that




. But the constructive reading
of the conclusion is that we can construct an object t such that given any proof of A
we can prove t to have property B. Thus the principle says that t can be constructed
independently of the proof of A, and this is not constructively evident given A →
∃yB(y).
One of our main purposes here is to sketch an analysis of 1–3 in order to pro-
vide coherent and consistent systems that partly contain these prima facie non-
constructive/non-finitary principles. Systems that nevertheless can be seen as con-
structively meaningful, in the sense that some of the principles are completely
schematisable/realizable. A system is constructively meaningful when it has sev-
eral important properties, say the existence property, in a crucial way. In the case
at hand this means, for instance, that when an existential statement is proved in one
of the theories then there is a number or a function from Gödel’s system T actually
realizing the existential quantifier. And this realizer can be found given any proof of
the statement. Thus existence in the disputed theories is shown to be based on objects
coming from T which we take to be constructive.
The general idea is that given the conceptual acceptance of a certain system,
what can (or maybe should) we then accept on the basis of this; in other words,
Given the acceptance of some system S0 (which in our case is T), if S1 reduces to (is
interpretable in) S0, then we also accept S1.
The concept of reduction or interpretation that we work with here is the follow-
ing:
S1 reduces to S0, in symbols S1  S0 if
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(i ) S1 has the existence property and the disjunction property.32
(ii) The terms realizing (i) live in S0.
If we accept S0 and have S1  S0 then we consequently accept S1 on the basis
of S0, since S1 has various nice properties and the realizers which make this possible
come from S0, found to be constructively unproblematic.
6.6.3 Specific Reductions
We will now take a look at some specific ideal elements. First extensionality. In
any of the following formal theories we have equality only between objects of the
lowest type—that is, equality between numbers. Functions and functionals are equal
if they are equal on equal arguments. Equality in higher types is thus defined in terms
of lower types and is therefore extensional. As the types can be fairly complicated
it is not obvious that functionals respect this defined notion of equality. However,
we can introduce axioms which claim all functionals to respect it. Let σ be type
σ1 → (· · · → (σn → o) . . . ). Then z of type σ is extensional, i.e. respects equality iff
∀xσ11 ,y
σ1








xi = yi → zx = zy
)
where x denotes x1, . . . ,xn. Claiming full extensionality is to claim that all functionals
of the theory are extensional. However, it turns out that we cannot always interpret
full extensionality. In certain situations we can interpret only weak extensionality.
This is not introduced by axioms but rather as a rule which within natural deduction





where ∆ consists only of quantifier free formulae, and s, t and r[x] are terms.33
In the following there will be two different theories on top of which we will put
ideal principles. They are two different versions of of intuitionistic number theory
32A theory S is said to have the existence property in case the following rule holds: S ` ∃xA(x) ⇒
S ` A(t) for some term t. Likewise, S has the disjunction property if we have that for any provable
closed formula A∨B there is a term deciding whether A or B holds.
33Full extensionality could also be formulated as a rule instead of using axioms. Then it has the same
form as weak extensionality, just without any restrictions on the assumptions.
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generalized to finite types; one will have full extensionality, E-HAω, and the other
one will only have weak extensionality, WE-HAω.34 Different elements which are
generally non-constructive will then be added to these theories. First of all, two
different versions of the principle of independence-of-premise. The principle in its
general form was defined on page 127. Here we will work with the case where
the formula A does not contain any existential quantifier, nor any disjunction—this
will be denoted IP. As it turns out, this principle is constructively in conflict with
Markov’s principle. Thus, we will have to consider a more restricted version, namely
the case where the formula A is purely universal. This principle will be denoted IP∀.
Markov’s principle is found on page 127. However, in our case the formulae which
are decidable are the quantifier free formulae. Consequently, the form of Markov’s
principle (MP) which we will look at is
¬¬∃xAqf(x) →∃xAqf(x),
where Aqf is quantifier free.
Finally, the axiom of choice, denoted AC, is also added.
Let Γ be any arbitrary but fixed set of true existence and disjunction free sentences
and likewise, let Γ∀ be any arbitrary but fixed set of true purely universal sentences.
Then we define the following theories:
T1 := E-HAω + IP + AC + Γ
T2 := WE-HAω + IP∀ + MP + AC + Γ∀
By modified realizability as defined by G. Kreisel (1962) T1 is interpretable in
Gödel’s system T, that is T1  T. On the other hand we have that Gödel’s func-
tional interpretation Gödel (1958) interprets T2 in T and so we have both T1  T
and T2  T. Therefore we accept both T1 and T2 as truly constructive theories.35 A
crucial point here, which I will return to, is that these two theories are constructively
incompatible.
An objection against this way of getting confidence in complex theories is found
by asking: How do we know that the realizers actually do what is required? If we
look at the details of the reductions then we see that this fact is actually proved us-
ing the exact principles in question. Using only basic mathematical reasoning we
know for instance that if T1 ` ∃xC(x), for any formula C then there exists a term in
T which we can find such that T1 ` C(t). The thing is that we really need the full
theory T1 in order to prove that t has property C. However, I do not find this prob-
lematic. The whole thing is, first of all, computationally meaningful, and the proper-
ties that the theories possess are certainly not enjoyed by theories based on classical
34See (Jørgensen; 2001) for full definitions of these theories.
35Note, however, that T1 is not closed under Markov’s rule as shown in (Jørgensen; 2001).
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logic. But one could still argue that the theories incorporate principles which are non-
intuitionistic and one may therefore be skeptical towards the theories. Now, such an
attitude is dogmatic: Why should precisely intuitionistic logic monopolize construc-
tivity? The interpretations referred to here show that the respective principles are
locally schematisable—not that, say, Markov’s principle generally is schematisable.
But it is schematisable relative to typed arithmetic with weak extensionality together
with a restricted form of the independence-of-premise and the axiom of choice, in the
sense that there is always a primitive recursive functional making the principle true.
Note that Markov’s principle is not only validated for numbers (type o) but is also
validated in higher types. It is easy to attach some understanding to the principle for
numbers, but this is surely not straight forward in higher types.
The really interesting thing is that many of these principles are in several combi-
nations constructively problematic. As I have shown in (Jørgensen; 2001) the combi-
nation of IP and MP is demonstratively non-constructive (relative to arithmetic) and
also full extensionality together with MP is likewise problematic; also when MP is
restricted to the much weaker rule:
(MRσ) T ` ¬¬∃xσA(x) ⇒ T ` ¬¬∃xσA(x).
In (Jørgensen; 2001, 76) the following theorem was proved:
Theorem. There is a quantifier free formula Aqf(x0) of L(E-HAω) such that
E-HAω ` ¬¬∃x0Aqf(x), but E-HAω + IPωef +AC 6` ∃x0Aqf(x).
It follows from this theorem, using mainly Spector’s result (1962), that:
• E-HAω ± IPωef ±AC are not closed under MR0.
• E-HAω + MR0 ± IPωef ±AC have not the existence property. The realizers are
not even bar-recursive.
• E-PAω proves totality of a type 3 functional, which cannot be proved total in
WE-PAω +QF-AC.36
But in case one wants to work with Markov’s principle and an extensional notion of
equality, then one will have to work with weak extensionality only.
36PAω is HAω with classical logic.
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6.7 Conclusions on the relativised a priori
There are several conclusions to draw from these investigations. It should be clear
that there is no unique global characterization of the a priori. We see that in cer-
tain contexts Markov’s principle is schematisable, but in others—where we have
full extensionality—it is not. Likewise versions of the principle of independence
of premise is realized by primitive recursive functionals. But also here one has to
be careful with respect to the context. It is indeed a very subtle issue to combine
the different principles which treated separately can be given an schematic interpre-
tation. One can obtain constructive methodologies in various different ways which
are not in harmony with one and each other, since the constructivity of mathematical
methods depends (also) on the context in which the methods are applied. Thus the
formation of concepts which are schematisable depends crucially on the collection
of ideal elements. Interests of reason (also) determines the more constitutive parts.
Markov’s principle is, for instance, very useful—but maybe it is not such a good idea
always to have it in your tool box, as their can be problems at hand which are solved




Based on Kant’s notion of schematism I have presented in this thesis first of all a rein-
terpretation of Kant’s theory of knowledge. This interpretation is centered around a
developed and detailed theory of schematism. As it turned out, notions like concept,
schema and object found their modern formulations in type, computable procedure
and token; respectively. The theory provides a foundation for an understanding of the
use of constructive categories and ideas and provides, furthermore, a characterization
of the notion of object. Essential for the whole theory is that schematism partially
explains how concepts and objects are related. The upshot of the theory is, that it
is basically the same type of theory which applies both to the empirical and to the
mathematical. This can be done due to a substantial generalization and relativization
of Kant’s theory. I provided arguments showing that Kant’s deductions of the unique-
ness of both intuition and categories of the understanding cannot be expected to carry
definite results.
I the last chapter, my interpretation of Hilbert’s and Bernays’ philosophy of math-
ematics is fused together with the revised Kantian epistemology. I then outlined a phi-
losophy of mathematics where constructive categories are partly determined by sub-
jective elements of reason. The constructive categories are constitutive in the sense
that they define a part of mathematics where we have—due to schemata—privileged
access to the mathematical objects. This is in contrast to the part of mathematics
where the concepts and principles are only quasi-schematisable.
My future work will consist of two projects. First of all, to provide a deeper and
more detailed analysis of how e.g., equivalence classes are understood as types which
are or can be (quasi-)schematisable within different areas of mathematics. Second of
all, to work out a variety of examples in the hope of getting a closer look at notions
like discovery, explanation and unification within mathematics. My hope is that a
general theory of schematism can provide the foundation for this work.
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